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MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - P. 1
G:\S<:hmocl1el\Pleadings\M!L\Response Memo to MIL- BVF.doc

COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, David E. Comstock
and Byron V. Foster, and respectfully submit this Memorandum in Response to
Defen.dants' Motions in Limine. Defendants Byrne, Dille and Southern Idaho Pain Institute
have overlapping arguments in their respective Motions in Limine. For the Court's
convenience, the Plaintiffs address those issues that overlap together and those that don't
separately.

1. Evidence Pertaining to the Williams Case or the Care and Treatment of
Patients other than Mrs. Schmechel Should not be Excluded.
The Defendants seek to exclude from the jury's consideration any evidence pertaining
to a prior case-Le., the Williams case, in which Mr. Byrne prescribed Methadone to a
patient and the patient died as a result. The Defendants assert that such evidence is not
relevant to the present matter. The Plaintiffs argue otherwise. As in the instant case
involving Mrs. Schmechel, Mr. Byrne wrongfully prescribed Methadone to a patient, and
his negligence resulted in the patient's death. Evidence pertaining to the Wifliams case
and Mr. Byrne's previous experience with Methadone will prove that Mr. Byrne was aware
of the .adverse effects of Methadone before treating Mrs. Schmechel. In other words,
evidence relating to the Williams case would have the tendency to demonstrate to the jury
that Mr. Byrne should have foreseen the consequences of prescribing Methadone to Mrs.
Schmechel, based on his past experience in prescribing it and realizing its fatal effects.
Defendant Byrne contends that even if the Court does find that evidence
pertaining to the Williams case is relevant, the probative value of such evidence is
outweighed by its prejudicial value. Again, the Plaintiffs disagree. The purpose of

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - P. 2
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introducing evidence relating to patient Williams would not be to invoke passion in the jury,
nor would it likely have such an effect. Rather, evidence showing that Mr. Byrne
prescribed Methadone to patient Williams, and Williams subsequently died is a fact that
proves Mr. Byrne knew of the adverse effects of Methadone, yet continued to wrongfully
prescri.be it to his patients. The probative value of the fact that Mr. Byrne knew of
Metha.done's potentially fatal effects before treating Mrs. Schmechel certainly outweighs
the minor potential that a jury would be overly impassioned by such a fact.
The Defendants also assert that in introducing evidence of the Williams case the
Plaintiffs would cause confusion of the issues and lengthen the trial. Plaintiffs assert that
any confusion on the issue would not come from the Plaintiffs, but from the Defendants.
The fact is that Mr. Byrne prescribed Methadone to a patient in the past, and that patient
died. Such evidence could be presented to the jury in a matter of minutes. Any rebuttal
evidence on the issue would be solely related to whether it actually happened or not. The
facts that the patient died and that Mr. Byrne was the caregiver that prescribed the
. Methadone is not in dispute, and therefore, the rebuttal evidence would be limited
accordingly. The Plaintiffs do not intend to prove that Mr. Byrne breached the standard of
care in the Williams case. Rather, the Plaintiffs only intend to show that Mr. Byrne has
prior experience with Methadone and knows of its potentially fatal effects.
As argued in Defendant Byrne's Memorandum, evidence of the Williams case
does not prove breach and causation in this case, but it does prove that Mr. Byrne could
have foreseen Methadone's adverse effects on Mrs. Schmechel. Given that forseeability
is an element of the Plaintiffs' case, the Plaintiffs submit that evidence of the Williams case

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - P. 3
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is enti1·ely relevant, and its probative value substantially outweighs any potential for
prejudice.
In addition, should the Court determine that Plaintiffs are not entitled to mention

Wil/iaifls, Plaintiffs should not be prevented from cross examining Defendants based upon
their prior sworn testimony taken in the Williams case. Rule 804(b)(1) allows a party, over
a hearsay objection, to present prior sworn testimony.
2. Statements Made by Mrs. Schmechel do not Constitute Hearsay.

The Defendants argue that statements Mrs. Schmechel made to Mr. Byrne on
September 28 and September 29, 2003, should be excluded from evidence because they
are hearsay. As revealed in deposition testimony from Plaintiffs Robert Lewis, Tamara
Hall and Vaughn Schmechel, Mrs. Schmechel told Mr. Byrne on the phone that she was
experiencing several symptoms that were or may have been related to a reaction she was
having to the medications that Mr. Byrne prescribed her.
The principle of the Rule on hearsay is to exclude out of court statements that are
offered for the truth of the matter asserted. In this case, the Plaintiffs intend to introduce
the evidence to demonstrate two things. First, that the phone calls took place, and
second, to reveal that Mr. Byrne was aware of Mrs. Schmechel's symptoms preceding her
death, yet did nothing to relieve the symptoms or prevent her death. The Idaho Court of
Appeais has held that if an out-of-court statement is relevant for reasons other than what
the declarant was intending to communicate, the statement is not hearsay for that purpose.

State v. Nichols, 124 Idaho 651,657 862 P.2d 343,349 (Ct.App. 1993), IRE 801(c). In
proving that the phone calls took place, the Plaintiffs are not attempting to prove the truth
of what was said during the conversations, but simply that the conversations took place.

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - P. 4
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Therefore, at the very least, evidence demonstrating that the calls simply took place is
admissible.
In addition, Plaintiffs intend to demonstrate not only that the calls took place, but
that Mrs. Schmechel made Mr. Byrne aware of the specific symptoms she was
experiencing preceding her death. IRE 803(4) allows use of hearsay statements made "for
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or
present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the source thereof insofar as reasonably
pertine'nt to diagnosis or treatment." "The rule is premised on the assumption that such
statements are generally trustworthy because the declarant is motivated by a desire to
receive proper medical treatment and will therefore be truthful in giving pertinent
information to the physician." State v. Nelson, 131 Idaho 210, 216 953 P.2d 650, 656
(Ct.App. 1998) (Citing, State v. Kay, 129 ldaho 507, 518, 927 P.2d 897,908
(Ct.App.1996). The motive to speak the truth to a physician in order to advance a selfinterest in obtaining proper medical care for the declarant or another is generally assumed.
State v. Kay, 129 Idaho at 518, 927 P.2d at 908.

The Court in State v. Kay recognized that the proponent of introducing the out of
court statements must show: (1) that the statements were "made for purposes of medical
diagn~sis or treatment"; (2) that the statements described "medical history, or past or
preselit symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the source thereof"; and (3) that the statements
were ''reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." Id. The record in this case, and
testimony presented at trial will certainly reflect that Mrs. Schmechel's statements were
made for purposes of diagnosis or treatment. Indeed, the unfortunate fact that Mrs.
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Schmechel died within days of her phone conversations with Mr. Byrne indicates that Mrs.
Schmechel was experiencing symptoms that she wanted her physician to be aware of.
The basic justification for the state of mind exception in Rule 803(3) and the
medical diagnosis exception found in Rule 803(4) is the reliability of the hearsay statement
when made under circumstances in which it is free of suspicion. Further, the exceptions
recognize that there is a special need for the evidence because of the difficulty of proving a
person's state of mind or physical disposition at the time the statements were made. See,
Nielsen v. Nielsen, 93 Idaho 419 462 P.2d 512 (1969). While there are no cases in Idaho

addressing whether someone other than the care-giver can testify as to the out-of-court
statements made for purposes of a medical diagnosis, the plain language of Rule 803(4)
does not preclude it. The rule simply states that "statements made for purposes of a
medical diagnosis" are admissible hearsay statements. The rule does not require the
caregiver to testify as to what the statements were, it just requires that the statements be
made for purposes of a medical diagnosis.
In addition, other neighboring courts have held that "statements made for a
medical diagnosis" are admissible, regardless of who is testifying. State ex rel. Juvenile
Dept. of Multnomah County v. Pfaff, 164 Oregon 470, 994 P.2d 147 (Or. App. 1999). The

Oregon Court of Appeals went as far as to hold that statements need not be made to a
physician. Id. Rather, "[s]tatements to hospital attendants, ambulance drivers or even
members of the family or friends may be within the scope of the exception." Id. Citing,
Legislative Commentary to Rule 803(4), reprinted in Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence at 522.
See also, State ex rel. Juv. Dept. v. Cornett, 121 Or.App. 264,270,855 P.2d 171 (1993),
rev. dismissed 318 Or. 323, 865 P.2d 1295 (1994) (rejecting argument that "OEC 803(4)
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does not apply, because the person hearing the statements did not have a medical
degree.") Accordingly, the issue is not whether the care-giver who heard the statements
posse\>ses certain credentials but rather whether the statements meet the requirements of
Rule 803(4). Therefore, under this framework, Plaintiffs are entitled to introduce
statements Mrs. Schmechel's made to Mr. Byrne in the days preceding her death.
Plaintiffs concede that certain family members only heard Mrs. Schmechel's side
of the conversation. Contrary to what the Defendants argue, this fact, when applied to
Rule 602, does not necessarily preclude the Plaintiffs from testifying as to the
conversation. The Defendants argue that the conversations are inadmissible pursuant to
Rule 602 because the Plaintiffs lack personal knowledge to identify Mr. Byrne as the caller.
Plaintiffs submit that Rule 602 is not as restricting as the Defendants represent. The Rule
provides:
"A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient
to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.
Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the
testimony of the witness ... "
Accordingly, the Rule simply requires that the witness have personal knowledge
of the matter, and such personal knowledge can be shown via the witness's own
testimony. The family was certainly aware of Mrs. Schmechel's physical condition and that
she was being treated for pain medication. The family knew that Mrs. Schmechel was
being treated by Mr. Byrne. The family was aware that Mrs. Schmechel was experiencing
symptoms related to her medication. Finally, the family was aware that Mrs. Schmechel
felt a ~eed to relate those symptoms to her caregiver, Mr. Byrne. Moreover, Plaintiffs will
show that Mr. Lewis had a custom of checking the caller ID at the home to discern who a
caller is upon receiving the phone call. Such intimate knowledge of their mother's life and
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - P. 7
G:\Schmechel\P!oadings\Mll\Response Memo to Mll· BVF.doc

medical status demonstrates that the family had the requisite personal knowledge to testify
on the matter. Notwithstanding such personal knowledge, the alleged incompetence of a
witness to testify at trial does not necessarily render out-of-court statements by the witness
incompetent, if they are otherwise admissible hearsay. State v. Wright, 116 Idaho 382,
775 P.2d 1224 (1989).
The Plaintiffs also contend that Mrs. Schmechel's conversation with Mr. Byrne is
admissible under IRE 803(24). To be admissible under I.R.E. 803(24), the Court must
determine that ( 1) the statement has circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
equivalent to those in Rules 803(1) to 803(23), (2) the statement is offered as evidence of
a material fact, (3) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts, and (4)
· the general purposes of the rules of evidence, and the interests of justice, will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence. State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 697
760 P:Zd 27, 36 (1988). The evidence in this case, as reflected in the present record and
as will be produced at trial, demonstrates that there are circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness surrounding the phone conversations Mrs. Schmechel had with Mr. Byrne.
With no motivation to fabricate the information she related to Mr. Byrne and the testimony
of her family that Mrs. Schrnechel in fact had the conversation and made the statements
she did to Mr. Byrne, the purposes of the rules of evidence and interests of justice favor
the admissibility of such evidence.

3. Dr. Vorse's Testimony should not be limited to her Care and Treatment of
Mrs. Schmechel.
The Defendants argue that Dr. Vorse should be prevented from offering any
testimony regarding her standard of care opinions. The Plaintiffs do not intend to try to
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - P. 8
G:\Schmeche!\Pleadlngs\Mll\Responso Memo to MIL- BVF,doc

218

introdu_ce any opinion Dr. Vorse has on the standard of care in this matter. However, the
Plaintiffs do intend to offer the testimony of Dr. Lipman, who had a conversation with Dr.
Vorse in July of 2005, in which the standard of care was discussed. The conversation
provides one of the foundations for Dr. Lipman's knowledge of the local community
standard of care. Such a conversation does not constitute hearsay, as the Defendants
contend, because the information related was made for the purpose of familiarizing Dr.
Lipman with the local standard of care.

Furthermore, Idaho Code§ 6-1012, 6-1013 and

the Court of Appeals in Keyser v. Garner hold that there is no requirement that the
information an expert gains to qualify the expert on the local standard of care is somehow
inadmissible. 129 Idaho 112, 116-117 922 P.2d 409 413-314 (Ct. App. 1996). The
Plaintiffs must be able to establish a foundation that Dr. Lipman is qualified to testify as an
expert, and in laying such a foundation, the Plaintiffs will demonstrate that one of the ways
he gained such qualifications was via his conversation with Dr. Vorse. The Plaintiffs will
question Dr. Vorse in accordance with what is reflected in her deposition testimony and
medical records she documented while treating Mrs. Schmechel.

4. Evidence Regarding Lost Income for Mrs. Schmechel is not Speculative
and Should be Admissible.
The Defendants argue that any evidence pertaining to Mrs. Schmechel's loss of
income is speculative and should not be admissible because Mrs. Schmechel was not
actually earning a wage, per se, for her work. However, Defendants fail to take into
consideration the value attributable to Mrs. Schmechel's work when another independent
contractor either must fill in for the work that she used to perform for the company or Mr.
Schmechel must do it himself. As is often the case with family run businesses, family
members supply the labor to keep costs down for the betterment of the company.
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - P. 9
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Additionally, the Defendants misapply Moeller v. Harshbarger. That case stands
for the rule that when precise amounts of lost income cannot be determined, evidence that
would speculate as to what that amount might be is inadmissible. 118 Idaho 92, 93 794
P .2d 1148 (Ct. App. 1990). The trial court in Moeller held that while the plaintiff did lose
some wages because of the accident in which the plaintiff was involved , because the
plaintiff did not have a past work record that would enable the court to find, with
reasonable certainty, that he lost any particular amount, the court could not award lost
wages based on speculation. The Court of Appeals determined that damages for lost
earnings must be shown with reasonable certainty; compensatory awards based upon
speculation and conjecture will not be allowed. Id. Citing, Patino v. Greg and Anderson
Farms, 97 Idaho 251, 542 P.2d 1170 (1975). In this case, the value of Mrs. Schmechel's

work is ascertainable and Plaintiffs' expert economist will so testify. That monetary loss is
not based on speculation or conjecture, it is a determinable fact.
Moreover, it is important to note that Idaho Courts allow for plaintiffs to recover the
value of future lost household services. Sheets

v.

Agro-West, Inc. 104 Idaho 880, 664 P.2d

787 (1983). In Sheets, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed a jury's award of $50,000 in
household services to plaintiffs in a personal injury action. Thus, in so far as the family unit
is concerned, there is a monetary return from the services of a housewife which results in
a savi1ig of the family income that could have otherwise been .used to hire a maid or
caregiver. The current record, and evidence to be presented at trial reflect that Mrs.
Schmechel performed household duties and activities. Idaho Courts recognize a value for
such duties and activities, and evidence pertaining to their value is admissible. Sanchez v.
Galey, 112 Idaho 609,733 P.2d 1234 (1986). Additionally, there is no set standard for
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measuring the value of human health or happiness. Swanson v. U.S. By and Through
Veterans Administration, 557 F.Supp. 1041 (D.C.ldaho 1983).

With respect to Mrs. Schmechel's Social Security Disability income, the
Defendants assert that because Mrs. Schmechel was receiving that income because she
was prevented from working due to her disability, she was not employed and not receiving
an income. The Defendants are correct. Mrs. Schmechel was receiving a Social Security
Disability Income because she injured her back, and the injury prevented her from working
in her previous job, and in any "gainful employment recognized in the national economy."
Given Mrs. Schmechel's disability, it would have been very difficult for her to obtain any
sort of "gainful employment." Therefore, she helped as much as possible with the family
business in order to save on the business's costs. While Mrs. Schmechel's ability to do
only limited tasks at the family business would not be appreciated in the "national
economy" the work that she did perform for the business does maintain an economic value
and should be recognized.
In addition, it would be senseless to retroactively try to make a determination on
whether Mrs. Schmechel should have been receiving the benefits or not. The point is that
there is an ascertainable value to what Mrs. Schmechel did for the family business. The
activities which Mrs. Schmechel performed are activities in which a business would
normally have to pay an employee to do. Furthermore, Idaho law recognizes a value for
household services, and the Plaintiffs should not be precluded from presenting evidence
related to such value.
While the Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs should also be precluded from
introducing evidence relating to Mrs. Schmechel's contributions to the family business,
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pursuant to the collateral source rule in Idaho Code § 6-1606, the other family members
who provided services to the family business cannot be considered a "collateral source" of
"amounts received" because Mrs. Schmechel performed her own tasks for the business.
Such tasks were entirely separate than those done by her children, and thus, constitute a
separate form of income for the business and the Schmechel family.
5. Plaintiffs do not Intend to Introduce Autopsy Photographs at Trial

Plaintiffs agree with the Defendants that the probative value of Mrs. Schmechel's
autopsy photographs or photographs taken after her death is out-weighed by their
substantial likelihood to inflame or invoke the passions of the jury. Accordingly, the
Plaintiffs will

not seek their introduction at trial.

6. Evidence Pertaining to a Lack of Informed Consent

The Defendants' argue that the Plaintiffs should be precluded from introducing
evidence that Mr. Byrne did not obtain, or did not properly obtain Mrs. Schmechel's
informed consent when he treated her because the Plaintiffs did not so plead in their
Complaint. However, a Motion in Limine is not the appropriate vehicle to attack the
pleadings. If the Defendants wanted to assert such a defense, they should have done so
in a motion for summary judgment. Nonetheless, in so far as the Defendants' Motion in
Limine seeks clarification

on the issue of lack of informed consent, the

Plaintiffs are not

pursuiilg a cause of action for lack of informed consent. However this should not preclude
Plaintiffs from pursuing testimony regarding the sufficiency of the instructions given to Mrs.
Schmechel by Defendant Byrne concerning the dosages, frequency and amounts of
Methadone and Hyrdocodone prescribed by Byrne on September 26, 2003. Such
evidence constitutes aspects pertaining to Defendant Byrne's violations of the applicable

MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO THE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE - P. 12
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standard of care. In addition, in light of Defendant Dille's denial of a physician/patient
relationship with Mrs. Schmechel, Plaintiffs should be entitled to assume that Mrs.
Schmechel had the right to an explanation, from a medical doctor, of her treatment plan
and how that plan was to be implemented and pursued as well as the risks and benefits of
such a plan.
7. Deposition Testimony During Opening Statements
The Plaintiffs do not intend to use excerpts from depositions in their opening
statements. However, the Plaintiffs will, as they are entitled to, comment on evidence in
this case and provide the jury with the basic framework of the Plaintiffs' case. Such
comments may include references to depositions. The Idaho Supreme Court held that
while counsel should be allowed latitude in making an opening statement, generally,
opening remarks should be confined to a brief summary of evidence counsel expects to
introduce on behalf of his clients case in chief. State v. Griffith, 97 Idaho 52, 539 P.2d 604
(1975). Accordingly, the Plaintiffs are entitled to comment on the evidence, including
depositions that they intend to present at trial.
8. Non-disclosed Physicians
The Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs should be precluded from introducing
testimony from experts who were used to qualify the testifying experts on the local
standard of care. However, the Plaintiffs only intend to introduce such testimony to show
that th'e testifying experts have been adequately familiarized with the local standard of
care. The Plaintiffs do not seek to introduce the testimony of those who qualified the
testifying experts to prove that the standard of care was breached. Rather, the Plaintiffs
simply intend to show that that the testifying experts know what the standard of care is.
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Furthermore, the Defendants should not be able to have it both ways. If the
Defenr.Jants do not want the qualifying experts to testify, then any of the qualifying experts
who believed that Mr. Byrne and/or Dr. Dille did not breach the standard of care should
also not be able to testify.
As explained above, Plaintiffs are entitled to lay the proper foundation to qualify
their experts. In so doing, the Plaintiffs will present testimony from their disclosed experts
that said experts became familiar with the local standard of care through conversations
with Idaho care-givers. Thus, Plaintiffs will limit evidence or testimony from non-disclosed
experts according to the requirements of Idaho Code § 6-1012, 6-1013 and Keyser v.

Gamer, 129 Idaho 112, 922 P.2d 409 (Ct. App. 1996).
9. Testimony Relating Criticisms or Concerns Regarding Care and
Treatment that do not Constitute Breaches of the Standard of Care is
Relevant.
The Defendants argue that testimony pertaining to criticisms of Mrs. Schmechel's
caregivers that do constitute breaches of the standard of care ("Criticisms") should not be
admissible because they are irrelevant.

Such Criticisms are, however, relevant to the

Plaintiffs' case. In medical malpractice actions, it is often the case that some caregivers
will have differing opinions as to what the standard of care for a particular patient or case
is.

One caregiver testifies that the standard of care was breached, while another caregiver

with similar expertise will testify that nothing was done wrong. Accordingly, the line that
divides whether a breach of the standard of care has occurred is quite often blurred. In
that respect, testimony that reflects criticisms of a caregiver becomes entirely relevant as it
contributes to the Plaintiffs theory that even if one particular caregiver did not believe the
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standard of care was breached, said caregiver does believe that the blurry line was
approached.
Having determined that the Criticisms are relevant, the Plaintiffs also contend that
such Criticisms would not unfairly prejudice the Defendants or mislead the jury. Plaintiffs
are entitled to present their case to the jury, and by presenting testimony of caregivers that
are critical of Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dilles' care, the jury would be equipped to consider all the
evidence relating to the care Mrs. Schmechel received, and draw their own conclusions as
to whether the Criticisms contribute

to whether or not the standard

of care was breached.

10. Criminal History of the Plaintiffs Should be Excluded.
The Defendants argue that the criminal history of the Plaintiffs should be
admissible. As addressed in the Plaintiffs Motion in Limine and Memorandum in Support,
the Plaintiffs assert that such evidence is not relevant. With respect to the Defendants'
argument that two of Plaintiffs' past criminal histories bear on their credibility, such an
assertion might be accurate if they were still using illicit drugs. However, both Mr. Lewis
and Ms. Howard have completed their sentences, have "paid their debt to society," have
rehabilitated themselves and are now responsible members of the community. Their lives
have changed for the better and to now take the position that their credibility is suspect in
light of their past actions would serve to perpetuate a stereotype of the "ex-con" that does
not apply to these two Plaintiffs. If someone has been in trouble with the law and
subsequently evidenced rehabilitation from those former habits, there is no longer any
valid reason to believe their veracity or their credibility is not equal to other members of the
community. In addition, there is doubt as to whether convictions for drug offenses impact
an individual's capacity for speaking truthfully and accurately. The use of illicit drugs may
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certainly change a person's character but to find that once the person is no longer using
drugs, those character changes continue to exist ignores the benefit of rehabilitation, which
is the foundation for drug courts and rehabilitation programs world wide.
The Defendants also argue that the Plaintiffs' criminal history is relevant because it
is probative of the nature of the Plaintiffs' relationship with Mrs. Schmechel, and serves as
a defense to the Plaintiffs' loss of consortium claim. However, the criminal histories of both
Kim Howard and Robert Lewis have absolutely no bearing on the relationship they had
with their mother. If anything, their mother provided even more love and support for Kim
and Robert during trying times in their lives. Further, the dates of incarceration were
minimal, and a significant period of time has passed since either Kim or Robert have been
charged with even a minor traffic violation, much less a felony.

In fact, Robert has been

the successful owner of an antique shop and a roofing business and has been
disassociated from drugs and criminal thinking for over seven years. Clearly, the criminal
records of Kim and Robert are so far attenuated from the relationship they enjoyed with
their mother that any mention of such criminal history should be excluded.

l-l~

DATED this _J_ day of October, 2007.
COMSTOCK & BUSH

Taylor ossman, of the Firm
Attorne s for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

~

I hereby certify that on the
~ y of October, 2007, I served a true and correct
.copy of the above and foregoing iri'stument, by method indicated below, upon:
Steven J. Hippler
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP
601 W. Bannock St
PO Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720
Attorneys for Clinton Di/Je, M. D. and

D
D

[6

U.S. Mail·
Hand Delivery
Facsimile (208) 388-1300

Southern Idaho Pain Institute

Richard E. Hall
Keely E. Duke
HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, PA
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
PO Box 1271
Boise ID 83701

D

B,

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile (208) 395-8585

Attorneys for Thomas Byrne, PA

~~
Taylrfvfossman
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Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J. Byme
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FIFT.E-:1 JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR IBE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

VAOGBN: SCHMECHEL, individually,
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal
Representa,ive of the Estate of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P.
. LEWIS,KIMHOWARD and TAMARA
HALL natural children of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased,

CaseNo. CV-05-4345

DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNJVS
SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE OF
EXPERT WI'l'NESSES

Plaintiffs,
vs.

CLINTON .DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A. and
JOHN DOE, I through X,

Defendants.

COMES NOW defendant, Thomas J. Byrne, P.A., by and through his counsel ofrecord,
Hall, Farley, Oberrecbt & Blanton, P.A., and makes the following supplemental disclosures pursuant
DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE'S SUPPLEMENTAL D!SCLOSURE OF EXPERT WITNESSES - 1

to Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure related to experts who may be called to testify
at trial:

DISC£OSURES

Without waiving such objections, and subject to such reservations as asset forth in Mr.

Byrne's original Disclosure of Expert Witnesses, Mr. Byrne makes the following supplemental
disclosures:
1.

Chris J. Kottenstette, PA·C
8405 E. Hampden Ave., Apt. 23-C
Denver, CO 80231
(970) 215-0903

Substmce of Facts:

In additional to the those items previously identified in Mr. Byrne's original Disclosure of
Expert Witnesses, Mr. Kottenstette has reviewed the following items:
Depositions:
a)

Dr. Groben;

b) Shaiyenne Anton;

c) Dr. Lorden;

d) Dr. Lipman;
e) Mr. Keller;
f) Dr. Verst;

g) Dr. Vorse;
h) Dennis Chambers

i) Dr. Harris; and
j) Kent Jensen.
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Medical Records:
a) Medical records of decedents' care providers.
Pleadings:
a) Plaintiffs' Supplemental Expert Disclosures.

Miscellaneous:

a) Slides produced by Dr. Lipman; and
b) Inventory of medications and pill counts prepared by cotmsel after
inspection of materials at Coroner's office.

Mr. Kottenstette has not testified as a retained expert within the previous four years. He did
provide trial testimony in February, 20D7, as a trea1fag medical provider in a criminal matter set in

Los Angeles.
2.

Rodde Cox, M.D.
1000 N. Curtis, Suite 202

Boise, ldaho 83706
(209) 377.3435
Substance of Facts:
In additional to the those items previously identified in Mr. Byrne's original lJisclo$ure of
Expert Witnesses, Dr. Cox has reviewed the following items:
Depositions:
a) Dr. Groben;

b) Shaiyenne Anton;
c) Dr. Lordo11;
d) Dr. Lipman;
e) Mr. Keller;
f) Dr. Verst;
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g) Dr. Vorse;

h) Dennis Chambers;
i) Dr. Hanis; and
j) Kent Jensen.

Medical Records:
a) Medical records of decedents' care providers.

Pleadings:
a) Plaintiffs' Supplemental Expert Disclosures.

Miscellaneous:
a) Slides produced by Dr. Lipman; ,md
b) Inventory of medications and pill ceunts prepared by counsel after
inspection of materials at Coroner's office.
3.

Keri L. Fakata, Pharm.D
3838 S. 700 E., Suite 202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

Substance of Facts:

In additional to the those items previously identified in Mr. Byrne's original Disclosure of
Expert Witnesses, Dr. Fakata has reviewed the following items:

Depositions:
a) Dr. Groben;
b) Shaiyenne Anton;

c) Dr. Lordon;
d) Dr. Lipman;
e) Mr. Keller;

f) Dr. Verst;
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g) Dr. Vorse;
h) Dennis Chambers;
i) Dr. Hams; and
j) K,mt Jensen.

Medical Records:
a) Medical recoxds of decedents' care providers.

Pleadings:
a) Plaintiffs' Supplemental Expert Disclosures.
Miscellaneous:
a) Slides produced by ))r. Lipman; and
b) Inventory of medications .md pill counts prepared by counsel after
inspection of materials at Coroner's office.

4.

James Smith, M.D.
Boise Heart Clinic
287 W. Jefferson
Boise, ID 83102

Suk,ject Matter:
Applicable and internal medicine, medical principles, causation, and damages, including

life expectancy.
Substance of Opinions:
It is anticipated that Dr. Smith will testify that, on a more probable than not basis, the likely

cause of Mrs. Schmechel 's death was a cardiac death, likely a fatal dysrhyth.mia. He will testify that
the dysrhythmia was caused by her underlying cardiac and other co-morbid conditions.

In addition to relying on all materials previously identified in Mr. Byrne's original :Oisclosure
of Expert Witnesses related to Dr. Smith, and identified in this supplemental disclosure, Dr. Smith
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relies on the deposition of Dr. Glen Groben, M.D.; Dr. Groben's autopsy report and toxicology
report; the deposition testimony of Shaiyenne Anton and Coroner's records and notes, as well as
those of the Sherriff's office; death scene photographs, and descriptions of the death scene.
Dr. Smith believes the evidence indicates that MrS. Schmechel suffered a fatal cardiac
dysrhythmia while awake sitting up on her couch. He believes that she had a number of underlying
co-morbid conditions which likely contributed to this fatal cardiac death. These would include her
cardiomegaly, high blood pressure, history of smoking, and smoking at the time of death, her
documented obesity, and her significant narrowing of the coronary arteries. In addition, Dr. Smith
will testify that had Mrs. Schmechel not passed away when she did, and if, in fact, her death was
attributable to medications she was taking, rather than her underlying co-morbid condition,
epiderniologic research, and specific findings of co-morbid risk factors, suggest Mrs. Schmechel' s
life expectancy was less than ten years from the time she died. To reach this conclusion, Dr. Smith

relied upon the autopsy report and findings of co-morbid conditions, as well as the documented
history of elevated cholesterol and triglycerides, elevated blood pressure, evidence of the
hypertensive kidney damage, the significant stenosis of the major coronary arteries, and her
obstructive sleep apnea. Other factors include Mrs. Schrnechel' s history of srooking and failure to
discontinue smoking despite repeated warnings and suggestions to do so, her obesity, her chronic use
of narcotics, Bextra, and other medications, as well as other factors identified on autopsy, in
depositions, and the medical records.
Dr. Smith also relies upon various epidemiologic studies identifying risk factors and
likelihood of death, i11ch1ding the Framingham Study and updates, the MRFIT, Multiple Risk Factor
Intervention Study, and his years of clinical practice as a cardiologist, as well as other literature and
studies he is familiar with generally. Such information and experience allow him to identify specific
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risk factors that increased Mrs. Schmechel' s likelihood of an early cardiac death. Her risk was
grealerthan generalized epidemio!ogic studies that take into account only certain factors, and do not
identif-y other factors that were not known until her autopsy.
Dr. Smith also may rely upon the testimony that may be provided at trial by other defense
th

experts, defendants, and others, as well as Basalt's Disposition ofToxJc Drugs in Man. 5 Ed. and
any of the documents identified below:
Substance of Facts:
In additional to the those items previously identified in Mr. Byrne's original Disclosure of
Expert Witnesses, Dr. Smith has reviewed the following items:
Depositions:
a) Dr. Groben;
b) Shaiyenne Anton;
c) Dr. Lordon;

d) Dr. Lipman;
e) Mr. Keller;
f) Dr. Verst;

g) Dr. Vorse;
h) Dennis Chambers;
i) Dr. Harris; and

j) Kent Jensen.

Medical Records:
a) Medical records of decedent$' cate providers.
Pleadings;
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a) Plaintiffs' Supplemental Expert Disclosures.
Miscellaneous:

a) Slides produced by Dr. Lipman;
b) Inventory of medications and pill counts prepared by counsel after
inspection of materials at Coroner's office;
c) Various photographs of the death scene produced;
d) Complete Coroner's file and Ada County Pathologist's file; and

e) Complete Twin Falls County file.
Literature:
a) Framingham Heart Study and Cardiac Risk Assessment Profiles; and

b) MRFIT: Multiple Risk Factor !ntervention Study.
5.

Scott Phillips, M.D., F.A.C.P.
Toxicology Associates
2555 S ))owning Street, Ste. 260
Denver, Colorado 80210

Substance of Facts:
In additional to the those items previously identified in IYir. Byn1e's original Disclosure of
Expert Witnesses, Dr. Phillips has reviewed the following items:
Depositions:
a)

Dr. Oroben;

b) Shaiyenne Anton;
C) Dr. Lordon;

d)

Dr. Lipman;

e) Mr. Keller;

f) Dr. Verst;
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g)

Dr. Vorse;

h) Deruris Chall:lbers;
i) Dr. Harris; and
j) Kent Jensen.

Medical Records;

a) Medical records of decedents' care providers.
Pleadings:
a) Plaintiffs' Supplemental Expert Disclosures.

Miscellaneous:
a) Slides produced by Dr. Lipman; and
b) inventory of medicatiollS and pill counts prepared by counsel after
inspection of materials at Coroner's office.

6.

In addition, defendants reserve the right for their experts to rely upon any journal

articles, medical texts, treatises, abstracts, teaching materials or other medical literature of any kind
or nature referenced or relied upon by plaintiffs' experts, <1-l)y llterature created or edited by plaintiffs'
experts, and any other medical literature ideJltified or produced by plaintiffs.

DATED this

5¾ay of October, 2007.
HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT
&BLANTON,P.A.

By~
Keely E. Duke. Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J. Byrne

/4
D
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 51'-aay of October, 2007, I caused to be served a true copy
of the foregoing DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE'S SUPPLEMENTAL DISCLOSURE OF
EXPERT WITNESSES, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:

_
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
__ Hand Delivered

David Comstock
Law Offices of Comstock & Bush
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 500
P.O. Box2774
Boise, Idaho 83701
Attorney for Plaintifft
Fax No.: (208) 344-7721

:::2::,ernight Mail
=Telecopy

__ U.S. Mall, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_ ,2-vemight Mail
_L1elecopy

Steven J. Hippler
GIVENS PURSLEY
601 W. Bannock ST.
POBox2720
Boise ID 83701-2720

Attorneys for Clinton Dille, MD. and
Southern Idaho Pain Institute

t

Keely E. Duke
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199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste 500
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_
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PO Box 2774
'"--1:>!t.i.
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I\
Boise, Idaho 83701
· ERK___
··
Telephone: (208) 344-7700
__
'
..
_O§~~ijVy
Facsimile:
(208) 344-7721
--OEi"UI Y
ISB #2455
Byron V. Foster
Attorney At Law
199 N, Capitol Blvd., Ste 500
P.O. Box 1584
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-4440
Facsimile: (208) 344-772 i
ISB #: 2760
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually, and
as Surviving Spouse and Personal
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P
LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA
HALL, natural children of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased,

Case No. CV 05-4345

PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH SUPPLEMENTAL
EXPERT WITNESS DISCLOSURES

Plaintiffs,

vs.
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., and
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X,
Defendants.
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COME NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, David E. Comstock,
of Comstock & Bush, and Byron V. Foster, Attorney at Law, and pursuant to the Court's
Scheduling Order and in accordance with I.R.C.P. 26, hereby supplements their list of
expert witnesses to be called at the trial of this case:
Plaintiffs' experts Arthur G. Lipman, Pharm.D., Stephen P. Lorden, M.D., and
Jimmie E. Keller, MPH, PA-C have reviewed the following additional documents,
depositions and medical records of Rosalie Schmechel:

1.

Article: Sleep-Disordered Breathing in Stable Methadone Program Patients:
A Pilot Study;

2.

Article: Sleep-Disordered Breathing Associated with Long-Term Opioid
Therapy;

3.

Article: Control of Breathing During Methadone Addiction;

4.

Article: Methadone Reincarnated: Novel Clinical Applications with Related
Concerns;

5.

Article: Obstructive Sleep Apnea in the Adult Obese Patient: Implications for
Airway Management;

6.

Deposition transcripts of Clinton Dille, M.D., Glen Graben, M.D., Kimberly
Vorse, M.D., and Vaughn Schmechel;

7.

2003 IDAPA Rules and Regulations for Physician's Assistants; and

8.

Delegation of Services Agreement between Thomas J. Byrne, PA and
Clinton Dille, M.D.;

In addition, Dr. Lipman and Mr. Keller have reviewed the deposition transcript of Dr.
Lordon. Dr. Lipman and Dr. Lordon have also reviewed medical records of Kenneth Harris,
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M.D., including:
1.

Office notes dated October 8, 1997, May 1, 2001, May 11, 2001, May 30,

2001, July 12, 2001, May 6, 2002, June 18, 2002, July 2, 2002, July 23,
2002, August 26, 2002, October 2, 2002, December 16, 2002, July 2, 2003,
and August 27, 2003;

2.

Physician center/encounter forms dated May 1, 2001, Fylay6, 2002, June 18,

2002, July 2, 2002, October 2, 2002, December 16, 2002, July 2, 2003, and
August 27, 2003;
3.

The Medicine Shoppe refill authorization requests for Norvasc and Enalapril
Maleate dated September 4, 2003;

4.

Handwritten notes dated October 8, 1997, October 16, 2002 and June 12,

2003;
5.

Phone call note dated June 4, 2002;

6.

Physician Center Well Women Examination-Ages 140-70 years dated
September 25, 2003;

7.

Magic Valley Regional Medlcal Center Department of Diagnostic Imaging
Services request dated October 9, 2003;

8.

Cytology report dated September 25, 2003;

9.

Hematology Cell Count/Differential and Coagulation reports, EKG graphic
report, and chest PA and LAT radiology reports dated December 16, 2002;
and

10.

Idaho Diagnostic Sleep Lab Short Report and Polysomnpgraphy report dated
June 12, 2002.
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Plaintiffs' experts will testify as to their understanding as to the facts of this case
based upon their review of the above-referenced documents, depositions and medical
records.
DATED this _5_ day of October, 2007.

Attorney for Plaintiffs

I

'
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this i; day of October, 2007, l served a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated b~low, upon:
Steven J. Hippler
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP

D

D.,.,

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery

601 W. Bannock St.

[]

Facsimile (208) 388-1300

D

U.S.Man

PO Box2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720

Richard E. Hall
Keely Duke
HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, PA ·
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
PO Box 1271
Boise ID 83701

D

Hand Delivery
[3..- Facsimile (208) 395-8585
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ORIGINAL
David E. Comstock
LAW OFFICES OF COMSTOCK & BUSH
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste 500
PO Box 2774
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 344-7700
Facsimile:
(208) 344-7721
ISB # 2455

2007 OCT -9 AM 10: 53
BY__
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·•1 E-R-;;----·
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Byron V. Foster, ISB #: 2760
Attorney At Law
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste 500
P.O .. Box 1584
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-4440
Facsimile: (208) 344-7721

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually,
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal
Representative of the Estate of
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased,
and ROBERT P LEWIS, KIM HOWARD
and TAMARA HALL, natural children of
ROSALIE SCHMECHEL, deceased,
Plaintiffs,

~CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A.,
and JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I
~roughX,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-05-4345

PRETRIAL MEMORANDUM

Defendants.
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Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, respectfully submit this
memorandum in an effort to offer the Court a summary of the background of the case and
address certain issues likely to come before the Court during trial.

I.

BACKGROUND
Rosalie Schmechel died six days after changing her pain management from
Kimberly Vorse, M.D., at the Sun Valley Pain and Sleep Center, to the Defendants who
dramatically altered her prescription narcotics.

Mrs. Schmechel had a complicated

medical history of chronic low back pain and right leg pain for approximately thirty years.
Her surgeries included two lumbar fusions and bilateral knee arthroscopies. Dr. Vorse was
Mrs. Schmechel's treating physician from October 29, 1996, to September 16, 2003. Dr.
Vorse's diagnosis as of September 16, 2003, was lumbar arachnoiditis, severe obstructive
sleep apnea, worsening left knee osteoarthritis, acute right knee meniscal injury and
repair, periodic limb movement disorder, hypertension and nasal obstruction, for which
surgery was recommended.
Dr. Vorse prescribed Oxycontin twice daily and one tablet at bedtime, along with
Lortab, as needed for pain.

To relieve her increased pain, Dr. Vorse increased Mrs.

Schmechel's Oxycontin dosage. Mrs. Schmechel was and had been on CPAP therapy for
her severe obstructive sleep apnea since July, 2002. Mrs. Schmechel was pleased with
the care provided by Dr. Vorse; however the distance and winter travel were concerns for
her, along with work her husband would miss to drive her to her appointments, so she
decided to try treatment at the Southern Idaho Pain Institute. At the time she discontinued
treatment with Dr. Vorse, Mrs. Schmechel was complaining of worsening low back pain
and bilateral knee pain and had undergone evaluation by Dr. David Verst, who felt
-2
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continued conservative pain management was appropriate.

Mrs. Schmechel had been

under medical care for her pain for a very long time and was a very compliant patient
during her treatment, following Dr. Vorse's directions very carefully, particularly as they
pertained to her pain medications.
Mrs. Schmechel was first seen at Southern Idaho Pain Institute on September 26,
2003. · The typed office note for that date by Thomas Byrne, P.A., signed by Clinton Dille,
M.D., indicates an assessment of (1) Post laminectomy/fusion ongoing back pain with
minimal radicular symptoms, and (2) Pain management. Mr. Byrne's plan was to
discontinue Oxycontin, start methadone at a dosage of 10 mg every 12 hours, and a
titrated dose from 5 mg to maximum of 15 mg over 72 hours, depending on its benefit.
Hydrocodone was increased to 10/500 mg one every four to six hours.

The

corresponding handwritten office note indicates Mrs. Schmechel was to follow up by
telephone for problems.
However, the handwritten instructions which Mr. Byrne gave to Mrs. Schmechel
regarding the titration dose of Methadone indicates something different than his typed
history and physical of that date. While the history and physical indicates she was to start
Methadone at a dosage of 10 mg every 12 hours titrated from 5 mg to a maximum of 15
mg over the next 72 hours, his handwritten instructions indicate she could take one half to
one pill every 12 hours and could increase the dosage to a maximum of one and one half
pills every 12 hours or a total of 30 mg of Methadone, with no instruction regarding the
time period over which this increased dosage could be begun. Therefore, Mrs. Schmechel
could reasonably have believed she could have increased her dosage of Methadone to a
total of 30 mg per day without regard to any 72 hour period.
The next office note indicates a call to Mrs. Schmechel on September 29, 2003 at
-3
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which time she was advised to increase Methadone to 10 mg at bedtime and 1O mg at
daytime, and to follow up sooner if problems. The following office note, dated September
30, 2003, indicates Mrs. Schmechel called in as instructed, and was taking Methadone at a
dosage of 10 mg a.m. and 15 mg p.m. She was advised to titrate the dose on a variable
basis between 10 and 15 mg a.m. and p.m.

The note indicates a minimal amount of

short-acting Hydrocodone for pain control and follow up with Mr. Byrne by phone the
following week. That is the last chart note regarding any treatment for Mrs. Schmechel.
Notably, other than a handwritten chart note dated September 26, 2003, there is no
indication that Dr. Dille or anyone at Southern Idaho Pain Institute paid any notice to Mrs.
Schmechel's severe obstructive sleep apnea, for which she had been treated with CPAP
therapy since July, 2002. It appears there was no effort by Dr. Dille or anyone at Southern
Idaho Pain Institute to familiarize themselves with Mrs. Schmechel's extensive and
complicated medical history or to obtain prior medical records of other providers before
making sweeping changes in her pain management regimen.
There is a dispute between the deposition testimony of Defendant Byrne and
Plaintiffs Robert Lewis, Vaughn Schmechel and Tamara Hall regarding whether or not Mrs.
Schmechel spoke to someone from the Southern Idaho Pain Institute on Saturday and
Sunday, September 27 and 28, 2003. While Mr. Byrne denies such conversations took
place, Mr. Lewis has testified that he overheard his mother, Mrs. Schmechel, speaking
with someone from Southern Idaho Pain Institute and indicating that she was suffering
nausea, upset stomach and lower extremity swelling and pain.

There is no chart note

indicating either telephone call in the records of Southern Idaho Pain Institute.
On October 2, 2003, Rosalie Schmechel was pronounced dead from acute
combined poisoning with Methadone and Hydrocodone, according to the Twin Falls
•4
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County Coroner's office.
II.
ELEMENTS OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE

This is a medical malpractice/wrongful death case.

Plaintiffs allege the medical

negligence of Defendants Byrne, Dillie and Southern Idaho Pain Institute all causally
contributed to the wrongful death of Mrs. Schmechel and to the loss of love and
consortium of her family members. Plaintiffs accordingly have the burden of proving that
each of these medical providers violated the applicable standard of care; various statues
and regulations and are medically negligent and/or negligent per se.

Ill.
THE INDETERMINABLE ST AND ARD OF CARE

Idaho Code§ 6-1012 mandates that a plaintiff in a medical negligence action must
come forward with expert testimony establishing a violation, by the defendant, of the
applicable standard of health care practice. The Statute reads, in pertinent part:
" ... (p)laintiff must, as an essential part of his or her case in
chief, affirmatively prove by direct expert testimony and by a
preponderance of all the competent evidence, that such
defendant then and there negligently failed to meet the
applicable standard of health care practice of the community in
which such care was or allegedly should have been provided,
as such standard existed at the time and place of the alleged
negligence ... and as such standard then and there existed with
respect to the class of health care provider that such defendant
then and there belonged to and in which capacity he, she or it
was functioning. Such individual providers of health care shall
be judged in comparison with similarly trained and qualified
providers of the same class in the same community, taking into
account his or her training, experience, and fields of
specialization, if any. If there be no other like provider in the
community and the standard of practice is therefore
indeterminable evidence of such standard in similar Idaho
communities at said time may be considered. As used in this
act, the term "community" refers to that geographical area
•5
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ordinarily served by the licensed general hospital at or nearest
to which such care was or allegedly should have been
provided." (Emphasis added).
The manner and method for qualifying an out-of-area expert for rendering testimony
against an Idaho health care provide has been the subject of many Idaho appellate court
decisions. Perhaps one of the most thorough analyses of the state of Idaho law on this
subject is contained in Keyser v. Garner, 129 Idaho 112, 922 P.2d 409 (Idaho Ct. App.
1996). Keyser was a medical negligence case involving a suit by the parents of a severely
brain damaged infant against a Boise ear, nose and throat physician. After losing at trial,
plaintiffs appealed and one of the issues on appeal was the foundation for testimony of
one of the defendants' out of area medical experts and the method by which an out-oftown expert in a medical malpractice case may gain 'actual knowledge' of the local
standard of care as required by Idaho Code§ 6-1013. Id. The expert doctor in question,
Dr. Muntz, was a board certified pediatric ENT practicing at Children's Hospital in St.
Louis, Missouri and also a faculty member of Washington University Medical School. At
trial, Dr. Muntz stated that in order to familiarize himself with the Boise standard of practice
for the medical concerns of the infant, he had spoken with a board certified ENT practicing
in Boise, reviewed the infant's medical records and reviewed depositions taken in the case
of other physicians who have practiced in Boise. Keyser, supra, at 116.
While Dr. Muntz was permitted to testify at trial, in ruling on plaintiffs' motion for new
trial, the trial court concluded that Dr. Muntz's testimony should have been excluded
because an inadequate foundation had been laid regarding the standard of care in Boise.
The trial court held that the testimony of Dr. Muntz was flawed because he based his
opinion upon hearsay from other local physicians, which the court determined was
insufficient to constitute the necessary foundation. Keyser v. Garner, supra, at 116-117.
-6
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The Court of Appeals, in discussing the District Court's decision stated the
following:
"This issue of how to meet the foundational standards for out of
area experts has been addressed a number of times by the
Idaho Supreme Court since the enactment of Idaho Code § 61013. The first such decision is Buck v. SI. Clair, 108 Idaho
743, 702 P.2d 781 (1985). In that case, the trial court had
concluded that the plaintiff's out of state expert lacked actual
knowledge of the Boise standard of care because he had not
practiced in Boise, had not admitted patients to Boise hospitals,
had not evaluated any area medical facilities, and was not
familiar with any local medical literature. The trial court
therefore granted a directed verdict for the defendant. The
Supreme Court reversed. The court stated that an out of town
physician must make an inquiry to ensure that there are no
local deviations from the national standard. In the Buck case,
the plaintiffs expert testified that he obtained familiarity with the
local standard through his specialty training and through
questioning of a Caldwell physician who informed the expert
that the local standard was equivalent to the national standard.
The Idaho Supreme Court found this inquiry sufficient to qualify
the witness to testify."
Keyser, supra, at 117.
The Court in Keyser v. Gamer went on to quote from Frank v. East Shoshone
Hospital, 114 Idaho 480, 757 P.2d 1199 (1988). In that case, the expert witness testified
that he had not discussed the standard of care with any local doctors. In affirming the
grant of summary judgment for defendant, the Court in Frank stated:
"Our decision today does not cast an onerous burden on
plaintiffs in medical malpractice actions. It is not an overly
burdensome requirement to have an expert become familiar
with the standard of care in the community where alleged
malpractice is committed. In Buck v. St. Clair, the expert
became familiar with the local standard of care by simply
questioning a local doctor."
Frank, supra at 482.

In a concurring opinion in the Frank case, Justice Huntley similarly observed that:

"[l]t does not take a Herculean effort for an expert to become
familiar with the local standard of care. It can be done on the
telephone."

Frank, supra at 484.
The Court of Appeals in Keyser went into an in depth analysis of several other
Idaho decisions and then determined that foundation for establishing a familiarity with the
local standard of care "is satisfied by an out of area physician's testimony that he or she
has conversed about those standards with a qualified physician practicing in the
community." Keyser, supra at 117.

The Court of appeals further found that even when

no national standard applies to the case at bar, an out of area expert may satisfy the
foundational criteria of Idaho Code § 6-1013 "by obtaining information about the local
standard of practice through consultations with one or more qualified local physicians."

Keyser, supra at 118-119.
Thus, case law in Idaho contemplates that an out of area physician can meet the
foundational requirements of Idaho Code § 6-1012 and § 6-1013 by conducting a
telephone conversation with a qualified Idaho physician. There is no requirement that the
qualifying physician submit an affidavit and there is no requirement that the information
gained through the telephone conversation is somehow inadmissible. This issue is put to
rest by Keyser.

To find otherwise, would be to place a mandatory burden upon Plaintiffs

that in every medical negligence case they must illicit testimony of a local physician. This
is not what the statutes contemplate.

Keyser v.

Gamer, supra, establishes the

methodology by which a plaintiff in a medical negligence claim can satisfy the actual
knowledge requirement of Idaho Code § 6-1013. The applicable portion of that code
section states:

"This section shall not be constr\led to prohibit or otherwise
preclude a competent expert witness who resides elsewhere
from adequately familiarizing himself with the standards and
practices of (a particular) such area and thereafter giving
opinion testimony in such a trial."
Idaho Code§ 6-1013.
Against this backdrop, what is a plaintiff to do when no local qualifying expert can
be located who will speak with the plaintiff's out-of-area experts? The answer is found in

the language quoted above from I.C. § 6-1012 and the two cases that have interpreted that
portion of the Statute; Hoene v. Barnes, 121 Idaho 752,828 P.2d 315 (1992) and Morris v.
Thomson, 130 Idaho 138,937 P.2d 1212 (1997).

In Hoene, Plaintiffs brought suit against a cardiovascular surgeon in Boise, arising
out of a PDA surgery. In attempting to qualify their expert, plaintiffs discovered that Dr.
Barnes and his business associates were the only cardiovascular surgeons in the state
who performed this type of surgery. Thus, plaintiffs had no health care provider to turn to
in Idaho through which to qualify their expert. The Idaho Supreme Court, in discussing this
issue applied the language of§ 6-1012 to find the following:
Under the unique circumstances of this case, there was no
provider of PDA surgery by a cardiovascular surgeon in Idaho
other than Dr. Barnes and his colleagues who practiced as a
professional association. Because these physicians all
practiced together and were part of one business entity, we
treat them as one provider under the statue. Therefore, we
conclude under Idaho Code § 6-1012 that the standard of
health care practice in the community ordinarily served by St.
Luke's was indeterminable. We also conclude that no 'similar
Idaho communities' existed about which Monica could have
presented evidence of the standard of practice for a
cardiovascular surgeon performing PDA surgery. Therefore,
Idaho Code§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 do not provide a means of
establishing the applicable standard of practice in this case."
121 Idaho 752 at 754.
-9
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The Supreme Court went on to determine that it needed to turn to Idaho decisions
which predated the enactment of Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 to determine the
common law of Idaho prior to the enactment of those statutes in order to determine the
methodology by which plaintiffs, under these circumstances, could qualify their expert
witness.
After its review of Idaho common law regarding this issue, the Court in Hoene
concluded that prior to the enactment of Idaho Code§§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 in 1976, the
common law rule in Idaho was the similar localities rule and that this similar localities rule
was not limited to similar localities in Idaho. Thus, plaintiffs' expert, who had practiced
cardiovascular surgery in Syracuse, New York, and had served two terms on the American
Board of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgery, had demonstrated actual knowledge of the
standard of practice for cardiovascular surgeons throughout the United States, including
the standards in localities similar to the community ordinarily served by St. Luke's.
In Morris, plaintiffs sued a physician in Emmett, Idaho. At trial, plaintiffs' expert was
not allowed to testify because the expert attempted to testify to the standard of care in
similar Idaho communities as opposed to the specific standard of care in Emmett.
Plaintiffs' argument was that the only other qualified health care provider in Emmett was
Defendant's expert and therefore, pursuant to Hoene, plaintiffs could look to similar Idaho
communities for a health care provider to qualify their expert. However, the court held that
the plaintiff could not establish the local standard of care under§ 6-1012 by reference to
similar communities until the plaintiff demonstrates to the court that the standard of care in
the plaintiff's community is indeterminable
providers in the community.

due to the absence of other health care

130 Idaho 138 at 147. Ultimately, the Court held that the

plaintiff failed to establish that no other health care provider was practicing in the plaintiff's
- 10
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community through which the plaintiff's expert could have been familiarized with the local
standard of care. Id.
The Morris opinion indicates that had plaintiffs established that other health care
providers in Emmett had refused to speak with their expert, they could have established
that the standard of care was indeterminable pursuant to § 6-1012. This is exactly the
situation presented in the instant case. There were no other qualified health care provider
in Twin Falls, Idaho, to speak with Plaintiffs' experts.

Therefore, under this alternative

argument, the standard of care in Twin Falls, Idaho, is "indeterminable" pursuant to Idaho
Code§ 6-1012.
Plaintiffs could find no local qualifying expert for either their anesthesiologist/pain
management expert, Dr. Lordon; their Dr. of Pharmacy, Dr. Lipman; or their physician's
assistant, Jim Keller. Thus, with the assistance of legal nurse consultant Lorraine ShoafKadish, Plaintiffs undertook to locate suitable qualifying experts from elsewhere in Idaho.
Ms. Shoaf-Kadish, after searching areas elsewhere in Idaho, located Craig Flinders, M.D.,
an anesthesiologist/pain management physician practicing in Lewiston, Idaho.

Tom

Rambow, a pain management PA practicing in Boise, Idaho, and David Martin, a PA in
Pocatello, agreed to speak with Plaintiffs' experts. (See Affidavit of Lorraine Shoaf-Kadish,
attached as Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of Byron V. Foster (("Foster Aff.")) filed herewith).
Those two individuals agreed to speak with Plaintiffs' experts regarding the standard of
health care practice; as evidenced by Plaintiffs' Expert Witness Disclosures, attached as
Exhibit "B" to the Foster Aff.
While the Expert Disclosures make clear that both Dr. Flinders and PA Rambow
and Martin are familiar with the applicable standard of health care practice in Twin Falls,
Idaho in September of 2003, should the Court find that such is not the case, Plaintiffs'
- 11
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experts are still sufficiently qualified pursuant to the "indeterminable" language of I.C. § 61012 and Idaho case law as embodied by Hoene and Morris, supra.
Under the circumstances of this case, either Plaintiffs' experts have laid an
appropriate foundation for their testimony pursuant to their conversations with Dr. Flinders,
Rambow and Martin; or, because Plaintiffs could find no other qualified health care
providers in Twin Falls, Idaho willing to speak with their experts, the applicable standard of
health care practice is "indeterminable" and Plaintiffs can then look to similar Idaho
communities from which to qualify their experts. In the Hoene case, after determining that
plaintiffs' cardiovascular surgeon expert could testify based upon his knowledge of similar
localities outside of Idaho, because of the unique circumstances of that case, the Court
stated that it was not the legislature's intent to insulate physicians from liability who are in
the unique position of practicing specialties in which there are a limited number of
physicians practicing in the local area: "(t)here is no indication in Idaho Code§§ 6-1012
and 6-1013 that the legislature intended to grant this immunity from suit to those
physicians who have unique specialties in this state."

121 Idaho 752 at 756.

In the

present case, the Defendants are specialists in pain medication in Twin Falls. There is no
other entity in Twin Falls devoted specifically to the treatment of pain. Accordingly, it was
necessary for the Plaintiffs to look elsewhere in order to obtain an unbiased opinion about
whether the Defendants breached the standard of care . .The Plaintiffs were able to do so,
and should not be precluded from presented the experts' testimony simply because the
Defendants have a monopoly on their specialty in Twin Falls. (See, Shoaf-Kadish Aff.,
attached as Exhibit "A" to the Foster Affidavit filed herewith).
The search for expert witnesses in a medical negligence case is a daunting task for
the plaintiff's bar. The search for local physicians to qualify those experts is often a time
- 12
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consuming, fruitless endeavor. The statutes governing medical malpractice litigation in
Idaho, as well as the case law

on

the subject, indicate neither should be used to thwart

pursuit of a claim against a physician based upon a "conspiracy of silence." So long as a
plaintiff proceeds in good faith and does everything possible to locate a local qualifying
health care provider; the failure to find such an individual in the "community" does not, and
cannot, operate as a bar to the courthouse door.
Accordingly, as Plaintiffs have done all they could reasonably be required to do to
qualify their expert witnesses; Plaintiffs believe the Court should find legally sufficient
foundation for the testimony of their expert witnesses.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS~ day of October, 2007.

COMSTOCK & BUSH

Attorneys for Plaintiff
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COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, David E. Comstock
and Byron V. Foster, and respectfully submit this Reply Memorandum in Support of their
Motion in Limine.

Defendant Byrne and Defendants Dille and Southern Idaho Pain

Institute responded to the Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine separately.

For the Court's

convenience, this single Memorandum serves as Plaintiffs' Reply to all of the Defendants'
Responses.
1. The Criminal History of the Plaintiffs and Other Witnesses is Inadmissible.

The Defendants assert that the criminal history of Plaintiffs Robert Lewis and Kim
Howard, as well as that of Mr. Lewis's girlfriend, Amber Zaccone is relevant to impeach
their credibility at trial. As addressed in their original Motion in Limine, the Plaintiffs assert
otherwise because such criminal history is 1) not relevant to their credibility and 2) the
probative value of introducing their criminal histories is outweighed by the prejudicial effect.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 609(a); State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628,977 P.2d 890 (1999).
Because the Court has already been briefed on the Ybarra decision in both the
Plaintiffs' Memorandum and the Defendants' Response, Plaintiffs will not rehash the law.
Rather, Plaintiffs simply point out that the Defendants have failed to demonstrate to the
Court how the Plaintiffs' and Amber Zaccone's criminal histories affect their ability to be
credible witnesses while testifying in a wrongful death trial. Drug-related crimes are not
connected to a witness's ability to be truthful on the stand.

Even if there were a

connection, the criminal histories would be irrelevant because Mr. Lewis, Ms. Howard and
Ms. Zaccone have all rehabilitated themselves and no longer use drugs. In fact, all three
were given the opportunity to rehabilitate themselves on the Retained-Jurisdiction
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' IN MOTION IN LIMINE - 2
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Program.

As the Court is aware, that program instills attributes such as truthfulness,

veracity, responsibility and accountability in its participants. Although Mr. Lewis violated
his probation after completing the Rider program, Mr. Lewis has made remarkable
changes in his life. He owns two businesses and has been sober for a significant period of
time.

The Rules of Evidence and the holding in Ybarra do not contemplate using the

criminal histories that Mr. Lewis, Ms. Howard and Ms. Zaccone have against them in a civil
trial.

More notably, even if the Court were to determine that their prior convictions are

relevant, the potential for the jury to be prejudiced by such information far exceeds any
probative value that the convictions have in this case.
The Defendants also contend that the criminal histories of Mr. Lewis and Ms.
Howard somehow disturb their loss of consortium claims because they did not enjoy the
love and affection of their mother while they were incarcerated. This argument is flawed.
Mr. Lewis maintained consistent contact on the phone with his mother while on the Rider
program at Cottonwood and while in the Penitentiary. Mrs. Schmechel sent letters and
even traveled to Boise to visit him. Mr. Lewis spoke with his mother often while at the
Penitentiary.

Ms. Howard also maintained regular contact with her mother while at the

Women's Correctional Facility in Pocatello. The spoke on the phone at least twice a week
and sent cards and letters back and forth. Clearly, Mrs. Schmechel's role as a mother did
not vanish simply because her children were incarcerated. In fact, the love and support
Mrs. Schmechel gave them during such difficult times provided motivation for them to
rehabilitate themselves once they returned to the community.
4. Dr. Groben's Conclusions about Methadone Toxicity in Mrs. Schmechel
Should be Excluded.
The Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs should not be able to exclude Dr.
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' IN MOTION IN UMINE · 3
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Groben's testimony concerning the toxicity levels of Methadone in Mrs. Schmechel's
bloodstream when she died and yet admit Dr. Groben's conclusions regarding the cause of
death. This argument is also flawed.

Dr. Groben's conclusion as to Mrs. Schmechel's

cause of death is "Acute combined poisoning with Methadone and Hydracodone." This
conclusion is distinct from a conclusion regarding the level of toxicity of Methadone in the
blood stream and the resulting conclusion that Mrs. Schmechel was not taking the
prescribed dose of Methadone. The former conclusion reflects that Mrs. Schmechel was
poisoned by a combination of two drugs and is a general conclusion about the cause of
Mrs. Schmechel's death, while the latter would be testimony directly related to toxicity
levels, which Dr. Graben conceded he is not qualified to comment on.
Furthermore, the Defendants do not articulate in their response how Dr. Graben is
qualified to testify about the toxicity levels of Methadone in Mrs. Schmechel or how he
would be qualified to conclude that Mrs. Schmechel was not taking the prescribed dosage
of Methadone in the days preceding her death. Again, the Plaintiffs will not rehash the
elements of Rule 702 and case law on the issue. The fact is that Dr. Graben specifically
stated that he is not qualified to testify as to levels of toxicity in the bloodstream and he lets
the toxicologists make those determinations.
Further, introduction of Dr. Groben's conclusion that Mrs. Schmechel was allegedly
overdosing on Methadone before she died would be incredibly prejudicial to the Plaintiffs'
case. Any evidence that Mrs. Schmechel was abusing pain medication belies the Plaintiffs
case significantly.

The jury would perhaps be inclined to assign some blame to Mrs.

Schmechel for abusing Methadone, when the evidence reflects that she ingested the
Methadone as prescribed, just as she had always done when prescribed pain medication.

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' IN MOTION IN LIMINE - 4
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Again, even if an objection is made, the harm or prejudice caused by such questions or
remarks cannot be cured by cautionary instruction.

Therefore, Plaintiffs respectfully

request that the Court issue an Order in Limine precluding any reference to conclusions
reached by Dr. Groben about whether or not Mrs. Schmechel ingested the Methadone as
prescribed.
5. Cumulative Expert Testimony is Inadmissible.

· Pursuant to Rule 403, IRE, Defendants should be precluded from presenting
cumulative expert opinion testimony.

While the Defendants contend that it may be

premature for the Court to exclude expert testimony before it has had an opportunity to
hear the substance of the Defendants' experts' testimony, the Plaintiffs submit that the
purpose of Motions in Limine, is in part, for the Court to be able to rule on potentially
inadmissible evidence before the trial begins, so the jury, Court, and parties involved can
make more efficient use of trial time. Thus, it is proper for this Court, in its discretion, to
limit the number and testimony of Defendants' expert witnesses before the trial begins.
DATED this _Lday of October, 2007.
COMSTOCK & BUSH

4Mossman, oft
Atto neys for Plaintiff
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Vs,
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DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILLE, M.O.
AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN
INSTITUTE'$ REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS'
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTIONS IN LIMINE

'

''
'
SOUTHERN :

CLINTON DILLE, M.D.,
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho :
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., and :
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X,
;
1
1

Defendants.

'
I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants Clinton DIiie end the Southern Idaho Pain Institute ("Defendants") moved
in I/mine to preclude Plaintiffs from attempting to submit Inadmissible testimony and
evidence on a number of issues, as well as affirmatively seeking the Court's ruling that
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Plaintiffs' criminal records are admissible. In Response to Defendants' Motions in Limine,
Plaintiffs conceded several issues and contested others.
The Court should grant Defendants their requested relief on !he uncontested issues
and should also grant Defendants' contested Motions In Limlne because Plaintiffs have not
shown the questioned testimony and evidence Is admissible or that they will suffer any
undue prejudice If the evidence or testimony Is not admitted or Is limited at trial. Finally, the
Defendants have established that under the circumstances of this case where witness
credibility is paramount, and the Plaintiffs' have a self Interest ill their testimony, that their
criminal records are admissible under Rule 609 or are at least admissible to show
Impairment of the i'>lalntlffs' relationship with Mrs, Schmechel,

II. ARGUMENT
A.

The Court Should Grant The Uncontested Motions in Limine,
Plalnfiffs did not conte$t a number of Issues raised In Defendants' Motions in Limine.

Because Plaintiffs agreed with the Defendants on these issues, the Court should grant the
Defendants their requested relief and: (1) order that no autopsy photos can be admitted at
trial; (2) find that Plaintiffs are not pursuing a lack of Informed consent claim and preclude
Plaintiffs from submitting evidence or attempting to argue to the Jury evidence of such claim;
(3) order that Plaintiffs cannot display transcripts or video clips in their opening statement
from the depositions taken In this case; and (4) order that Plaintiffs cannot elicit testimony
from their experts of conversations those experts had with any Idaho practitioner wherein an
Idaho practitioner allegedly agreed the Defendants' conduct did not meet the applicable
standard of care.
Because the Plaintiffs failed to respond to It, the Court should also grant Defendants'
Motion seeking to preclude Plaintiffs from commenting to the jury on witnesses or expert
opinions that Defendants disclosed, but did not call or have their experts opine upon at trial.
DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILLE, M,D, AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE'S REPLY TO
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S.L. v. J.H., 883 P.2d 984, 986 (Alaska 1994) ("When a party files a motion and the
opposing party fails to respond, the superior court may construe the failure to respond as a
nonopposltlon, and may grant the motion If the relief requested appears to be justified,");
See also 56 Am Jur 2d Motions § 29 (2007) {"When a party files a motion and the opposing

party fails to respond, the court may construe such failure to respond as nonopposltlon to
the motion or an admission that the motion was meritorious, may take the facts alleged In
the motion as true, and may grant the motion if the relief requested appears to be justified.")

(footnotes omitted).

B.

The Court Should Grant the Defendants Contested Motions In Llmine,

1. Defendants' care and treatment of other gatients js not relevant and anv
reference to the Defendants' treatment of other patients is more prejudicial than probative.
In response to Defendants' Motion to exclude any refarence to their care and
treatment of other patients, Plaintiffs argue evidence of the facts and circumstances of the
Williams v. Dille case are relevant to show Mr, Byrne's knowledge of the potentially lethal
effects of Methadone if It Is taken In too large of a dose. There are many less prejudicial
ways for Plaintiffs to establish Mr. Byrne's knowledge of Methadone's dangers. It Is not
necessary to refer to the WIiiiams v, Dille matter for the Plaintiffs to establish Mr. Byrne's
knowledge concerning Methadone's risks. Oefer,d;mts do not dispute that Methadone can
cause death If taken in excess quantities.

Indeed the decedent In the Williams case

consumed between 40 and 70 tablets In less than 48 hours. Evidence of or reference to
that case Is simply more prejudicial than probative.
More over, as disclosed by in the record in this matter, Mr. Byrne was well aware of
Methadone's (and other opioids') dangers. Mr. Byrne testified at his deposition he was
aware of the risks of all long acting opioids before he prescribed Methadone to Mrs.
Schmechel, He further testified at his deposition he discussed with Mrs. Schmechel the
DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILLE, M,O, AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE'S REPLY TO
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risks and benefits of Methadone. Therefore, Mr, Byrne's prior testimony is sufficient for the
Plaintiffs to establish his knowledge of Methadone's dangers,
For purposes of this Motion, Defendants are willing to concede Mr. Byrne was aware
of the dangers, Including death, associated with Methadone. The possible prejudice of
disclosing the WIiiiams case to the Jury Is obvious as the Jurors may Improperly conclude
that because Mr. Byrne and the other Defendants were sued because of another
Methadone death or that they had another patient die from Methadone, they somehow
automatically bear liability here.

The jury could also Improperly seek to punish the

Defendants for the facts of another case or conclude that because the Defendants were
sued in another case that they were negligent In this case. Such potential prejudice greatly
outweighs the Plaintiffs' need to refer to any facts from that case in this matter and any
reference to the Williams v, DIiie case should be excluded under Rule 403, Moreover, If
such evidence was allowed it would result in a trial within a trial.
Plaintiffs also argue they should be allowed to submit deposition testimony from the
WIiiiams v. DIiie case under Rule of Evidence 801(b)(1). Rule 801(b)(1) only provides an
exception to the hearsay rule for prior testimony, It does not address the possible prejudice
that may result from admission of such testimony.

Therefore, before admitting any

deposition testimony from the WIiiiams v. DIiie case, the Court must stlll engage in Rule 403
balancing and, as discussed above and in the Defendants' Memorandum In Support, such
testimony Is more prejudicial than probative and Is likely to confuse the Jury. Therefore, any
reference to the Williams v, Dille case, including deposition testimony given In that case,
should be excluded, Certainly before any reference Is made to such testimony the matter
should be taken up outside the presence of the jury, Even if the Court allows Plaintiffs to
examine the Defendants on deposition testimony from the WIiiiams case, the Court must

DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILLE, M,D, AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE'S REPLY TO
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make sure the facts and circumstances of the Williams case are not disclosed to the Jury
and that such testimony does not relate to the facts of the other lawsuit.
2. Evidence of Mrs. Schmechej's alleged phone conversations with Mr, Byrne
should be excluded because Plaintiffs cannot establish proper evidentiary foundation for
admission of testimony concerning the alleged conversations.
Plaintiffs argue evidence of Mrs. Schmechel's alleged phone calls with Mr. Byrne Is
admissible under Rule 801 (c) because they are not trying to prove the truth of the matters
asserted In the phone calls. Examination of the purpose for which the Plaintiffs intend to
offer the phone calls, however, shows they are indeed trying to offer the calls for the truth of
the matter asserted, /.e., they Intend to offer the phone calls to show that Mrs. Schmechel
told Mr. Byrne that she was suffering symptoms associated with her switch to Methadone.
Plaintiffs further argue the phone conversations are admissible under Rule 803(4) as
a statement made for the purposes of medical diagnosis. Plaintiffs' arguments fall to
address the multiple layers of hearsay present If Mr. Lewis or another witness Is allowed to
testify to these conversations at trial. While Mrs. Schmechel's statements may arguable fit
this exception to the hei;irsay rule, Plaintiffs cannot establish any exception that would allow
Mr. Lewis or any other witness to testify to anything Mrs. Schmechel said to them regarding
the Identity of the alleged caller or what was discussed during the alleged phone
conversation,
As discussed in detall In Defendants' Memorandum In Support, before any testimony
concerning these alleged phone conversations is admissible, the Plaintiffs must establish
proper evidentiary foundation for the alleged phone calls, which Includes the identity of the
individual on the other side of the phone conversation, State v. Marlar, 94 Idaho 803, 807,
498 P.2d 1276, 1280 (1972). Therefore, because the alleged phone conversations lack
appropriate foundation, they should be excluded,

DEFE;NDANTS CLINTON DILL~, M,D, ANO SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE'$ REPLY TO
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3. Plaintiffs' exgerts' testimony, including Dr. Verse's testimony, must be limited to
their disclosures and degosltlon testimonx.
Plaintiffs concede they "do not Intend to Introduce any opinion Dr. Vorse has on the
standard of care In this matter" and that they "will question Dr. Vorse In accordance with
what is reflected in her deposition testimony and medical records she documented while
treating Mrs. Schmechel." (Plaintiffs' Response at pp. 8-9). Dr. Vorse clearly testified she
was not going to offer any standard of care opinions with regards to the Defendants in this
case. (See Varin Alf. at Ex. 8, Deposition of K. Vorse, M,D. at p, 116, I, 16- p, 117, I. 1.).
Therefore, Plaintiffs should be precluded from attempting to expand Dr, Verse's testimony
at trial to offer the Jury any standard of care testimony specifically relating to the Defendants
or their care of Mrs. Schmechel.
Plaintiffs intend to show their expert, Dr. Lipman, familiarized with the local standard
of care through establishing he talked to Dr. Vorse. Defendants do not object to Plaintiffs'
attempt to qualify Dr. Lipman as an expert, They do object If Plaintiffs attempt to elicit
testimony from Dr. Lipman or any other of their experts that 9oes directly to the details of
this case they discussed with Dr. Vorse or any Idaho health care provider in an attempt to
either bolster their own opinions or offer previously undisclosed expert testimony through
the guise of "discussions" regarding the standard of care.
Moreover, if Plaintiffs intend to go into detail regarding the exact nature of the
conversations they had with Idaho health care providers, Defendants request the Jury be
excused so such foundation can be laid outside the jury's presence

.o the jurors

are not

Improperly tainted.
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4. Evidence of Sl?eculative economic damages should be precluded. and Plaintiffs
should be estopped from claiming damages for Mrs. Schmechel's alleged economic
contributions to the fam/1~ business,
F>laintiffs claim they should be allowed to recover for damages for "value attributable
to Mrs. Schmechel's work when another Independent contractor either must fill in for the
work that she used to perform from the company or Mr. Schmechel must do It himself.'
(Plaintiffs' Response at p. 9). There are several problems with this argument. First, as
Defendants already pointed out in their Memorandum in Support, the Schmechels' family
business is not a proper plaintiff and cannot recover. (Memorandum in Support at p, 15).
Second, no wages were paid to Mrs. Schmechel for work she performed so her estate Is not
losing any income from her death. Third, the future value of any services Mrs. Schmechel
may have continued to offer is purely speculative given the fact she was not paid for past
services and her chronic pain and other health probleme very well could have prevented
Mrs. Schmechel from offering ru:ll( services in the future,
Moreover, Plaintiffs should be estopped from claiming any economic damages
because Mrs. Schmechel had represented herself as disabled to the federal government
and was receiving disability payments. (See Varin Aff. at Ex. F). Defendants do not dispute
the determination Mrs. Schmechel was disabled or ask the Court to make any determination
as to whether Mrs. Schmechel was entitled to these payments. Rather, Mrs. Schmechel's
estate should not be allowed to recover in death what she could not be paid In life because
she was accepting disability payments. In order to continue receiving disability payments,
Mrs. Schmechel could not work and receive wage$. The Plaintiffs should be estopped from
claiming damages that Mrs. Schmechel's estate would not be entitled to If Mrs. Schmechel
was still alive today. Simply stated, Plaintiffs cannot have It both ways and accept disability
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payments when Mrs. Schmechel wes alive because she allegedly could not work and then
seek to recover economic damages for work she would have performed had she lived.

5. Plaintiffs should be precluded from ellqltlng crltlclsm11 of the Defendants' care
Mrs. Schmechel that the experts concede do not rise to a breach of the standard of care.

of

Plaintiffs' experts have identified criticisms of the Defendants care and treatment of
Mrs. Schmechel they admit do not rise to a breach of the standard of care. Plaintiffs claim
these criticisms are relevant to showing how "blurry" the line is between a breach of the
standard of care al'ld no breach of the standard of care. To establish the prlma facla
elements of their case, however, Plaintiffs must establish by a preponderance of the
evidence a breach of the standard of care. Therefore, It Is anticipated their experts will
opine on what they believe were actual breaches of the standard of care. The experts'
criticisms and suggestions of what the Deferidants could have done differently only serve to
Impugn the Defendants before the Jury and are not relevant to Plaintiffs' claims. The
purpose of offering such testimony Is to plant seeds of doubt regarding the Defendants'
overall competency and would likely serve to further complicate an already complicated
medical malpractice case. Therefore, such criticisms should be excluded under Rule 403 If
Plaintiffs or Plaintiffs experts attempt to offer such testimony.

C.

Plaintiffi,' and Other Witnesses' Criminal Records Are Admissible.

The issue of the admlsslblllty of Plaintiffs' and other witnesses' criminal records Is
extensively briefed in Defendants' Memorandum in Support and Defendants' Response to
Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine. The arguments made there will not be repeated, but It should
be noted that the Supreme Court has held that when performing the Rule 609 balancing
analysis, It Is proper to consider whether the witness has an Interest in the testimony. See
State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 631, 977 P.2d 890, 893 (1999); State v. Pieroe, 107

Idaho 96, 103, 685 P.2d 837, 844 (1984), Where, as here, the witness has a felony
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Steven J. Hippler ISB #4388
J. Will Varin ISB #6981
Givens Pursley LLP
601 w. Bannock Street

P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone: 208-388-1200
Facsimile: 208-388-1300
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Attorneys for Defendants, Clinton Dllle, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

VAUGHN SCHMF:oCHEL. Individually, and :
as SurvlVing Spouse and Personal :
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE :
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT ':
P. LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA:
HALL, natural children of ROSALIE /
SCHMECHEL, deceased,
Plaintiffs,
Vs.

'
:

CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., and
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X,

:
:'
:
:

Defendants.

Case No. CV 05 4345

DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILLE,
M.D. AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN
INSTITUTE'$ JOINDE:~ IN
OE.FENOANT BYRNE'S MOTION IN
LIMINE

'''

'
:'
''

COM!c NOW Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pein Institute

and join In Defendant Thomas Byrne's Motion in Limine re: Various Issues, filed
September 29, 2007, and incorporate by reference Defendant Byrne's Motion in Limine

and Memorandum in support as their own.

DEF!aNDANTS C1..INTON 011..L.E, M.D. AND SOUTHERN IOAHO PAIN INSTITUTE'$ JOIN DER IN
DEFENDANT BYRNE'S MOTION IN LIMINE , 1

272

···. ·.·.: ·: ·:·: ·r~s~:
:?:: :9'.J:": :?:.:: ·
......................
.·::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::;::::::::::

1IttI1r'!
·mll~i:•.~il::::,.:::I,::m::!!i W9R~~~YB~4R
• • ••.
\:i.\m

Ql\/!:;l\1$

•••.:

illi_i_Jliiiltliil~:\l\·1:. . .,. .

!.,l

h$f?ll?'ij r~i .. •••.t T .••.••••••/••·•••••••••························································································ .

1

1

~
~
=~~:~:::';:.,

··.!.

$
.••;.,,·.:··.·#5~
• .•..
•.:· .·.. · •· .· .·..•. · ~ / : ..\:

·.··.,.·i
.:·.··.···
.u
•...·.• .••.·:·.·
. 7·•.·.·
•• •.

···.1··.,,,:·
.•.·•...·..· ··.l)·.·~·
•.. ·
.•...···
o
·..
•..0•9.·y·
·..·
· ·.
···.····,
1.
•
M
.,•
;·
•'
·.s·.··
·
•. ·...
·
·...··.,
......·:.:·'··1··
.. ............
·""·.··.·".b·····'
·ca.·.··.·
..
.••..
"
·
.• ·
'o
e
·
..
·••·
·
•.
".··o·'·.~.·
·
p ·•••
·
•..
.•
.o
.
•.•.
o····
,·
m
...•
,••••.·
··
··
•..:··,,.~··
...
•.·..• ..•.•·.,·.'.··.~
•.•..•

4

,n

f\l(qtp~y~ fftf?f~!qt[ff.

........ , .•.• , •.•..•

'

WD.·GmJ•·~~i
•
.
rnn~*~*~~rrT

::·.:;:·.::::::·.::::::::::::::.:::::.:.:.:.:::::::::::::

:::::~.\~"iii::,\'.

.. ...................................... ,, ................. ..... .......... ...... ,, ...
,

,

,

,

,

........... ,, ................ , ...... , ........ .

"~lilNOA•ira;;iiN"'•ONOl'L~Niti;.Ji•
h1k~\i,JJ~1blL,f~.;~1U~!.1ii•~k1Jii,·~.Wl..,;ji.{·································
~

.Iii.~... , ...... ,'.'II ..·....'ti;~.·.:,:: .. , ........

... .J.•...•..• ,·... ,:-.1 •.. S'.'M":ljl( . . !::t•.....•....... .1.:}W.·.·f':t:,1.... . F~:9. .. ·. ,.,-..,... .. ,;it'.,1if.W. !"fW.l-,f.11·, .~1 ... . , ..... , ........... , ... , ..

·:::::::::::11::~;\1}
timNPANTa'(ftfl~1~MP1lP~lr.1c1N)l~~\t····················••.•.•••.•.•••.·.·.••.•••••••·.•.•••·.·.·.···············•••••••••••••••••·••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

273

I

r'
l

l-'

200·1 OCT -9 PM L,: SO

Keely E. Duke

~

!

!SB #6044; ked@hallfarley.com

Chris D. Comstock

t
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BY----------~CRh ..

!SB #6581; cdc@hallfarley.com

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 395-8500
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585
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Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J. Byrne

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually,
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL; deceased, and ROBERT P.
LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA
HALL natural children of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased,

I C-;
Case No. CV-05-4345

DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE,
P.A.'S PROPOSED SPECIAL
VERDICT FORM

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A. and
JOHN DOE, I through X,
Defendants.

Attached are defendant Thomas J. Byrne, P.A.' s proposed special verdict form.
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DATED this "l~day of October, 2007.

l

HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT
& BLANTON, P.A.

Il
l

!

By·L/,;~~~._µ.'f.&.~=-------

Keely Duke - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J. Byrne
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CERTIFICA1E OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ 1}; day of October, 2007, I caused to be served a true copy
of the foregoing, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
David Comstock
Law Offices of Comstock & Bush
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 500
P.O. Box 2774
Boise, Idaho 83701
Attorneyfor Plaintiffs
Fax No.: (208) 344-7721

-U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
__ Overnight Mail
__ Telecopy

Steven J. Hippler
GIVENS PURSLEY
601 W. Bannock ST.
POBox2720
Boise ID 83701-2720
Attorneys for Clinton Dille, MD. and
Southern Idaho Pain Institute
Fax No.: (208) 388-1300

~
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U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
__ Overnight Mail
__ Telecopy
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATEOFIDAHO,IN AND FOR THECOUNTYOFTWINFALLS

VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually,
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P.
LEWIS, KlM HOWARD and TAMARA
HALL natural children of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased,

Case No. CV-05-4345
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAlN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A. and
JOHN DOE, I through X,
Defendants.

We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatory as follows:
Question No. 1: Did defendant Clinton Dille, M.D., negligently fail to meet the applicable

standard of health care practice in his treatment and cate of Rosalie Schmechel?
Answer to Question No. 1:

YesLJ

No LJ

If you answered "No" to Question No. 1, then do not answer Question No. 2 and proceed
directly to Question No. 3.
If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 1, then answer Question No. 2.
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - l
')

")

"'

"' ' I
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!

I

Ii

Question No. 2: Was Dr. Dille's negligence a proximate cause ofMrs. Schmechel's death?
Auswer to Question No. 2:

YesLJ

No LJ

Il

Please answer Question No. 3.
Question .No. 3:

l
l

Did defendant Thomas J. Byrne negligently fail to rneet the applicable

standard of health care practice in his treatment and care of Rosalie Schmechel?
Answer to Question No. 3:

YesLJ

NoLJ

If your answers to Questions No. 1 and 3 were ''No" you are finished. Please sign the verdict
form and tell the bailiff that you are finished. If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 3, then answer
Question No. 4.
Question No. 4: Was Mr. Byrne's negligence a proximate cause ofMrs. Schmechel 's death?
Answer tQ Question No. 4:

YesLJ

NoLJ

If your answers to Questions No. 2 and 4 were "No" you are finished. Please sign the verdict
fom1 and tell the bailiff that you are finished. If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 2 or Question
No. 4 please answer the next question.
Instruction for Question No. 5: You will reach this question if you have found that either

defendants Dr. Dille or Mr. Byrne were negligent, which negligence caused the death of Mrs.
Schmechel. In this question, you are to apportion the fault between the parties in terms of a
percentage. As to each party or entity to which you answered "Yes" to Questions No. 2 and 4,
determine the percentage of fault for that party or entity, and enter the percentage on the appropriate
line. If you answered "No" to any of the above questions, insert a "0" or "Zero" as to that party or
entity. Your total percentages must equal 100%.
Question No. 5: What is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each of the following:

SPECIAL VERD[CT FORM - 2
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Answer to Question No. 5:

%

To the Defendant, Clinton Dille, M.D,
To the Defendant, Thomas l Byrne
Total must equal

___%
100%

Please answer Question 6.
Question No. 6: What is the total amount of economic damages, if any, sustained by

Vaughn Schmech~l?
Answer to Question No. 6:

$_ _ __

Question No. 7: What is the total amount of non-economic damages, if any, sustained by

plaintiffs?
Answer to Question No. 7:

Vaughn Schmechel

$_ _ __

Robert Lewis

$_ _ __

Kim Howard

$_ _ __

Tamara Hall

$_ _ __

Please sign the verdict form and notify the bailiff that you have finished your deliberations.

Dated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 2007
Presiding Juror

SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - 3
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SPECfAL VERDICT FORM· 4
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'
Keely E. Duke
!SB #6044; ked@hallfarley.com

Chris D. Comstock
!SB #6581; cdc@hallfarley.com

HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 395-8500
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585
W:\2\2~404.53\TIUAL BRJEF .OOC

Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J. Byrne

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

'\ \\ / :,
: \ I \
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually,
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P.
LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA
HALL natural children of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased,

Case No. CV-05-4345

DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE'S
TRIAL BRIEF

Plaintiffs,
vs:
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A. and
JOHN DOE, I through X,
Defendants.

DEFENDANT IBOMAS J, BYRNE'S TRJAL BRlBF - 1
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I. INTRODUCTION

'j

I

This is an action for medical malpractice arising out of pain management treatment provided

l'

to Rosalie Schmechel at the Southern Idaho Pain lnstitute ("SIPI"), by Clinton Dille, M.D. ("Dr.
Dille") and Thomas Byrne, P.A. ("Mr. Byrne") (collectively "defendants") between September 26,
2003 and October-2, 2003. Plaintiffs are Mrs. Schmechel's husband, Vaughn, and her three children,
Robert, Tamara and Kim. Plaintiffs allege that defendants breached the standard of care in their
treatment of Mrs. Schmechel, and that such breaches resulted in her death.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Rosalie Schmechel was treated at the Southern Idaho Pain Institute ("SIPI") beginning on
September 26, 2003, relating to complaints of severe low back pain. Prior to presenting to SIPI, Mrs.
Schmechel had seen several medical providers for chronic low back and right leg pain she had
experienced for over twenty years.

In October 1996, Mrs. Schmechel began treatment with Dr. Kimberly Vorse in Ketchum,
Idaho, for lower back and right leg pain. Mrs. Schmechel continued treatment with Dr. Vorse for pain
management until September 16, 2003. During the course of Mrs. Schmechel's treatment with Dr.
Vorse, she continued to experience periods of severe low back and right leg pain. As such, Dr.
Vorse placed her on a pain management regimen that included the use ofOxyContin (a class II
narcotic). Mrs. Schmechel was started on OxyContinon April 6, 1999at 20 mg per day, which was
adjusted throughout Ms. Schmechel's treatment with Dr. Vorse. Dr. Vorse also treated Mrs.
Schmechel for obstructive sleep apnea, which was diagnosed in June 2002, with C-pap therapy.
In September 2003, Mrs. Schmechel, who lived in Twin Falls, Idaho, determined that it was
inconvenient to travel to Ketchum for treatment ofher chronic pain, and her primary care physician,
Dr. Harris referred her to SIPI. As of September 26, 2003, Mrs. Schmechel was taking 60 mgsof
DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE'S TRIAL BRIEF - 2
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OxyContin, and had been on a near daily regimen of OxyContin for over four years. She was also

!

i

taking, amount other prescriptions, Lortab (a generic Hydrocodone) as needed for break through
pain.
During her initial evaluation at SIPI, Mrs. Schmechel met wifu and was evaluated by Mr.
Byrne, a physician assistant at SIPI, working under the supervision of Dr. Dille. Mr. Byrne and Dr.
Dille had worked together for over two and one half years as of September 2003 and it was their
standard practice for Mr. Byrne to see, evaluate and treat the patient, and then to discuss such
treatment with Dr. Dille subsequently.
During Mrs. Schmechel's appointment, Mr. Byme performed a physical examination on Mrs.
Schmechel. In adf!ition, he and Mrs. Schmechel had a lengthy and extensive discussion regarding
her chronic leg and back pain, her medical history, family/social history, and long-term treatment for
chronic pain she had receive.cl and was currently receiving. Mrs. Schmechel also reported to Mr.
Byrne that she had obstructive sleep apnea and was compliant with her C-pap therapy.
With respect to her current condition, Mrs. Schmechel told Mr. Byme, among other things,
the following: her current pain management plan was not controlling her pain; she was interested in
receiving new information in reference to pain management; she believed her medications were not
working as well as they used to; and her recent severe pain prevented her from taking part in her
normal daily activities.
Based upon the history obtained from Mrs. Schmechel, his physical examination of Mrs.
Schmechel, his lengthy discussion with Mrs. Sclunechel regarding her pain, his experience as a pain
management physician assistant, and his knowle.dge ofDr. Dille's practice, Mr. Byrne devised a pain
management plan in which he discontinued the OxyContin and started Mrs. Schmechel on a different
class If narcotic, Methadone.

DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE'S TRIAL BRIEF· 3
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On the following Sunday evening, September 28, 2003, Mr. Byrne called Mrs. Schmechel to
check on how she was doing with her change in medication. :Mrs. Schmechel indicated she "was
doing well," and Mr. Byrne advised her to increase her Methadone to 10 mg in the daytime and 10
mg at night. :Mr. Byrne then instructed Mrs. Schmechel to call him the following day.
As instructed, Mrs. Schmechel called Mr. Byrne the next day (Monday September 29, 2003).

Mrs. Sclunechel told him her pain was improving and that she was taking l Omg ofMethadone in the
day and 15 mg at night. Mr. Byrne instructed Mrs. Schmechel to use the Methadone on a variable
dose between 10 and 15 mg in the morning and 10 to 15 mg in the evening, and to take a "minimal
amount of short-acting Hydrocodone for pain control and follow up with me by phone next week."
Mr. Byrne also told Mrs. Schmechel to call him if she had any problems.
On Monday, September 29, 2003, Mr. Byrne discussed his care and treatment of Mrs.
Schmechel with Dr. Dille. Dr. Dille agreed with and approved Mr. Byrne's treatment plan for Mrs.
Sclunechel.
After his Monday conversation with Mrs. Schmechel, Mr. Byrne did not hear from Mrs.
Schmechel again. On the morning of Thursday, October 2, 2003, Mrs. Schmechel passed away.
Ill.
A.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs' Cannot State a Prima Facie Case of Medical Malpractice Against Mr.
Byrne.

1. . Elements of a primafacie case.
To prevai!,on a medical malpractice claim, a plaintiff must establish the following elements
of proof:
(a) The existence ofa physician/patient relationship;
(b) A duty of care, recognized by law requiring the physician to conform to a certain
standard of conduct;
(c) A breach of that duty by conduct which fails to meet the applicable standard of
care;
DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE'S TRIAL BRIEF· 4
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(d) Proximate cause, and;
(e)' Actual loss or damage.

l
l'l

Fullerv. Studer, 122 Idaho 251,833 P.2d 109 (1992); Johnson v. Thomson, 103 Idaho 702,652 P.2d

I
.I

650 (1982); Algeria v. Payonl" 101 Idaho 617,619 P.2d 135 (1980); IDJI 205. If plaintiffs are

''

unable to prove all of these elements, Mr. Byrne is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw.
2. Plaintiffs will be unable to establish that Mr. Byrne failed to conform to the
. local standard of care.
Because plaintiffs will be unable to prove that Mr. Byrne did not follow the local standard of
care, plaintiffs cannot prove a case of medical malpractice against Mr. Byrne. First, plaintiffs must

I

establish the standard of care applicable to Mr. Byrne. Second, they must prove by expert medical
testimony a breach of the standard of care applicable to a physician assistant practicing in Twin Falls,
Idal10 in September and October of 2003. LC. § 6-1012 and§ 6-1013 (establishing the substantive
and foundational requirements for expert testimony in medical malpractke cases); Ramos v. Dixon,
144 Idaho 32, 35, 156 P.3d 533,536 (2007); Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867,876, 136 P.3d 338,
347 (2006); Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284,292, 127 P.3d JS7, 195 (2005); Dulaney v. St.
Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 164, 45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002); Kolln v. St. Luke's Reg.
Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323,940 P.2d 1142, 1147-48 (1997); Strode v. Lenzi, 116 Idaho 214,775 P.2d
106 (1989); LePelley v. Grefenson, 101 Idaho 422,614 P.2d 962 (1980).
Under Idaho Code § 6-1012, an essential part of a plaintiffs' case is affirmative proof by
direct expert testimony that the defendant health care provider failed to meet the applicable standard
of health care practice in the community in which the care was, or should have been, provided. LC.
§ 6-1012; see also Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho at 35, 156 P.3dat 536; Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho

at 876, 136 PJd at347; Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 164, 45 P.3d 816,
820 (2002); Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208,868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994). The expert must

DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE'S TRJAL BRIEF - 5
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testify that the defendant health care provider did not meet the standard of care applicable to his or

I

ll

her particular field of health care and specialty. I.C. § 6-1012. Thus, every defendant health care
provider shall be judged in comparison with similarly trained and qualified health care providers in

t

the same community, taking into account his or her training, experience, and field of medical

\

specialization, if any. See Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho at 35, 156 P.3d at 536; Edmunds v. Kraner,

~

142 Idaho at 876, 136 P.3d at 347; Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 164,
45 P.3d 816, 820 (2002)Kolln, 940 P.2d at 1150.
Idaho Code§ 6-1012 must be read in conjunction with Idaho Code§ 6-1013, which provides
the foundational requirements for the expe1t testimony in medical malpractice cases. The applicable
standard of practice and the failure to adequately meet the community standard of care must be
established by the plaintiff by one or more knowledgeable, competent expert witness. I.C. § 6-1013.
However, before the expert testimony will be admitted into evidence, the plaintiff must first lay a
proper foundation for the testimony. See Weeks v. Eastern fdaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834,
153 P.3d 1180, 1183 (2007); Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32, 156 P.3d 533, 536 (2007); Dulaney,
137 ldaho at 164, 45 P.3d at 533; Evans v. Griswold, 129 Idaho 902,905,935 P.2d 165, 168 (1997);
Watts v. Lyn-ll, 125 Idaho 341,345,870 P.2d 1300, 1304 (1994).Rhodehouse, 868 P.2d at 1227-28.
A proper foundation establishes that: (a) the opinion is actually held by the expert witness, (b) the
opinion is held with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, and (c) the ex.pert possesses actual
knowledge of the applicable community standard which was in place at the time of the alleged
malpractice. LC. § 6-1013. Accordingly, the expert's testimony must show that he or she
familiarized himself or herselfwith the local standard of care for a particular defendant, whether the
defendant be a physician, thoracic surgeon, nurse, hospital or other health care worker. Id.; see also
Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32, 156 P.2d at 536 127 Idaho 599, 903 P.2d 1296, 1302 {1994). A
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plaintiff must first establish; as a foundation for expert testimony, that his expert has actual
knowledge oftbe local standard of care and skill ordinarily exercised by a like provider in the same

''

community. Id. This means showing actual knowledge of the standard of care and skill for
physician assistants in Twin Falls, Idaho, in September and October of 2003.
If the expert is not from the locality where the alleged malpractice occurred, the expert can
only demonstrate an adequate familiarity with the local standard of care by consulting with a health
care provider who practices in the same community where the alleged malpractice occurred. Kolin
v. St. Luke's Reg'! Med. Ctr., 130 Idaho 323, 940 P.2d l 142, 1147-48 (1997); Watts v. Lynn, 870
P.2d at 1304; Rhodehouse v. Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 868 P.2d 1224, 1228 (1994) (In order to show
actual knowledge of the local standard ofcare underI.C. 6-1013, the Court has held that a medical
expert from out of the area must inquire ofa local specialist as to the local community standard of
care.); Strode, 775 P.2d at 108 (holding that before a board certified specialist from outside tbe state
may testify as to the local standard of care, the specialist "must, at a minimum, inquire of a local
specialist to determine whether the local community standard varies from the national standard for
that board certified specialty.") The term community refers to that geographical area ordinarily
served by the licensed general hospital at or nearest to which such care was provided. I.C. § 6-1012.
Thus, plaintiffs must present expert testimony proving that Mr. Byrne failed to meet the standard of
care for a physician assistant practicing in Twin Falls, Idaho in September and October of 2003.
In this case, all of plaintiffs' experts are from out of state: Mr. Keller is a physician assistant
practicing in Lakewood, Colorado with no experience in the treatment of chronic pain; Dr. Lordon is
an anesthesiologist practicing pain management in Murray, Utah; and Dr. Lipman is a doctor of
pharmacy practicing in Salt Lake City, Utah. As such, none of plaintiffs' experts have practiced
medicine in Idaho, let alone Twin Falls, Idaho, and, therefore, do not have actual knowledge of the

DEFENDANT TI{OMAS J. BYRNE'S TRlAL BRJEF • 7
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standard of care for a physician assistant practicing in Twin Falls, Idaho in September and October
2003.
Given that plaintiffs' standard of care experts do not have actual knowledge of the applicable
standard of care, they must establish that they have adequately familiarized themselves with that
standard of care in order to testify at trial. Mr. Byrne recognizes that an expert witness may be
qualified to testify against a medical professional despite the fact that they are not of the same
specialty. See Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 292, 127 P.3d 187, 195 (2005); Clarke v.
Prenger, 114 Idaho 766, 769, 760 P .2d I 182, 1185 (1988)(holding that a board-certified obstetriciangynecologistwas qualified to testify as an expert against a general surgeon and a family practitioner
despite different specialties). However, in Clarke, the Idaho Supreme Court emphasized the
importance ofa purported expert's knowledge of the defendant medical provider's field:
,·

Recognizing the complexity of knowledge required in the various medical specialties,
more than a casual familiarity with the specialty of the defendant physician is
required. The witness must demonstrate a knowledge acquired from experience or
study ofthe standards of the specialty of the defendant physician sufficient to enable
him to give an expert opinion as to the conformity of the defendant's conduct to those
particular standards, and not the standards of the witness's particular specialty if it
differs from that of the defendant.
Id. 114 Idaho at 769 (citing Fitzmaurice v. Fly1m, 356 A.2d 887 (1975) with approval). Therefore,
plaintiffs must establish that plaintiffs' standard of care experts have knowledge acquired from
experience or study of the standards of a physician assistant such as Mr. Byrne that would enable
each of them to gi_ve an expert opinion as to whether Mr. Byrne conformed to such standards. As
will be addressed at trial, plaintiffs' experts have failed to do so.
3. Mr. Byrne's experts will establish that Mr. Byrne met the standard of care
in all respects.

Defendants have retained the following standard of care experts to testify at the trial of this
matter: Chris Kottenstette, PA-C, Rodde Cox, M.D., William Binegar, M.D., and Bradford Hare,
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M.D. Each of these experts will testify, from bis particular specialty and based on his actual or
gained knowledge of the applicable standard of care, that Mr. Byrne met the standard of care in all
respects.
4. ·The mere fact that an unfortunate or undesirable result occurred does not
' constitute a breach of the standard of care.

II
!

The mere fact that an undesirable or unfortunate result occms following the medical care

I

rendered by Mr. Byrne does not, of itself, establish a breach of the standard of care. See Brown v.

i
I

Tulane Medical Center Hosp. and Clinic, 958 So.2d 87 (La. 2007) (holding "the mere fact that an

I

injury occurred,., raises no presmnption or inference of negligence."); Kenyon v. Miller, 756 So.2d

I

133, 136 (FL App. 2000)(holding "the law is clear that 'negligence cannot be inferred from the fact
that the surgery was unsuccessful or terminated in unfortunate results."' Citations omitted); Hirahara
v. Tanaka, 959 P.2d 830 (Hawaii l 998)("The mere proofof an unfavorable result, without more, will
not be enough to establish a physician's liability."); Bates v. Meyer, 565 So.2d 134, 137 (Ala.,
1990)(holding that "the existence of an unfortunate result does not raise an inference of
culpability."); Miller v. Kennedy. 588 P.2d 734 (Wash. 1978)(holding "the instruction challenged
here accurately states that a bad result or injury in itself is not evidence of negligence; Instruction
NO. 5 is neither erroneous nor misleading, and the court did not err in giving the instruction to the

jury.");

~

Crawford v. Anagnostopoulos, 387 N.E.2d l 064 (111. 1st Dist. 1979) ("Proofby plaintiff

that defendant's treatment was not favorable, that she still suffers from the same condition, does not
of itself indicate that the defendant failed to use the applicable standard of care. Proof of a bad result
or mishap is not evidence oflack of skill or negligence."); see also G. Douthwaite, ALEXANDER'S
JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON MEDICAL ISSUES§ 3-36 at 129 (1987).

If liability could be predicated on a perceived "bad" result, without more, strict liability-rather than negligence--would be the standard. Medical practitioners, however, are not insurers of
DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE'S TRJAL BRIEF· 9
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the correctness of their diagnosis or treatment. Willis v, Western Hospital Ass'g, 67 Idaho 435, 182
P.2d 950 (1947); ~ also Holton v, Pfingst, 534 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Ky, 1975). Medicine is not a
perfect or exact science and infallibility is not, and has never been, the rule in Idaho or elsewhere.
Thus, in this case,plaintiffs must show more than the mere fact that Mrs. Schmechel died following
treatment by Mr. Byrne. Plaintiffs must prove that Mr. Byrne did not exercise the care and skill
reasonably expected of a physician assistant practicing in the Twin Falls, Idaho area in September
and October 2003. Testimony in this case, including the testimony of defendants' experts, will show

'

i--

that Mr. Byrne's care and treatment of Mrs. Schmechel entirely appropriate and in accordance with
the applicable standard of care. Therefore, there was no breach of the standard of care.
5. Plaintiffs are unable to establish, on a more probable than not basis, that
Mr. Byrne's care of Mrs. Schmechel caused her death.

Plaintiffs must also establish that Mr. Byrne's breach of the local standard of cru·e
proximately caused the plaintiffs' injuries. See generally Idaho Code § 6-!013; Newberry v.
Martens. 142 Idaho 284, 127 P.3d l 87 (2005); Swallowv. Emergency Medicine ofldaho. P.A., 138
Idaho 589. 594-95, 67 P.3d 68, 73-74 (2003). Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital, Inc., 122
Idaho 47,830 P.2d 1185 (1992); Fussell v. St. Clair, 120 Idaho 591,818 P.2d 295 (1991).Fau v.
Greenwood, !OJ Idaho 387, 613 P.2d 1338 (1980); Doe v. Sisters of the Holy Cross, 126 Idaho
1036, 895 P.2d 1229 (Ct. App. 1995). Plaintiffs are required to establish causation by competent
expert medical testimony because issues such as medical causation a11d medical prognosis are
typically outside the competency, knowledge or experience of the jury, See Swallow, 138 Idaho at
594-595, 67 P .3d at 73-74; Dodge-Farrarv, American Cleaning Services Co.• Inc., 137 Idaho 838, 54
P.3d 954 (2002); Maxwell v. Women's Clinic, P.A., 102 Idaho 53,625 P.2d 407 (1981); Hall v,
Bacon, 93 Idaho 1,453 P.2d 816 (1969); Scofield v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital. 90 Idaho
186, 409 P.2d 107, 109 (1965). In Swallow. the court cited with approval Evans v. Twin Falls
DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE'S TRJAL BRIEF· 10
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Couni:y, 118 ldaho 210,214,796 P.2d 87,91 (1990)(citing 31A Am. Jur.2d, Expert & Opinion

'

!

Evidence. section 207) as follows:

1

Where the subject matter regarding the cause of disease, injury, or death of a person
is wholty scientific or so far removed from the usual and ordinary experience of the
average person that expert knowledge is essential to the formation of an intelligent
opinion, only an expert can competently give opinion evidence as to the cause of
death, disease or physical condition.
Swallow, 67 P.3d at 77.
In Swallow, the court held that a jury oflay people was not qualified to determine the cause
of the plaintiff's heart attack without the assistance of expert testimony, upon the grounds that such
causation was, "a matter o.f science that is far removed from the usual and ordinary experience of the
average person." Id. For guidance, the Swallow court examined similar results reached by the court
in Bloching v. Albertson's, Inc., 129 Idaho 844,934 P.23 17 (l 997)(findingthat a lay person was not.
qualified to testify as to the cause of plaintiff's seizure); Evans, supra (finding that a lay person was
not qualified to testify as to the cause of his wife's cardiac arrest); and Flowerdew v. Warner, 90
Idaho 164, 409 P.2d I 10 (1965)(holding that a lay person was not qualified to testify that his
physician's treatment of him caused his injuries). As such, plaintiffs must establish, through
competent expert testimony, that Mr. Byrne's care and treatment of Mrs. Schmechel is the proximate
cause of plaintiffs' claimed damages.
Proximate cause is composed of two factors. Marias v. Marano. 120 Idaho 11, 13,813 P.2d
350,352 (1991); Henderson v. Comminco American, Inc., 95 Idaho 690, 695-96, 518 P.2d 873, 87879 (1974); Doe v.. Sisters of the Holy Cross, J30 Idaho 705, 708, 946 P .2d 1345, 1349 (Ct. App.
1995). The first factor of the proximate cause analysis is cause-in-fact (also referred to as "actual
cause") and the second factor is scope of legal responsibility (also referred to as "foreseeability").
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Marias, 120 Idaho at 13,813 P.2d at 352; Munson v. State Dept. of Highways, 96Idaho 529,531
P.2d 1174 (1975); Doe, 946 P.2d at 1349.
The determination of the first factor, cause-in-fact, is a factuai finding of whether defendants'
action was an actual cause of plaintiffs' harm, Ficarrov. McCoy, 126 Idaho 122, 126-127, 879 P.2d
30, 34-35 (Ct. App. 1994), while the second factor, legal responsibility, is a legal determination of
whether legal responsibility'should attach to defendant as a result of defendants' conduct. Henderson
at 695-696, 518 P:2d 878-879; Ficarro, 879 P.2d at 34-35.
Furthermore, the negligence of a party will not be considered the proximate cause of
plaintiffs' damages if such damages would have occurred notwithstanding the negligence.
Moreover, as noted above, expe1i testimony is required to establish causation in a medical
malpractice case. Plus, to satisfy the causation element, plaintiffs must demonstrate, through expert
testimony, that, but for Mr. Byrne's treatment of Mrs. Schmechel, plaintiffs would not have incurred
the damages they allege in this case.
The facts at trial will demonstrate that, on a more probable than not basis, Mrs. Schmechel's
death was a cardiac death, likely a fatal dysrhytbmia. The evidence is expected to show that, in all
respects, Mr. Byrne's care and treatment of Mrs. Schmechel met the applicable standard ofcare of a
physician assistant practicing in Twin Falls, Idaho, and that Mr. Byrne's care did not cause or
substantially contribute to Mrs. Schmechel' s death. Furthermore, the evidence will show that Mrs.
Schmechel' s death was the result of her preexisting conditions and/or her failure to properly take the
medication as prescribed.
6.

Plaintiffs' claimed damages are very limited in this case.

The Complaint asserts plaintiffs will seek damages for: (1) loss of past and future financial
support, household services, guidance and assistance; (2) medical and funeral expenses; (3) loss of
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past and future spousal and parental consortium, love, protection, comfort, companionship, society,
guidance, advice and intellectual training; and (4) other damages.
In general, plaintiffs bear the burden of proving not only a right to damages, but also the fact
and amount of damages. Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc., 143 Idaho 733, 152 P.3d 604,611
(2007); Sohn v. Foley, 125 Idaho 168,173,868 P.2d 496, 501 (Ct. App. 1994); Beare v. Stowes'
Builders Supply, Inc., 104 Idaho 317,658 P.2d 988,992 (Ct. App. 1983); Fish v. Fleislurum, 87
Idaho 126, 391 P.2d 344 (1964). The plaintiffs must establish the amount of damages with
reasonable certainty and sufficient proofmust exist to take the measure of damages out of the realm
of speculation. Griffith, 143 Idaho 733, 152 P.3d 604, 61 l, (2007); Homer v. Sani-Top, Inc., 143
Idaho 230, 141 P.3d 1099, 1106 (2006); Sells v. Robinson, 141 Idaho 767, 773, 118 P.3d 99, !05
(2005); McAtee v. Faulkner Land & Livestock, Inc., 113 Idaho 393, 744 P.2d 121 (Ct. App. 1987);
Eliopulos v. Condo Farms, Inc., 102 Idaho 915,643 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Ct. App. 1982) ("Damages
must be proven with reasonable certainty. The existence and extent of damages cannot be left to
speculation.")
Where a claim is asserted for the recovery of future damages, the burden of proof is on the
plaintiffs to prove with reasonable certainty the amount of loss caused by the conduct of the
defendant. Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Jnc., 143 Idaho 733, 152 P.3d 604,611 (2007); Homer
v. Sani-Top, Inc., 143 Idaho 230,141 P.3d 1099, 1106 (2006); Smith v. Mitton, l40Jdaho 893, 899900, 104 P.3d 367, 373-374 (2004); O'Dell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796,810 P.2d 1082, 1098 (1991).
The award must not be based upon mere conjecture or speculation. Id.

a. Plaintiffs cannot Recover for Past and Future Lost Income.
Although there are numerous plaintiffs in the instant action, only Vaughn Schmechel has a
claim for past or future lost income as a result of Mrs. Schmechel's death. Mr. Sclunechel is unable
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to remove his claim lost income (past or future) from the realm of speculation. Mr. Schmechel
claims that he has been damaged by defendants in that Mrs. Schmechel is no longer able to work at
the family's drywall business. However, there is no record of the company every paying Mrs.
Schmechel for her work, the amount she worked, the value of her services, or that she ever received
any payment for her services. As such, Mr. Schmechel is unable to establish the amount of work
Mrs. Schmechel perfom1ed for the drywall company, that she was ever paid a wage for the work that
she performed, or the value of her services. Without sufficient evidence as to any of these matters
Mr. Schmechel is unable to establish these alleged damages with any certainty, or remove such
. damages from the realm of speculation.
Further, Mrs. Schmechel had applied for and was receiving disability payments from the
Social Security Administration. To receive disability payments, Mrs. Schmechel had represented to
the Social Security Administration that she could not work, and after an investigation, the Social
Security Administration had agreed. Because of this representation and finding, Mrs. Schmechel's
estate should be estopped from claiming, after her death, that she was, and would continue into the
future, to perform work for which her estate should be compensated.
Mr. Schmechel is unable to provide sufficient evidence of these damages to take them ont of
the realm of speculation and is not entitled to recover such unsubstantiated claims. Further, plaintiffs
should be estopped from recovering these damages based on the fact that Mrs. Schmechel had been
found permanently disabled and was receiving disability pay.
b.

Mr. Scbmecbel Cannot Recover for Services
Obtained Without Expense, Obligation or Liability,

As with the claim for past or future lost income, only Vaughn Schmechel has a claim for loss
of household services resulting from Mrs. Sclnnechel' s death. As a general rule, an individual is not
entitled to recover the reasonable value of services that he has obtained without expense, obligation
DEFENDANT THOMAS l BYRNE'S TRJAL BRJEF - 14
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or liability. Idaho Code§ 6-1606 specifically precludes the recovery of damages which the plaintiffs
have already recovered from collateral sources as compensation for the same iajury. Section 6-1606

!

provides:

1)

l

6-1606. Prohibiting double recoveries from collateral sources. -- In any action for

!l

personal injuzy or property damage, a judgment may be entered for the claimant only for
damages which exceed amounts received by the claimant from collateral sources as
compensation for the personal injury or property damage, whether from private, group or
governmental sources, and whether contributory or noncontributory. For the purposes of
this section, collateral sources shall not include benefit paid under federal programs
which by law must seek subrogation, death benefits paid under life insurance contracts,
benefits paid by a service corporation organized under chapter 34, title 41, Idaho Code,
and benefits paid which are recoverable under subrogation rights created under Idaho
law or by contract. Evidence of payment by collateral sources is admissible to the court
after the finder of fact has rendered an award. Such award shall be reduced by the court
to the extent the award includes compensation for damages which have been
compensated independently from collateral sources.

l

i1
l

I''
l
l

1

The rule prohibiting reduction for collateral source payments applies to insurance benefits,
payments or other.forms of compensation for which there is a right of subrogation for the payments.
However, the rule does not apply and should not be applied in cases where the plaintiffs incur no
expenses, obligation or liability in obtaining the services of which they are seeking compensation,
and for which the plaintiff has no legal obligation to repay the source of such payments or services.
See Florida Physicians Ins. Reciprocal v. Stanley.452 So. 2d 514,515 (Fla. 1984); Peterson, supra.
See also, Overton v. United States, 619 F.2d 1299, 1308-9 (8th Cir, 1980); Swanson v. United States
by and throygh Veterans Admin., supra, 557 F. Supp. at 1047 (upon similar reasoning, defendant
entitled to an offset equal to the amount of Veterans Administration benefits paid to the plaintiff and

1

the present value of future Veterans Administration benefits to be paid to the plaintiff).

lI

Mr. Sclunechel seeks damages for the value of the household services that Mrs, Schmechel

2.

provided to him as his wife. However, the evidence will establish that certain household services

l
i

'.
j

1

'

were provided to Mr. Schmechel by Mr. Lewis, Amber Zaccone and Ms. Hall beginning immediately
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after Mrs. Schmechel's death without charge or obligation to repay. Therefore, to the extent that

l

l

Mr. Schmechel has obtained services for household services previously pe1fonned by Mrs.

j

I

Schmechel without out-of-pocket expense, such amounts may not be recovered in this action.
c.

l

Plaintiffs' Claims for Non-Economic Damages are Limited by
Idaho Code§ 6-1603.

I
II
l

Plaintiffs' damages are limited by Idaho Code § 6-1603, which places a limitation on the
recovery of non-economic damages in personal injury actions. TI1at section provides:
6-1603. Umitation on Non-economic Damages
(I) In no action seeking damages for personal injury, including death, shall a
judgment for Non-economic damages be entered for a claimant exceeding the
maximum amount of two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000); provided,
however, that beginning on July 1, 2004, and each July I thereafter, the cap on Noneconomic damages established in this section shall increase or decrease in accordance
with the percentage an10unt of increase or decrease by which the Idaho industrial
commission adjusts the average annual wage as computed pursuant to section 72409(2), Idaho Code.
(2)

The limitation contained in this section applies to the sum of:
(a) noneconomic damages sustained by a claimant who ·incurred personal
injury or who is asserting a wrongful death;

(b) noneconomic damages sustained by a claimant, regardless ofthe number
of persons responsible for the damages or the number of actions filed.
(3)

If a case is tried to a jury, the jury shall not be infonned of the limitation
contained in subsection (1) of this section.

(4)

The limitation of awards of Non-economic damages shall not apply to:
(a) Causes of action arising out of willful or reckless misconduct.
(b) Causes of action arising out of an act or acts which the trier of fact finds
beyond a reasonable doubt would constitute a felony under state or federal
law.

Idaho Code § 6-1603.
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B.

The Comparative Negligence of Other Persons Limits the Liability, if any, of Mr.
Byrne.

Mr. Byrne's liability in this case is limited to his own proportion of fault as may be
determined by the jury. Idaho Code § 6-801 provides that a plaintiffs or decedent's contributory
negligence or comparative responsibility diminishes a plaintiffs ability to recover against a
defendant "in the proportion to the amount ofnegligence or comparative responsibility atmbutable to
the person recovering." Further, in the event the trier of fact determines that a plaintiffs negligence
or comparative responsibility is as great as defendant's, plaintiff is barred from recovering damages.
Furthermore, under Idaho Code § 6-802, the Court is required, when requested by any party,
to "direct the jury to find separate special verdicts determining the amount of damages and the

!
j,

percentage of negligence or comparative responsibility attributable to each party .... " I.C. § 6-802.

l

Under this section, the Court must submit a special verdict form with the names ofevery person who
may have contributed to the plaintiffs' iajury, regardless of whether those persons are parties to the
action or are protected from liability by operation of!aw. Le'Gall v. Lewis County. 129 ldaho 182,
923 P.2d 427,430 (1996); Lasselle v. Special Products Co., 106 Idaho 170, 677 P.2d 483,485
(1983); Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783,621 P.2d 399 (1980); see
also Hickman Fraternal Order of Eagles, 114 Idaho 545, 758 P.2d 704, 706 (1988). In Pocatello
Industrial Park Co., the comt held as follows:
It is established without doubt that, when apportioning negligence, a jury must have the
opportunity to consider the negligence of all parties to the transaction, whether or not
they be parties to the lawsuit and whether or not they can be liable to the plaintiff or to
the other ton-feasors either by operation of Jaw or because of a prior release,
Pocatello Industrial Park Co., 621 P.2d at 403 (quoting with approval Connar v. West Shore
Eguipment of Milwaukee, Inc., 68 Wis. 2d 42, 227 N.W.2d 660,662 (1975)). The court went on to
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explain that negligence cannot be properly apportioned unless all tort-feasors guilty of causal
negligence are included. Pocatello Industrial Park Co., 621 P.2d at 403.

I

As a general proposition, a patient may negligently contribute to his or her injuries,

l

notwithstanding the negligence of the health care provider. See, 5'&, Adams v. Krueger, 124 ldaho
74, 76,856 P.2d 864,866 (1993); Birknerv. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1060 (Utah 1989);
Coyne v. Cirilli, 45 Or. App. 177, 607 P.2d I383 (l 980); Brazil v. United States, 484 F. Supp. 986
(N.D. Ala. 1979) (recognizing the patient's duty to cooperate with his or her physician and to follow
all proper instructions given to him/her); see also BAn 6.28 (6th Ed.) ("It is the duty of a patient to
use ordinary and reasonable care to follow all reasonable and proper advice and instructions given by
his or her [health care provider] regarding the patient's care, activities and treatment. The [heal1h
care provider] is not liable for any injury resulting from the negligent failure of the patient to follow
such advice and instructions.")
In the case at bar, the evidence will show, among other things, that Mrs. Schmechel failed to
take medications as prescribed and, if her family's testimony is accepted as true, failed to seek
medical attention when needed. In addition, if certain testimony by the family members is accepted
as true, then some of the plaintiffs failed to act in a reasonable manner. Until the evidence is
presented at trial, Mr. Byrne does not know what will or will not be testified to by the witnesses and,
therefore, are uncertain whether some of plaintiffs should be included on the verdict fonn. Until
evidence is presented at trial, Mr. Byrne is uncertain whether he will request that Mrs. Schmechel
and or any or all of the plaintiffs be included on the Special Verdict as responsible parties for l\1rs.
Schrnechel 's death and plaintiffs' claimed damages. As such, Mr. Byrne reserves the right to amend
his proposed Special Verdict Form until after some or all ofthe evidence has been presented at trial.
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l
c.

l

Plaintiffs' Counsel May Not Use a "Golden Rule" Argument in Statements to the
Jury.

r

l

I

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "golden rule" arguments, i.e., asking the jurors to
place themselves in the plaintiffs or defendant's shoes, are improper ifused to "influence the damage
award." Lopez v, Langer, 114 Idaho 873, 761 P.2d 1225, 1230-31 (1988). In Lopez, the court
condoned the argument which was given by defendant's counsel, but only because the defendant's

l

'i

J

argument was moderate in nature and was directed toward the reasonableness of a party's actions.

I:

The COUit held:

j

!

[T}he "golden rule" argument is only appropriate when used to ask the
jury to assess the reasonableness of a party's actions by relying on
their ovvn common sense and life expenses. The golden rule
argument is never appropriate when used to influence the damage
award, Our holding is in accord with the majority of courts which
have decided this issue.
The "golden rule'.' argument is uniformly prohibited where it is used to inflame the jury and
encourage an increased damage award, Typically, in such situations, the plaintiff's attorney will ask
the jury members to place themselves "in the shoes of the plaintiff' by asking them to question
themselves as to how much they would wish to be paid to endure the damage plaintiff has suffered.
Such argument is universally recognized as improper because it encourages the jury to depart from
neutrality and to decide the case on the merits of personal interests and bias rather than on the
evidence. Jg. at 1231 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Thus, the use of any "golden
rule" argument to influence damages by plaintiffs' counsel would be improper and grounds for a
mistrial.
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DATED this ~ay of October, 2007.

HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT
& BLANTON, P.A.

By_t:."J.M,~-L.4,t:a.4-,<:C_----Keely E uke • f the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J. Byrne
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the qf:::day of October, 2007, I caused to be served a true copy
of the foregoing DEFENDANT THOMAS J. BYRNE'S TRIAL BRIEF, by the method indicated
below, and addressed to each of the following:
David Comstock
Law Offices of Comstock & Bush
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 500
P.O. Box 2774
Boise, Idaho 83701
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Fax No.: (208) 344-7721
Steven J. Hippler
GIVENS PURSLEY
601 W. Bannock ST.
POBox2720
Boise ID 83701-2720
Attorneys for Clinton Dille, }.,f.D. and
Southern Idaho Pain Institute

/u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
__ Overnight Mail
__ Telecopy

./'u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
__ Overnight Mail
__ Telecopy
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 'IBE FIFTH JUDIClAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

Plaintiffs,

"'

2007 OCT IO AM 7: 53

!SB #6044; ked@hallfarley.com

VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually,
and as Surviving Spoiise and Personal
Representative of the Estate ofROSALlE
SCH.MECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P.
LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA
HALL nat\ll'al children of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased,

f[lti-i::.

Case No. CV-05-4345

DEFENDANT THOMAS BYRNE,
P.A.'S JOINDER IN CLINTON
DILLE, M.D. AND SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAlN INS'.rlTUTE'S REPLY
TO PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN
LIMINE

vs.

CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO :PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A. a:nd
JOHN DOE, I through X,
Defendants.

Defendant Thomas Byme, P.A., hereby joins in, as if his own, Clinton Dille, M.D. and
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Southern Idaho Pain Inslitute's Reply to Plaintiffs' Responses to Defendants' Motions in Limine
("Reply") filed on or about October 9, 2007. As such, that reply serves as a Reply in S11pport of Mr.
Byrne's Motion in Limine Re: Various Issues.
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of the foregoing DEFENDANT THOMAS BYRNE, P.A.'S .JOINDER IN CLINTON DILLE,

M.D. AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE'S REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS'
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANl"S' MOTIONS IN LIMINE, by the method indicated below, and
addressed to each of the following;
lJavid Comstock
Law Offices of Comstock & Bush
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 500
P.O. Box 2774
Boise, Idaho 83701
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Fax No.: (208) 344-7721
Steven J. Hippler
GIVENS PURSLEY
601 W. Bannock ST.
POBox2720
Boise ID 83701-2720
Attorneyofor Clinton Dille, MD. and
Southern ldC1ho Pain lnslitute
Fax No.; (208) 388-1300
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U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
_
Overnight Mail
1./'Telecopy

viJ.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
__ Overnight Mail
_iL'f'elecopy
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fN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATe OFlDAHO,IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually,
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P.
LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA
HALL natural children of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased,
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JOHN DOE, I through X,
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COMES NOW the defendants, Thomas Byrne, P.A.; Clinton Dille, M.D., and Southern Idaho
Pain Institute, by and through their counsels ofrecord, Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., and
Givens Pursley and hereby submits this Joint Exhibir List as of October 10, 2007. Defendants
reserve the right to withdraw, revise, or supplement any of these exhibits, and/or to submit further
exhibits to confonn to proof presented at the time oftJ:ial.
DATED this lo'!!:day of October, 2007.
HALL,FARLEY,OBERRECHT
& BLANTO , P.A.

GIVENS PURSLEY
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I HER.EBY CERT1FY that on the I O ~ay of October, 2007, I caused to be served a true copy

of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' JOINT EXHIBIT UST, by the method indicated below, and
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David Comstock
Law Offices of Comstock & Bush
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste, 500
P.O. Box 2774
Boise, Idaho 83 70 l
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Fax No.: (208) 344-7721

__ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
HllIJd Delivered
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Steven J. Hippler
GlVENS PURSLEY
601 W. Bannock ST.
PO Box 2720
Boise ID 83701-2720
Attorneys for Clinton Dille, M.D. and
Southern Idaho Pain Institute
Fax No.: (208) 388-1300
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200.

Southern Idaho Pain Institutc's Medical
Records for Rosalie Soltmeche1

200(A)

9118/03 Paiienl Information (Southern
ldoho Pain Inslituto)

200(B)

9118103 Completed Puin Questionnaire
(Southern Idaho P11in Tnstirure)

200(C)

9/26/03 Hendwritten Churl Nol<
(Southom ldoho Pain Institute)

200(D)

9/26/03 Drug Contraci (Southetn Idaho
Pain Instituto)

200(E)

9/26/03 Dictated History & Physical
(Southern Idaho Pain Institute)

200(F)

200(G)
200(H)
200(1)

7/13/0l MRI Record from Magic Valley
Regional Medical Cenier
9/26103 Handwrill<n Instructions
(Southern Idaho P_oin Inslilute)
9/26/03 Release from Dr. Verst
(Southern Idaho Pain Institute)

9/9/03 Letter to Kimberly Vorse from
Dr. Verst

200(J)

9/29/03 Office Note (Southern ldoho
Pain Institute)

200(K)

9/30/03 Office Note (Southern Idaho
Pain Institute)

201,

Appt Book- Southern ldoho Pain Clinic
for 9126103

202.

for Rosalie Schm~hel

202(A)
202(6)

202(C)
202(0)

202(!")
202(F)
202(G)
202(H)

202(1)

PhYsicien's Center's Medical Records
9/25/03 Chm Note
8/27/03 Chan Note

5/6/02 Chm Note
10/24/01 Chan Note
7112/01 Chart Note
5/30101 Chart Note
5/l 1/01 Chart Noto
5/1/01 Chart Note
5/1/01 Diagnostic Jmaging Report
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20:l(J)

202(K)
20;!(L)

202(M)
202(N)

2116188 Lab Report
4/20195 Lah Report
10181971,al:> Rep on
511/01 Lab Report
12116102 Lab Report

203.

Sun Valley Pain Management's Medical
Records for Rosalie Sthmechel

203(A)

9116103 Chart Note (Dr, Kimb<rly
Vorso)

203(8)
203(C)

203(D)
203(E)
203(F)
203(G)

203(H)
203(1)
203(J)

203(K)

204.
205,
206,

207,
208.
209.

8/19/03 Chart No\e

7124103 Chart Note
711103 Chart Noto
613103 Chart Note
5/6/03 Char\ Note
3/6/01 Faticnt Educfilion and Agrcoment

713101 Leuer fl'om Abbot Phurrnacoutlcal
ri:garcllng medication a$Sistnnce
713101 J~divldual Patient Assis!Ance
Progr"'°
Patient Assistance Program Applioation

.

Abbott I'AP Applica\ion
Vers\ Spine and Orthop<dio Core's
Medical Records for Rosalie Schmechel
10/02/03 TFCO Sheritl:'s Report
TFCO Shmff s photographs

10/03103 TFCO Coroner's R<porl
TFCO Coroner's Photo
Ada County Pathologist (Glen (lroben)
Report and File

2

3 ') 9

210.
211.

212.

213.
214.

215.
216.

Phntmacy Records-Tho Medicino
Shoppe- Computer Prin,oot

l'!\lll'l1>aey Record, - K-Matt
Pharmacy Records- Cosu:o
Pharmacy Records -Modiool Office
l'lmrmacy (Dtck's)

Phl>,rmacy Records - Expross ScriplS,
tnc,

RESERVED

219,

The Mcdioiru, Sh0ppe - preeicrlptlon
script end oomputer generored label
vdrocodonc 9/1~103
The Medicine Shoppe - computer
genermed prcs<iflptlon label (Melhll(lone)
912(,/03
Insert from The Medicine Shoppe re:
liydrocodoru,

220.

lose,, :fl'Pm 1'he Mcdicino Shoppe re:
Methadone

221,

Qxycontln Label 9118/03
(Photograph)

217.
218.

221.6

O,cycontln Label 8/ZJ 103
(l'hotol!J'lll'h)
Oxycontin Labtl 7/16/il3
(Photogmph)

221.C

Loose ()xyoontin Pills
(Photo Graphs)

222.

liydrooodono Label 9f.!6/03
(l'hoto;;raph)

222.A

Hydrocodonc Labo! 9118/0;l
(Pb0togrnph)

221,A

222.e

Hydroood¢no Label I124103

(Photograph)

223.

Methadone Lobel 9126/03
(Photograph)

223.A

Methadone Pills
(Phou,gmph)

224.

Bcstra Label 9/12/03
(Photograph)

224.A

Bextra Labol 7115103
(Photogrnph)

Z?5,

Purosemi~ Lobel a/11103
(Pho1ogroph)
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225.A

Hydrochlorothiazidc 913/02
(Photograph)

226.

Amitriptylin• 9/12/03
(Photograph)

226.A

Amitripty\ine 718/03
(Photograph)

226.B

Amitriptyllne 7/8/03
(Photograph)

226.C

Norvasc 914M
(Photograph)

226.D

U!tram in HydrocodMe Bottle
(Photograph)

226.E

Loperamide Hydrochloride
(PllorogNlJ)h)

226.F

Trileptal 3/l 8/02
(Photosraph)

226.G

Blue Pill
(Photograph)

226.H

Mul!!colored Pills
(Photograph)

226.I

Bio-Metabolic
(Photograph)

226.J

Loose Pills (22908)
(Photograph)

226.K

Enalapril Maloate 9/4103
(Phorograph)

226.L

Photogi-aph of Pills/BotUe,
(Photograph)

227.

Pill Bottles and medications from
Coroncr)s office

228.

Chart of Pill Counr t!lken at Coroner's
office

229,

Medical Records from Tim Johans, MD
regarding Rosalie Schmcchcl

230.

Medical Records from Sun Valley Spine
Institute regarding Rosalie Schmechel

231.

232.

Medical Records from Magic Valley
Regional Medical Center regarding
Rosalie Schmechel
Medic~! Records from Sun Valley SportS
Medicine regarding Rosalie Schmechel

234.

11114101 llmploymcmt Contract/Job
Description ofThomas Byrne
w/Southern Idaho Pain Institute
T...icensin,g Information fot Mr, Byrne:
(2003) Idaho Starn Board ofMedioinc

235.

Licensing Informn:tlon for Mr, Byrne
(2003) Drug llnforcemenl Agonoy

233.
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236.

Licensing lnfom,ation for Mr. Byme
(2003) Idaho $!!11e Boo,:d of Pharmnc;,,

237.

Licensing lnfonnation for Mr. Syrne
(2005) Drug Enforooment Agency

2$8.
2$9.

240.
241.
242.

243.

244.
245.
246.
247.

248.

RESERVED
Southern ldallo Pain lnstitute's Land
Linc Tclehone Records. and Home
Tole hone Records Land Line) of Dille
Cell Phone Records - Dille
Cell Phone Rocords - Byrne
Qwest Telephone Recm-ds - Byrne
Land l,ineRccords-Vaughn Schmcchel
Cell Phone Records - Vaughn
Schmechel

Cell Phone Records - Robert Lewis
Cell Phone Rccorcis -Tamaro Hall
Cell Phone Records - Kim Howard
2006 TEI:< Records Vaughn und Rosalle
Schmechel (including any supp0rtin11
documents

24~.

250.

251.
252.

2005 Ta.x Records Vaughn and Rosati•
Scbmechel (Including any supporting
documents
2004 Tax Records Vaughn and Rosalie
Schmcchcl (including ony supporting
documents
2003 Tax Records Vaughn and Rosalie
Schmechel (including any supponing
documents
2002 Tax Records Vaughn and Rosalie
Schmechel (including any supperting
documents

253.

2001 Tax Records Vnughn and Rosalie
Schmcchel (Including any supporting
documents

254.

2000 Ta>. Records Vaughn and Rosalie
Schmechel (inoluding any supp0rting
documents

265.

256.

1999 Tax Records Vaughn ond Rosalie
Schmcchcl (including ony supporting
'1ocumcnts
1998 Tnx Records Vaughn and Rosalie
Schmechel (including :my supponing
documents
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257.
258.

1997 Tax Records Vaughn and Rosalie
Schmechel (including any supporting
documents
1996 Tax Records Vaughn and Rosalie
Schmcchcl (including any supponing

280.

documcmts
1995 Tax Records Vaughn and Rosalie
Schmechel (including nny supporting
documents
Any records relating to Vaughn and
Rosalie Schmechel or any business
ownc:d or operated by Vaughn

261.

Sohmc,chol nnd/or Rosalie Schmcchcl in
the custod of Chris Fre
Social $e<:;uthy Records of Rosalie
Schmcchd

262.

Poweq>o!nt slides produced by plaintiffs'
experts, including by Dr. AnhurLlpman

259.

263.

263.A

263.B

263.C

Plaintiffs' Answers and Responses to
Defendant Thomas Byrne's First
Interrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents
Plaintiffs' SuppJeroenral Answers and
Responses to Defendanr Thomas Byme1 s
First Jnterrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents
Plaintiffs' Responses to Defendant
Thomas Byrne's Second Set of Requests
for Production of Dooumonts
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Respon(')S \o
Defe11dant Thomas Byrne1 s Second Set
of Requests for Production of

Documents
262.D

264,E

264.F

264.
265.
266.
267.

268.

Plain\iffs' Second Supplemenl•I
Responses to Dr::fcndm1t Thomas Byrne's
Second Set of Requests for Production of
Documents
Plaintiffs 1 Third Supplemental
Responses to Defendant Thomas Byrne's
Second Set of Requests for .Production of
Documents
Plaintifts' Foutth Supplemental
Responses to Defendant Thomas Byrne's
Second Set of Requests for Production of
Documents
Ueposi\ion Duccs Teoum of Vaughn
Sclimeohel
Curriculum Vil•e of Bradford Haro, MD
Curriculum Vit~ of William Binogar,
MD

Curriculum Vitae of lanai O'Donnell
Curriculum Vitae of Keri Fakata,
Pharm.D.
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269.
270,
271.

272.

Curriculum Vitae of Rodde Cox, MD
Curriculum Vitae of James Smith, MD

Curriculum Vitae of Scott Phillips, MD

273.

Certificate of Conviction and records or
conviction of Robert Lewis

274,

Cerclfico.te of Conviction and ri:cords of
conviction of Amber Zaccone

275.

CcJtificate or Conviction and record:s of
conviction of Kim Howard

276.

Delegation of Servic~ Agreement dated
April 200:I

277.
278.

RESERVED
RESERVED
Detnonstrafivd!11usrrativ~ Exhibits
Defendant reserves the right t0 uso any
documcm or taI'Jgiblt: items for
Im. eaohmcnt u oses
Defendant reserves the right to use any
deposi\lon exhibit in !his matter and to
Identify impeachment e"1ribits at a later
date
Defendant reserves the ri&ht to use any
exhibit identified by any parLY in this
matter
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DlSTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
Case No. CV 05-4345

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL
MEMORANDUM RE: PLAINTIFFS'
EXPERT JIM KELLER

Plaintiffs,

e<1:1tK •.

-----DEPUTY

Byron V. Foster
Attorney At Law
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste 500
P.O. Box 1584
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-4440
Facsimile: (208) 344-7721
ISB#: 2760

VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually, and
as Surviving Spouse and Personal
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P
LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA
HALL, natural children of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased,
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vs.
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., and
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X,
Defendants.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
In anticipation of an issue likely to come before the Court at trial, Plaintiffs
respectfully submit !his Second Supplemental Trial Memorandum for the Court's review.
The issue is whether the testimony of Jim Keller, PA, is qualified to testify in this matter,
and specifically, whether he is qualified to testify as to the local standard of care for
Twin Falls, Idaho at the time of Mrs. Schmechel's death.

II.

ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs have retained Jim Keller, PA, as an expert witnesses. Mr. Keller is the
Director of the Physician's Assistant Program at the Red Rocks Community Coflege in
Lakewood Colorado. Mr. Keller has reviewed all the pertinent medical records and the
depositions of Defendant Dille, Defendant Byrne, Kimberly Vorse, M.D., Glen Graben,
M.D., Stephen Lordon, M.D., Robert Lewis, Kim Howard, Tamara Hall and Vaughn
Schmechel.

In addition, Mr. Keller has spoken over the phone with Tom Rambow, a

pain management PA in Boise, Idaho and David Martin, PA-C, a professor in the PA
program at Idaho State University and Mr. Keller has reviewed several articles related to
Methadone and Sleep Apnea. Mr. Keller's opinions, as set forth in his affidavit, can be
summarized, in part, as follows:
1. Mr. Keller is of the opinion that it was a violation of the applicable
standard of care for Defendant Byrne to begin Mrs. Schrnechel on a new
drug regimen at the time that Mr. Byrne did, Mr. Byrne did not follow the
guidelines for medication changes with respect to Methadone, and Mr.
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL MEMORANDUM RE: PLAINTIFFS' EXPERT JIM
KELLER-2
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Byrne failed to monitor the effects of Methadone on Mrs. SchmecheL
2. Mr. Keller is also of the opinion that it was a violation of the standard of
care for Mr. Byrne· lo fail to communicate by telephone with Dr. Vorse,
Mrs. Schmechel's previous health care provider and pain management
physician, and fail to request Mrs. Schmechel's previous medical records.
3. Mr. Keller is also of the opinion that the instructions given to Mrs.
Schmechel, as indicated in Mr. Byrne's typewritten office note of
September 26, 2003, were confusing when contrasted against the hand
written instruction sheet which he also gave to Mrs. Schmeche! because
Mrs. Schmeche! could have interpreted the instructions to read that she
was to take an excessive dosage of Methadone in a short period of time.
4. Additionally, Mr. Keller is of the opinion that Defendant Byrne's initial
prescription for Methadone and Hydrocodone was a violation of the
standard of care because Mr. Byrne prescribed more than the amount
needed for an initial titration.
It is anticipated that the Defendants will attempt to preclude Mr. Kefler from
testifying regarding his opinions outlined above. The Plaintiffs respectfully request that
the Court deny such a request.

While Mr. Keller is a physician's assistant, not a

medical doctor, he is qualified to testify against the Defendant, Mr. Byrne, also a PA.
Specifically, the Defendants may try to preclude Mr. Keller from testifying based on the
theory that Mr. Keller is not qualified

to testify on the standard of care in Twin Falls at

the time of Mrs. Schmechel's death.
However, as set forth in Plaintiffs' Expert Disclosures, Mr. Keller is qualified to
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL MEMORANDUM RE: PLAINTIFFS' EXPERT JIM
KELLER-3
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testify regarding the standard of care in this case. An out of area expert may familiarize
himself or herself with the local standard of care in a medical malpractice case by
conferring with a local care-giver, and opine that at the relevant time and place, there
were no deviations from the national standard of care. Watts v. Lynn, 125 Idaho 341,
347 870 P.2d 1300, 1306 (1994).

The out of area expert familiar with the national

standard of care may review the deposition testimony of a local care-giver to become
familiar with the local standard of care, and subsequently opine that the local standard
of care is compatible with the national standard of care.

Kozlowski v. Rush, 121 Idaho

825, 828 P.2d 854 (1992). In Kozlowski, the Plaintiffs' expert, a doctor from Boston,
read the deposition of the Defendant, the depositions of several nurses, spoke to
physicians practicing in the local area, Pocatello, and read the deposition of another
physician practicing in Pocatello, which stated that the standard of care in Pocatelfo was
the same as the national standard of care.

The Idaho Supreme Court held that the

Plaintiffs' expert was qualified to testify as to whether the Defendant/physician breached
the standard of care in Pocatello because he read such depositions. 121 Idaho at 829,
828 P.2d at 859.
Similarly, in this case, Mr. Keller (from Denver, Colorado) reviewed the
deposition testimony of Mr. Byrne, Dr. Dille, Dr. Vorse, Dr. Graben, and Dr. Lordon, and
spoken to Tom Rambow, PA, and David Martin, PA-C, a professor in the PA program at
Idaho State University. In his review of the foregoing sources, it was revealed to Mr.
Keller that the standard of care in Twin Falls, Idaho, at the time Mrs. Schmeche! was
treated by the Defendants was no different than the standard of care in Denver.
Accordingly, Mr. Keller is qualified to testify as to the standard of care in Twin Falls at
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL MEMORANDUM RE: PLAINTIFFS' EXPERT JIM
KELLER-4
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the time Mrs. Schmechel was "treated" by the Defendants.
Moreover, the Defendants may seek to elicit testimony from one of their
disclosed experts,

Chris Kottensette, PA (also from Denver Colorado),

who the

Defendants assert is familiar with the local standard of care in Twin Falls because it
didn't deviate from the standard of care in Denver. This presents the Court with the
following equation: if A=B and B=C, then A=C.

If Mr. Kottenstette is from Denver and

believes the standard of care in Twin falls was no different then the standard of care in
Denver at the time Mrs. Schmechel was "treated," and Mr. Kottenstette is deemed
qualified to testify as to the local standard of care, then Mr. Keller, also a PA from
Denver, is deemed familiar with the local standard of care in Twin Falls at the time of
Mrs. Schmechel's death, and is therefore qualified to testify in this matter.

Ill.
CONCLUSION

The Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court allow Mr. Keller's testimony
because he is familiar with the local standard of care for Twin Falls, Idaho, at the time
Mrs. Schmechel sought treatment from the Defendants, and the standard did not
deviate from the standard of care in Denver, where Mr. Keller was and is a practicing
PA.
DATED this

I.;J- IAaay of October, 2007.

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL MEMORANDUM RE: PLAINTIFFS' EXPERT JIM
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

Id

day of October, 2007, I served a true and

correct copy of the above and foregoing instrumentt by method indicated below, upon:
Steven J. Hippler
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
PO Box2720

Boise, ID 83701-2720
Richard E. Hall
Keely E. Duke

HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, PA
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
PO Box 1271
Boise ID 83701

D
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
[a- Facsimile (208) 388-1300
B-- E~Mai!

D

0

ra[3--

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile (208) 395-8585

ENMail

,7/4A{M\1t_____
Tay!~ Mossman

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL MEMORANDUM RE: PLAINTIFFS 1 EXPERT JIM
KELLER-6

320

David E. Comstock ISB # 2455
Taylor Mossman ISB #: 7500
LAW OFFICES OF COMSTOCK & BUSH
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste 500
PO Box 2774
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 344-7700
Facsimile:
(208) 344-7721

-------- -~--------~

DEPUTY

Byron V. Foster
Attorney At Law
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste 500
P.O. Box 1584
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-4440
Facsimile: (208) 344-7721
ISB #: 2760
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually, and
as Surviving Spouse and Personal
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P
LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA
HALL, natural children of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased,

Case No. CV 05-4345

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL
MEMORANDUM RE: PLAINTIFFS'
EXPERT JIM KELLER

..• Plaintiffs,
vs.
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., and
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I thmugh X,
Defendants.

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL TRIAL MEMORANDUM RE: PLAINTIFFS' EXPERT JIM
KELLER-1

I.
INTRODUCTION

In anticipation of an issue likely to come before the Court at trial, Plaintiffs
respectfully submit this Second Supplemental Trial Memorandum for the Court's review.
The issue is whether the testimony of Jim Keller, PA, is qualified to testify in this matter,
and specifically, whether he is qualified to testify as to the local standard of care for
Twin Falls, Idaho at the time of Mrs. Schmechel's death.
II.
ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs have retained Jim Keller, PA, as an expert witnesses. Mr. Keller is the
Director of the Physician's Assistant Program at the Red Rocks Community College in
Lakewood Colorado. Mr. Keller has reviewed all the pertinent medical records and the
depositions of Defendant Dille, Defendant Byrne, Kimberly Vorse, M.D., Glen Groben,
M.D., Stephen Lordon, M.D., Robert Lewis, Kim Howard, Tamara Hall and Vaughn
Schmechel.

In addition, Mr. Keller has spoken over the phone with Tom Rambow, a

pain management PA in Boise, Idaho and David Martin, PA-C, a professor in the PA
program at Idaho State University and Mr. Keller has reviewed several articles related to
Methadone and Sleep Apnea. Mr. Keller's opinions, as set forth in his affidavit, can be
summarized, in part, as follows:
1. Mr. Keller is of the opinion that it was a violation of the applicable
standard of care for Defendant Byrne to begin Mrs. Schmechel on a new
drug regimen at the time that Mr. Byrne did, Mr. Byrne did not follow the
guidelines for medication changes with respect to Methadone, and Mr.
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Byrne failed to monitor the effects of Methadone on Mrs. Schmechel.
2. Mr. Keller is also of the opinion that it was a violation of the standard of
care for Mr. Byrne to fail to communicate by telephone with Dr. Vorse,
Mrs. Schmechel's previous health care provider and pain management
physician, and fail to request Mrs. Schmechel's previous medical records.
3. Mr. Keller is also of the opinion that the instructions given to Mrs.
Schmechel, as indicated in Mr. Byrne's typewritten office note of
September 26, 2003, were confusing when contrasted against the hand
written instruction sheet which he also gave to Mrs. Schmechel because
Mrs. Schmechel could have interpreted the instructions to read that she
was to take an excessive dosage of Methadone in a short period of time.
4. Additionally, Mr. Keller is of the opinion that Defendant Byrne's initial
prescription for Methadone and Hydrocodone was a violation of the
standard of care because Mr. Byrne prescribed more than the amount
needed for an initial titration.
It is anticipated that the Defendants will attempt to preclude Mr. Keller from
testifying regarding his opinions outlined above. The Plaintiffs respectfully request that
the Court deny such a request.

While Mr. Keller is a physician's assistant, not a

medical doctor, he is qualified to testify against the Defendant, Mr. Byrne, also a PA.
Specifically, the Defendants may try to preclude Mr. Keller from testifying based on the
theory that Mr. Keller is not qualified to testify on the standard of care in Twin Falls at
the time of Mrs. Schmechel's death.
However, as set forth in Plaintiffs' Expert Disclosures, Mr. Keller is qualified to
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testify regarding the standard of care in this case. An out of area expert may familiarize
himself or herself with the local standard of care in a medical malpractice case by
conferring with a local care-giver, and opine that at the relevant time and place, there
were no deviations from the national standard of care. Watts v. Lynn, 125 Idaho 341,
347 870 P.2d 1300, 1306 (1994).

The out of area expert familiar with the national

standard of care may review the deposition testimony of a local care-giver to become
familiar with the local standard of care, and subsequently opine that the local standard
of care is compatible with the national standard of care.

Kozlowski v. Rush, 121 Idaho

825, 828 P.2d 854 (1992). In Kozlowski, the Plaintiffs' expert, a doctor from Boston,
read the deposition of the Defendant, the depositions of several nurses, spoke to
physicians practicing in the local area, Pocatello, and read the deposition of another
physician practicing in Pocatello, which stated that the standard of care in Pocatello was
the same as the national standard of care.

The Idaho Supreme Court held that the

Plaintiffs' expert was qualified to testify as to whether the Defendant/physician breached
the standard of care in Pocatello because he read such depositions. 121 Idaho at 829,
828 P.2d at 859.
Similarly, in this case, Mr. Keller (from Denver, Colorado) reviewed the
deposition testimony of Mr. Byrne, Dr. Dille, Dr. Vorse, Dr. Groben, and Dr. Lordon, and
spoken to Tom Rambow, PA, and David Martin, PA-C, a professor in the PA program at
Idaho State University. In his review of the foregoing sources, it was revealed to Mr.
Keller that the standard of care in Twin Falls, Idaho, at the time Mrs. Schmechel was
treated by the Defendants was no different than the standard of care in Denver.
Accordingly, Mr. Keller is qualified to testify as to the standard of care in Twin Falls at
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the time Mrs. Schmechel was "treated" by the Defendants.
Moreover, the Defendants may seek to elicit testimony from one of their
disclosed experts,

Chris Kottensette, PA (also from Denver Colorado),

who the

Defendants assert is familiar with the local standard of care in Twin Falls because it
didn't deviate from the standard of care in Denver. This presents the Court with the
following equation: if A=B and B=C, then A=C.

If Mr. Kottenstette is from Denver and

believes the standard of care in Twin falls was no different then the standard of care in
Denver at the time Mrs. Schmechel was "treated," and Mr. Kottenstette is deemed
qualified to testify as to the local standard of care, then Mr. Keller, also a PA from
Denver, is deemed familiar with the local standard of care in Twin Falls at the time of
Mrs. Schmechel's death, and is therefore qualified to testify in this matter.

Ill.
CONCLUSION

The Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court allow Mr. Keller's testimony
because he is familiar with the local standard of care for Twin Falls, Idaho, at the time
Mrs. Schmechel sought treatment from the Defendants, and the standard did not
deviate from the standard of care in Denver, where Mr. Keller was and is a practicing
PA.

DATED this

j d-' ~ay of October, 2007.

Tayl r Mossman,
Attor ey for Plaintiffs
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Attorneys for Defendants, Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute
JN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE F!FTJ{ JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWTN FALLS
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, Individually, and
as Surviving Spouse and Personal
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P.
LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA
HALL, natural children of ROSALIE

Case No. CV OS 4345

DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILLE,
M.D. AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN
INSTITUTE'$ FIRST SUPPLEMENT
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

SC:HMBCHEL, deceased,

1.,

Plaintiffs,

Vs,
CLINTON DIL!.,E, M,D,, SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., and
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X.
Defenda11ts.
COME NOW Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institute
("Defendants") and submit the attached proposed supplemental jury instrnction regarding the

preliminary statement of the case for the jury. Defendants reserve the right to further supplement
their proposed jury instructions, as well as withdraw any of their previously proposed jury

instructions.
DEFENDANTS CLINTON DILLE, M,D, AND SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN lNSTJTUTE'S FIRST
SUPPLEMENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS - l

32B
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~
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DEFENDANTS'
INSTRUCTION NO, _ _

On September 26, 2003, Rosalie Schmeohel sought treatment for her chronic pain from
the defendant Southern Idaho Pain Institute. Defendant Thomas J. Byrne was a physician
assistant employed by the Southern Idaho Pain lnstiMe. Mr. Byrne's supervising physician was
defendant Clinton Dille, M.D. Mr. Byrne obtained a history from Mrs. Sch1nechel and examined
her on September 26, 2003. Among othet things, Mr. Byme changed Mrs. Schmechel's long
acting pain medication, Oxycontin, to another long acting pain medication, Methadone. On

September 29, 2003, Mr. Byrne discussed hls plan ofcare for Mrs. Schmechel with Dr. Dille.
Dr. Dille agreed with and approved Mr. Byme's treatment plan for Mrs. Schmechel.
On October 2, 2003, Mrs. Schmechel passed away. Plahitiffs allege that Mrs. Schmechel
passed away as a result of the care and treatment provided to her by the defendants.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, Individually, and :
as
Surviving
Spouse
and
Personal :
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE :
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P. :'
LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA:
HALL, natural children of ROSALIE :
SCHMECHEL, deceased,

Case No. CV 05 4345

ORDER RE: MOTIONS IN LIMINE

Plaintiffs,
Vs.
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., and
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X,
Defendants.
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:
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This matter came before the Court on the parties' Motions in Limine. A hearing was held
on the parties' Motions in Limine on October 11, 2007. Byron Foster appeared for plaintiffs,
Keely Duke appeared for defendant Thomas J. Byrne, P.A., and Steven Hippler and J. Will Varin
appeared for defendants Clinton Dille, M.D. and Southern Idaho Pain Institnte.
The Court made oral rulings on several motions in open court upon some Motions in
Limine and reserved ruling on others.

ORDER RE: MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 1

Having considered the briefing and oral argument

submitted by counsel as well as the Court's records and files on this matter and good cause
appearing therefore, the Court's rulings made in open court are incorporated by reference and IT
IS FURTHER ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER as follows:
Based upon the stipulation and agreement of the parties:
1. Photographs
a. Autopsy photos of Mrs. Schmechel are inadmissible.
b. Before any photographs of Mrs. Schmechel taken following her death by the
Twin Falls County Coroner or Twin Falls Sheriffs Department are displayed in
the courtroom or offered into evidence, the offering party must inform the Court
of its intent to offer such photographs and make an offer of proof, outside the
jury's presence, at which time the Court will rule on the photo's or photos'
admissibility.
2. No deposition testimony may be displayed or read to the jury by any party during
opening statements.
3. Plaintiffs shall not offer evidence or otherwise pursue any claim for lack of informed
consent. This Order shall not preclude plaintiffs from pursuing issues regarding the
adequacy of warnings and instructions regarding the use of the medications at issue in
this matter, in relation to the claim for medical negligence, and subject to objections to
any particular question as may be made by opposing counsel and ruling by the Court on
the same.
4. No party may comment in closing arguments on the fact the opposing party did not call a
particular witness that was disclosed on its witness list.

ORDER RE: MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 2

IT IS FURTHER ORDRED that:
1. Defendants' Motion in Limine regarding admission of evidence and testimony regarding
the defendants' care and treatment of other patients is GRANTED in part and DENIED
in part as follows:
a. Plaintiffs shall not refer directly or indirectly to the facts and circumstances
of the defendants care and treatment of any other patients involving adverse
reactions to medication or death;
b. Plaintiffs shall not disclose to the jury the facts and circumstances or
existence of the case entitled JULIE WILLIAMS, on behalf of her minor
daughter, JALEA LAREN WILLIAMS, and BRANDON WILLIAMS,
Plaintiffs, v. CLINTON L. DILLE, M.D., THOMAS J. BYRNE, P.A.,
SOUTHERN IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, BUSINESS ENTITIES I through
X, and JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, husband and wife, I through X,
Defendants, Case No.

CV-05-1198,

consolidated

with CV-05-2673

("Williams v. Dille"). Pursuant to I.R.E. 80l(d)(l), counsel may, however,
use deposition testimony taken in that matter to impeach a witness, provided
that they provide the Court and opposing counsel with prior notice of their
intention to so impeach a witness and provide the Court and counsel with the
opportunity to excuse the jury and review the portion of the deposition they
intend to use for impeachment purposes to determine the relevance of such
prior testimony, and for the Court to rule on any objections and to ensure that

ORDER RE: MOTIONS IN LIMINE - 3
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the facts and circumstances of the Williams case and its existence are not
disclosed to the jury.
2. Defendants' Motion in Limine to exclude standard of care testimony from a nondisclosed witness through the testimony of a testifying witness is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part as follows:
a. No party shall offer or attempt to offer any testimony from a testifying expert
concerning a non-testifying experts' alleged opinions, or agreement that, the
standard of care was breached.
b. This Order does not preclude any party from attempting to qualify its experts
as properly acquainted with the applicable standard of care provided that the
Court is provided with prior notice and the opportunity to excuse the jury and
let the offering party establish foundation for their experts' opinion outside
the jury's presence. The Court reserves ruling on the actual admissibility of
any such expert testimony until such experts' testimony is offered at trial and
the experts' qualifications and familiarity with the standard of care are
offered to the Court for ruling at trial.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court reserves ruling on the following Motions in Limine:
I. Admissibility of plaintiffs' or other witnesses' criminal history;
2. Admissibility of testimony by plaintiffs concerning alleged phone calls between Mrs.
Schmechel and the defendants;
3. Admissibility of Dr. Groben's testimony regarding the amount of Methadone Mrs.
Schmechel consumed, or alternatively, the admissibility of any of Dr. Groben's
opinions, reports, or conclusions regarding Mrs. Schmechel 's cause of death;

ORDER RE: MOTIONS !N L!MINE - 4

4. Admissibility of Dr. Vorse's testimony concerning the standard of care and the
defendants' care and treatment of Mrs. Schmechel as well as proposed testimony of
Dr. Vorse as to why she did not prescribe Methadone or why Methadone may or
should not have been prescribed;
5. Admissibility of expert testimony offered by plaintiffs regarding criticisms of
defendants' care and treatment of Mrs. Schmechel that do not rise to a breach of the
standard of care;
6. Admissibility of evidence relating to plaintiffs' economic damage claims.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no party or their counsel may refer to (in opening statements
or otherwise), or elicit from witnesses, the evidence or testimony at issue in the Motions in
Limine that the Court has reserved ruling npon or that the Court has ruled must first be brought
to the Court's and opposing counsels' attention outside the presence of the jury before it is
offered.
DATED this

l(p day of October, 2007.

Hon. G. Richard Bevan
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY

I,:5'/itJ. y:; e ~ , hereby certify that on the J.f£_ day of October, 2007, a true
and correct copy of the£egoing Order was mailed, postage paid, and/or hand-delivered to the
following persons:
David Comstock
Law Offices of Comstock & Bush
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 500
P. 0. Box 2774
Boise, Idaho 83701-2774
Keely E. Duke
Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton
P. 0. Box 1271
Boise, ID 83701-1271
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Steven J. Hippler
Givens Pursley LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
P. 0. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720
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David E. Comstock
LAW OFFICES OF COMSTOCK & BUSH
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PO Box 2774
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Telephone: (208) 344-7700
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(208) 344-7721
ISB # 2455
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Byron V. Foster
Attorney At Law
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste 500
P.O. Box 1584
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-4440
Facsimile: (208) 344-7721
ISB #: 2760
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually, and
as Surviving Spouse and Personal
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P
LEWI~,
,, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA
HALL, natural children of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased,

Case No. CV 05-4345

PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., and
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X,
Defendants.
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COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, David E.
Comstock, of the firm Comstock and Bush, and Byron V. Foster, Attorney at Law, and
pursuant to Rule 51 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby submits the
following first supplemental proposed jury instructions attached at Exhibit "A."

A clean copy of the proposed jury instructions is attached as Exhibit "B" for the
Court's convenience.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED T9i

;.gday October, 2007.

t
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ../...f?_ day of October, 2007, I served a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon:
Steven J. Hippler

GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
PO Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720

Q_.......-0.S. Mail
IT Hand Delivery

D

Facsimile (208) 388-1.300

Attorneys for Clinton Difle, MD. and
Southern Idaho Pain Institute

Richard E. Hall
Keely E. Duke
HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT &

BLANTON, PA

0 __,..-trS. Mail
IT Hand Delivery
D

Facsimile (208) 395-8585

702 West Idaho, Suite 700
PO Box 1271
Boise ID 83701
Attorneys for Thomas Byrne, PA

I
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INSTRUCTION NO. 32

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 54-806(2), the Idaho State Board of Medicine is
authorized to promulgate rules to govern activities of persons employed as physician
assistants by persons licensed to practice medicine in Idaho. A "supervising physician"
is a person registered by the Board who is licensed to practice medicine in Idaho, who
is responsible for the direction and supervision of the activities of the physician
assistant. A "physician assistant" is a person who has been authorized by the Board of
Medicine to render patient services under the direction of a supervising physician.
Under applicable Board of Medicine regulations, the defendants in this case were
required to have in place a delegation of services agreement which defined the working
relationship between Dr. Dille and Mr. Bryne. Pursuant to Board of Medicine
regulations, a physician assistant may issue written or oral prescriptions only in
accordance with approval and authorization granted by the Board of Medicine and in
accordance with the delegation of services agreement and shall be consistent with the
regular prescriptive practice of the supervising physician.
Under the Southern Idaho Pain lnstitute's Delegation of Services Agreement
applicable to this case, Mr. Byrne was authorized to conduct an initial evaluation of
patients seen in the facility, to do a full history and physical, and thereafter document his
findings and recommendations. It was the duty of Dr. Dille, pursuant to the Board of
Medicine regulations and the Delegation of Services agreement, to review the
recommendations of Mr. Byrne and to thereafter confirm his findings and to determine a
treatment plan.
Failure to follow the duties imposed by the Board of Medicine regulations and/or

PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 3
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the Delegation of Services Agreement is a violation of the applicable standard of care.
Idaho Code§ 54-806(2); IDAPA § 22.01 .03; 2003 Southern Idaho Pain Institute
Delegation of Services Agreement

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ __

Pursuant to Idaho Code 54-806(2), the Idaho State Board of Medicine is
authorized to promulgate rules to govern activities of persons employed as physician
assistants by persons licensed to practice medicine in Idaho. A "supervising physician"
is a person registered by the Board who is licensed to practice medicine in Idaho, who
is responsible for the direction and supervision of the activities of the physician
assistant A "physician assistant" is a person who has been authorized by the Board of
Medicine to render patient services under the direction of a supervising physician.
Under applicable Board of Medicine regulations, the defendants in this case were
required to have in place a delegation of services agreement which defined the working
relationship between Dr. Dille and Mr. Bryne. Pursuant to Board of Medicine
regulations, a physician assistant may issue written or oral prescriptions only in
accordance with approval and authorization granted by the Board of Medicine and in
accordance with the delegation of services agreement and shall be consistent with the
regular prescriptive practice of the supervising physician.
Under the Southern Idaho Pain lnstitute's Delegation of Services Agreement
applicable to this case, Mr. Byrne was authorized to conduct an initial evaluation of
patients seen in the facility, to do a full history and physical, and thereafter document his
findings and recommendations. It was the duty of Dr. Dille, pursuant to the Board of
Medicine regulations and the Delegation of Services agreement, to review the
recommendations of Mr. Byrne and to thereafter confirm his findings and to determine a
treatment plan.
Failure to follow the duties imposed by the Board of Medicine regulations and/or
the Delegation of Services Agreement is a violation of the applicable standard of care.
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 5
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INSTRUCTION NO. 27

To prove that Thomas Byme, P.A., was "negligent," the Plaintiff must prove, by direct
expert testimony and by a preponderance of ail of the competent evidence, that Thomas Byrne,
P.A., failed to meet the applicable standard of health care practice in Twin Falls, Idaho, as such
standard of care existed in September of 2003 through October of 2003 with respect to the class
of health care provider to which Thomas Byrne, P.A., belonged and in which he was functioning.
A physician's assistant, such as Thomas Byrne, P.A., shall be judged in comparison with
similarly trained and qualified physician's assistants in the same community taki!1g into account
his training, experience and field of specialization.

INSTRUCTION NO. 28

To prove that Clinton Dille, M.D., was "negligent," the Plaintiff must prove, by direct
expert testimony and by a preponderance of all of the competent evidence, that Dr. Dille, failed
to meet the applicable standard of health care practice in Twin Falls, Idaho, as such standard of
care existed in September of 2003 through October of 2003 with respect to the class of health
care provider to which Dr. Dille belonged and in which he was functioning.
A pain management specialist and anesthesiologist, such as Dr. Dille, shall be judged in
comparison with similarly trained and qualified pain management specialist and anesthesiologist
in the same community taking into account his training, experience and field of specialization.

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. 29

The words "reckless conduct" when used in these instrnctions and when applied to the
allegations in this case, mean more than ordinary negligence. The words mean acts or omissions
under circumstances where the actor knew or should have known that the acts or omissions not
only created an umeasonable risk of harm to another, but involved a high degree of probability
that such harm would actually result.

IDJI2d 2.25. (Modified)

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED _ _ _ __
OTHER

') 1 .,

d·..)

INSTRUCTION NO. 30

When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, I mean the failure to use ordinary
care in the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary care" mean the care a
reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those shown by the
evidence. Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a reasonably careful
person would do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person would not do, under
circm11stances similar to those shown by the evidence.

IDJI2.d 2.20.

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED

COVERED _ _ _ __
OTHER.

344

INSTRUCTION NO. 31

As used in these instructions, the term "community" refers to that geographical area
ordinarily served by the licensed general hospital at or nearest to which the medical care
complained of was or allegedly should have been provided.
J.C.§ 6-1012

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
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David E. Comstock
LAW OFFICES OF COMSTOCK l'l BUSH
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste 500
PO Box2774
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone; (208) 344-7700
Facsimile; (208) 344-7721
ISB #2455

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
·. · OF THE STATE OF IDAHC, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually, and
as Syrviving Spouse and Personal
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and RC•IBERT P
LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMJ\l~A
HALL, natural children of ROSALIE
SCHljJlECHEL, deceased,

Case No. CV 05-4346
l"'LAlil-4TIFFS' BENCH BRIEF RE:
PROPOSED "RECKLESS" JURY
ll~ISTRUCTION

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Defendants.

i
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Byron V. Foster
Attorney At Law
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste 500
P.O. Box 1584
Boise, Idaho 83701
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Facsimile: (208) 344-7721
ISB#: 2760
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COME NOW, Plaintiffs, b\f and throu9h their attorneys of record, David E.
Com.stock, of the firm Comstock and Bush, ,md Byron V. Foster, Attorney at Law, and
hereby submit the following Bench Brief rE1garo1ing the Plaintiffs proposed "Reckless"
jury instruction.
Plaintiffs proposed "Reckle,,;s" instruction reads as follows:
The word "reckless conduct" when m,ed in these instructions and when
applied to the allegatiorn; in this c;asi,, means more than ordinary
negligence. The word me,ms actions ial<en under circumstances where
the actor knew or should h,ive known that the actions not only created an
unreasonable risk of harm to anotl1er, but involved a high degree of
probability that such harm would actually reimlt.
This instruction is a modii'fed versrcin ::rf IDJI 2d, 2.25.

The only meaningful

difference is to insert the words "reckless cc,nduct" in place of "willful and wanton,"
which the Idaho Courts have rEqJeatedly h,,ld are words that have the same legal
definition, as the comments to the instruction cle,arly state. In the proposed instruction,
Plaintiffs are proposing only to w;e the word "mckless" as being defined, since that is
the only word the jury will hear throughout the, trial regarding what the Plaintiffs in this
case. are claiming against each of the Defendants.

The experts in this case who

address this subject will similarly focus on whether the Defendants' conduct was
"reckless" or not. As such, the Plaintiffs submit that it makes sense for the jury only to
be instructed on this particular tenn.
Further, the definition provided by the Plaintiffs in this regard is entirely consistent
with Idaho law. The appellate col;rts have n,pe,atedly held that
"reckless" conduct refers tc:, conduct whe~, the actor does or fails to do an
act "knowing or having giason to J5.!1.9W facts which would lead a
reasonable man to realize that his conduct not onl)' creates an
unreasonable risk of harm to another, but involves a high degree of
probability that such harm would result. "

PLAINTIFFS' BENCH BRIEF RE: PROPOSEO, "~:EGKELSS" JURY IN:STRUCTION-2
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See, e.g. Harris v. Idaho Dept. of Nealth & w,~Jfam, 123 Idaho 295, 299 847 P .2d 1156,
1160 (1992); Jacobsen v. City

or Rathdrum,

'115 Idaho 266, 270 756 P.2d 736, 740

(1988).
It is not necessary, under Idaho law, tbit a plaintiff prove a defendant actually
knew of the high risk of harm and proceeded in the face of that risk regardless. There is
no requirement that the plaintiff prove intentional misconduct. Intentional misconduct is
not the same as reckless conduct.
An intentional conduct standard would apply if it were requilred that Defendants
actually knew of the high risk o"I harm.

Howe,ver, under the circumstances were a

defendant did not know, but should have known, the acts are mckless rather than
intentional. There is no requirem,,1nt under lda,ho law with regard to "reckless conduct'
that the defendant engaging in such conduct hs1s to actually know and proceed in the
face ·of that knowledge. It is enc ugh for "recklE1ss conduct" if the defendant, in either
acting or failing to act "should ha 1e known." This standard has been in effect at least
0

since the case of Petersen v. Parry, 92 Idaho Ei47, 448 P.2d 653 (1968), wherein the
Idaho Supreme Court adopted the Second R.e,statement of Torts. § 500 definition of
reckless conduct. The definition ie as follows:
"The actor's conduct is in rnckless disregard of the safety 01' another if he
does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the
other to do, knowing or having reason tc, !mow of facts which would lead a
reasonable man to reali1:e, not only that his conduct creates an
unreasonable risk of physi::al harm to anolher, but also that such risk is
substantially greater than that whic:h iB 11e1cessary to make his conduct
negligent."

PLAINTIFFS' BENCH BRIEF RE: PROPOSElD "R.ECl<ELSS" JURY INSTRUCTION- 3
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Based on the above, the Pl:,1intlffs resp1:s{)ti'ully request that the Plaintiffs'
proposed instruction regarding thei definition of "Reckless" is the proper and appropriate
a jury instruction for this issue.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMl"JTED This

JS,_ day October, 2007.

-----~;t~
Byron Fost-e_i:,
Attorn1,ys for 'Plaintiff

CEl:{TIFICATE;J~F.SERVICE

J.~

I hereby certify that on the
day of October, 2007, I serv,3d a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument, by ms,thod indicated beilow, upon:
Steven J. Hippler
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
PO Box2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720
Attorneys for Clinton Dille, /Vi.D. and
Southern Idaho Pain lnstituto
Richard E. Hall
Keely E. Duke
HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, PA
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
PO Box 1271
Boise ID 83701
Attorneys for Thomas Byrne,, PA

[)

IJ-[)

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile (208) 388-1300

[]
U.S. Mail
i:::::r-Hand Delivery
[]
Facsimile (208) <195-8585
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Byron V. Foster
Attorney At Law
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste 500
P.O. Box 1584
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-4440
Facsimile: (208) 344-7721
/SB#: 2760
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually, and
as Surviving Spouse and Personal
Representative of the Estate of ROSAL! E
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P
LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA
HALL, natural children of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased,

,l

------Df?Ury

Case No. CV 05-4345

PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO THE
DEFENDANTS'PROPOSEDJURY
INSTRUCTIONS

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CUNTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., and
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X,
Defendants.
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COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, David E.
Comstock, of the firm Comstock and Bush, and Byron V. Foster, Attorney at Law, and
and hereby submits the following objections to the Defendants' proposed jury
instructions. Defendant Byrne and Defendants Dille and Southern Idaho Pain Institute
submitted separate proposed jury instructions, but the Plaintiffs respond in this single
set of objections. 1

DEFENDANT BYRNE
1.

Jury Instruction #14: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the grounds

that it is redundant and/or cumulative with Defendant Byrne's proposed instruction #15
and a later instruction that adequately covers the applicable standard of care.

2.

Jury Instruction #15: See objection to #14. This instruction is redundant

and /or cumulative with instruction #14. In addition, proposed instructions 14 and 15 are
redundant with the instruction that gives the general standard of care to the jury. There
is no need for the jury to be instructed on how to apply the standard of care to the
Defendants twice.
3.

Jury Instruction #19: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that

it a comment on the evidence, and it is not a proper instruction. "Unfortunate result"
language is not approved by IDJI. I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 do not authorize the use
of such an instruction. See also, IDJI 217 and Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 159 45
P.3d 810, 815 (2002) ("(a)n instruction should not be given that states 'negligence may
not be presumed from the fact of an accident alone."')
4.

Jurv Instruction #20: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that

Defendant Byrne did not number his proposed jury instructions, but for purposes of this objection,
Plaintiffs refer to his proposed jury instructions as though Defendant Byrne numbered them in sequential
order.
1
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it is a comment on the evidence, it is redundant, and it is better suited for cross
examination.
5.

Jury Instruction #21: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that

it is covered elsewhere in a separate jury instruction, it is a comment on the evidence,
and it argumentative.
6.

Jury Instruction # 22: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that

it is covered elsewhere in a separate jury instruction, it is a comment on the evidence,
and it argumentative.
7.

Jury Instruction #23: Plaintiffs object to this proposed instruction on the

basis that it is covered elsewhere in a separate jury instruction, it is redundant, and is
not necessary to instruct the jury on their duties as fact-finders.
8.

Jury Instruction #24: Plaintiffs object to this proposed instruction on the

basis that it is covered elsewhere in a separate jury instruction, it is redundant, and is
not necessary to instruct the jury on their duties as fact-finders.
9.

Jury Instruction #25: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that

it is not proper. The proper test for proximate cause is not a "but for" test, but rather "a
substantial factor." In determining actual cause, the Idaho Supreme Court has held the
"substantial factor" test is appropriate when there are multiple possible causes that lead
to the injury or death. Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 288 127 P.3d 187, 191
(2005). In the instant case, there are multiple possible causes for Mrs. Schmechel's
death.

Therefore, the appropriate language for the jury to consider is whether the

Defendants' negligence was a "substantial factor" in causing Mrs. Schmechel's death.
10.

Jury Instruction #27: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that

it fails to address that the jury may consider economic damages as an element of
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO THE DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 3
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damages. In addition, use of the term "conjugal relationship" will be confusing to the
jury and prejudicial to Plaintiffs because the term is commonly understood to refer only
to the sexual aspect of the marital relationship. While "conjugal" is defined as "of,
pertaining to, or characteristic of marriage," "conjugal rights" is defined as "sexual rights
and privileges conferred on husband and wife by the marriage bond." Thus, the use of
the term "conjugal" is improper. The language should be "love, comfort, care, society
and companionship," thus denoting all of the factors which compromise the marital
relationship.
11.

Jury Instruction #28: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that

it is already addressed in instruction #27and it is argumentative.
12.

Jury Instruction #30: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that

it is confusing and does not fit the facts of this case. A preexisting condition has to be
symptomatic before the Defendants can attempt to apportion the damages to the
preexisting condition.

Idaho Civil Jury Instructions 9.02, concerning "Aggravation of

Pre-existing Conditions" direct the jury to apportion damages, "if possible, between the
condition, pain, or disability prior to this occurrence and the condition, pain, or disability
caused by this occurrence and assess liability accordingly." The instruction also states:
"(y)ou should not consider any condition or disability that existed prior to the occurrence,
or any aggravation of such condition that was not caused or contributed to by reason of
this occurrence."
Furthermore, a comment to IDJI 940, which concerns damages, similarly states
that "[i]f there is no evidence that a pre-existing bodily condition was causing pain or
disability before the occurrence, then the activation of that pre-existing condition makes
a defendant liable for all damages proximately caused to the person in that condition.
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO THE DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS· 4
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There is no prior pain or disability to segregate."

(

In this case, Mrs. Schmechel was not

symptomatic of the condition brought on by ingesting Methadone; she wasn't even
taking Methadone before she sought treatment from the Defendants.

Her pain and

other medical conditions were under control prior to being prescribed Methadone by the
Defendants.

Accordingly, because Mrs. Schmechel's death is not something that

normally would have resulted from her medical condition prior to seeking treatment from
the Defendants, a jury instruction regarding Mrs. Schmechel's preexisting condition is
entirely inappropriate.
13.

Jury Instruction #34: Plaintiffs object to this verdict form with respect to

Question No. 1 and Question No. 3.

Both questions ask whether the Defendants

"negligently failed" to meet the standard of care.

This question presents the jury with a

double negative, as if the jury must find that the Defendants were "negligently negligent"
in their treatment of Mrs. Schmechel. The question should read, "Did the Defendants
fail to meet the standard of care?" or "Were the Defendants negligent?" Asking the jury
to find that the Defendants negligently failed to meet the standard of care imposes too
high of a burden on the Plaintiffs to prove that the Defendants did not meet the standard
of care in this case.

DEFENDANT DILLE
1.

Jury Instructions# 13, 14, 15, 16: Plaintiffs object to these instructions

on the basis that when taken together, they are cumulative and/or redundant.

In

addition, the instructions would have the jury believe that the Plaintiffs cannot prove that
the standard of care is indeterminable, and thus any testimony from experts outside of
Twin Falls should be disregarded. "(i)n the community in which such care was provided
at the same time it was provided" is prejudicial language because it will raise a question
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO THE DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 5
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in the jury's mind regarding the out-of-area experts' ability to testify regarding the
applicable standard of care.
2.

Jury Instruction #18: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that

it is a comment on the evidence, it is argumentative, and it is covered elsewhere in
separate instructions, such as in instructions 20 and 21.
3.

Jury Instruction #19: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that

it is a comment on the evidence and it is argumentative. In addition, "unfortunate result"
language is not approved by IDJI. It is an improper comment on the evidence and
invades the province of the jury. I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013 do not authorize the use of
such an instruction. See a/so, IDJI 217 and Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 159 45 P.3d
810, 815 (2002) ("(a)n instruction should not be given that states 'negligence may not
be presumed from the fact of an accident alone."')
4.

Jury Instruction #22: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that

it is a comparative negligence instruction. The facts of this case do not support a
comparative negligence defense, and the jury should not be so instructed. There is
nothing in the record to suggest that the Plaintiffs actions or alleged failures to take
actions contributed to the cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death.
5.

Jury Instruction #25: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the grounds

that it is covered elsewhere in a separate jury instruction, and it is confusing for the
jurors. In a previous instruction, the jurors are told to rely on their common sense, yet
this instruction informs them to do otherwise. Giving this instruction would violate the
principles set forth in Sheridan v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center. The Court in

Sheridan held that "(u)nlike the elements of duty and breach of duty, there is no
statutory requirement explicitly stating proximate cause in medical malpractice cases
PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO THE DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS • 6
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must be shown by direct expert testimony." Sheridan v. St. Luke's Regional Medical

Center, 135 Idaho 775, 25 P.3d 88 (2001). Testimony concerning proximate cause is
governed by the rules of evidence regarding opinion testimony by lay witnesses and
experts under Idaho Rule of Evidence 701 and 702. Id. Thus, unlike the Defendants'
jury instruction suggests, the jury does not have to rely on expert testimony to determine
proximate cause, and submitting such an instruction to the jury would be in error.
6.

Jury Instruction #26: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that

it is covered elsewhere in a separate jury instruction, such as proposed instructions 20
and 21.
7.

Jury Instruction #30: Plaintiffs contend that this is improper because the

jury should not be instructed to consider whether any damages awarded are considered
taxable income. If the Court decides to instruct the jury regarding the Plaintiffs' award
the instruction should not read as the Defendants propose, but rather, "You are
reminded that in deciding the issue of damages you are not to consider whether there
are any tax consequences associated with an award for damages." !name v. Brewer,
132 Idaho 377,380 973 P.2d 148, 151 (1999).
8.

Jury Instruction #31: Plaintiffs object to this instruction on the basis that

it is a comparative negligence instruction.

The facts of this case do not support a

comparative negligence defense, and the jury should not be so instructed. There is
nothing in the record to suggest that the Plaintiffs actions or alleged failures to lake
actions contributed to the cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death.

THE VERDICT FORM
Defendants Dille and Southern Idaho Pain Institute and Defendant Byrne used
different language on their verdict forms.

Defendants Dille and Southern Idaho Pain

PLAINTIFFS' OBJECTIONS TO THE DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS· 7

356

UC

'l·cUU/

14:4;'

CUMSIOCK

&'

0

H

208-344-7721

(

Institute asked the jury, in one question, whether the Defendants breached the
applicable standard of care, and if so, whether the breach was a proximate cause of the
Plaintiffs' damages. Defendant Byrne separated breach and proximate cause into two
questions. Plaintiffs submitted a special verdict form that that asked the breach and
proximate cause question as a single question, rather than separating it into two
questions. Plaintiffs now request that the question be separated into two questions, as
proposed by Defendant Byrne. Defendant Byrne's proposed instruction is easier for the
jury to understand and also clarifies the jury's verdict once it is rendered.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED This

Jj_ day October, 2007.

Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the _lS- day of October, 2007, I served a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon:
Steven J, Hippler
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
PO Box2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720
Attorneys for Clinton Dille, M.D, and

D U.S. Mail
0------Hand Delivery
D Facsimile (208) 388-1300

Southern Idaho Pain Institute

Richard E. Hall
Keely E. Duke
HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, PA
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
PO Box 1271
Boise ID 83701

D

U.S. MaH
~ a n d Delivery
D Facsimile (208) 395-8585

Attorneys for Thomas Byrne, PA
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David E. Comstock
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199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste 500
PO Box 2774
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 344-7700
Facsimile: (208) 344-7721
ISB #2455
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Byron V. Foster
Attorney At Law
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste 500
P.O. Box 1584
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 336-4440
Facsimile: (208) 344-7721
!SB#: 2760
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually, and
as Surviving Spouse and Personal
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P
LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA
HALL, natural children of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased,

Case No. CV 05-4345

PLAINTIFFS' SECOND
SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., and
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X,
Defendants.
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COME NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys of record, David E.
Comstock, of the firm Comstock and Bush, and Byron V. Foster, Attorney at Law, and
pursuant to Rule 51 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby submits the
following proposed second supplemental jury instructions, attached hereto as Exhibit

A clean copy of the proposed jury instructions is attached as Exhibit "B" for the
Court's convenience.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED This "Z. ¥day October, 2007.

David E(Comstoc
Attorneys for Plaintiff ·
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the Z. 'liday of October, 2007, ! served a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon:
Steven J. Hippler
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP
601 W. Bannock St
PO Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701-2720

D

U.S. Mail

D

Facsimile (208) 388-1300

G__.--Hand Delivery

Attorneys for Clinton Dille, M.D. and
Southern Idaho Pain Institute

Richard E. Halt
Keely E. Duke
HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT &
BLANTON, PA
702 West Idaho, Suite 700

D U.S. Mail
~Hand Deliveiy
D Facsimile (208) 395-8585

PO Box 1271

Boise ID 83701
Attorneys for Thomas Byrne, PA
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INSTRUCTION NO. 33
You are instructed that under Idaho law, each Defendant is only responsible for its
negligent percentage of causative fault. In the event you should choose to attribute fault on one
or more of the Defendants, that Defendant will only be responsible for that percentage of
negligence, if any. Any percentage of negligence attributed to Rosalie Schmechel will reduce
the total amount of damages awarded to Plaintiffs in that percentage. In answering the damage
questions, you must disregard any allocation of causative fault and award the total amount of
damages, if any, you find the Plaintiff to have incurred. You must not in any way reduce the
damages which you award because of the allocation of negligence. You should award a figure
wbich will fully and fairly compensate Plaintiffs for all the damages they have sustained
regardless of their cause.
You are further instructed that if you find, in allocating the percentages of fault, that the
negligence attJ.ibuted to the decedent Rosalie Schmechel, is equal to or greater than the
negligence of any one defendant, Plaintiffs will recover no damages from that Defendant.

In advising you as to the effect of your verdict, I do not mean to express an opinion as to
whether any or all of the parties contributed to the cause of Plaintiff's damages. That is for you
to determine.

IDJI No.: 271 (modified)
Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186,
579 P.2d 683 (1978); I. C. §6-801.

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
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INSTRUCTION NO. _ __

You are instmcted that under Idaho law, each Defendant is only responsible for its
negligent percentage of causative fault. In the event you should choose to attribute fault on one
or more of tbe Defendants, that Defendant will only be responsible for that percentage of
negligence, if any. Any percentage of negligence attributed to Rosalie Schmechel will reduce
the total an1ount of damages awarded to Plaintiffs in that percentage. In answering the damage
questions, you must disregard any allocation of causative fault and award the total an10unt of
damages, if any, you find the Plaintiff to have incurred. You must not in any way reduce the
damages which you award because of the allocation of negligence. You should award a figure
which will fiilly and fairly compensate Plaintiffs for all the damages they have sustained
regardless of their cause.
You are further instmcted that if you find, in allocating the percentages of fault, that the
negligence attributed to the decedent Rosalie Schmechel, is equal to or greater than the
negligence of any one defendant, Plaintiffs will recover no damages from that Defendant.

In advising you as to the effect of your verdict, I do not mean to express an opinion as to
whether any or all of tbe parties conhibuted to tbe cause of Plaintiffs damages. That is for you
to detennine.
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Attorneys for Defendants, Clinton Dille, M.D.
and Southern Idaho Pain Institute

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, Individually, and
as Surviving Spouse and Personal
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT
P. LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA
HALL, natural children of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased,
Plaintiffs,
Vs.

:
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:
:
:
:
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Case No. CV 05 4345

DEFENDANTS' JOINT OBJECTIONS
TO PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS

'

''
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN :
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho:,
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., and :
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X, :
''
'
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

COME NOW Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D., the Southern Idaho Pain Institute
and Thomas J. Byrne, P.A. ("Defendants") and lodge the following objections to
Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions filed October 8, 2007 as well Plaintiffs proposed
supplemental jury instructions filed during trial as follows:
DEFENDANTS' JOINT OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 1
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GENERAL OBJECTION
Defendants object to the use of any jury instructions or special verdict form they
did not propose. Defendants further object to the failure to instruct the jury using the
jury instructions and special verdict form they have proposed. Defendants reserve their
right to object to the Court's proposed final jury instructions and special verdict form and
to object to any further supplemental jury instructions Plaintiffs may propose.

OBJECTIONS TO SPECIFIC JURY INSTRUCTIONS
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 9:

Defendants object to

Plaintiffs' proposed Instruction No. 9 because it omits the final sentence of the first
paragraph of IDJl2d 2.30.2 that states "It is not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or
damage likely would have occurred anyway." This sentence is necessary under the
circumstances because of the other factors, including Mrs. Schmechel's health
conditions, which could have caused or contributed to her death.

PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 10 AND 11:

Defendants

object to Plaintiffs' proposed Instructions Nos. 10 and 11 because they are unnecessary
because if Mr. Byrne or Dr. Dille are found negligent, this negligence will be imputed to
the Southern Idaho Pain Institute.

The Defendants do not contest this issue and

including an instruction on this topic will only serve to confuse the jury.

PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 12 AND 13:

Defendants

object to Plaintiffs' proposed Instructions Nos. 12 and 13 on the basis they do not
accurately reflect Idaho law as contained in Idaho Code§ 6-1012 and§ 6-1013, which
contain the requirements that both the applicable standard of care and a breach of the
applicable standard of care be established by direct expert testimony. As noted by the
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Idaho Supreme Court in Robertson v. Richardson, 115 Idaho 628, 769 P.2d 505 (1987)
on re-hearing (1989) instructions embodying the precise language contained in Idaho

Code § 6-1012 and § 6-1013 are the appropriate instructions to be used at trial.
Further, Plaintiffs' proposed instructions omit any reference to the standard of care as it
existed at the time and place of the alleged occurrence. Defendants herein incorporate
by reference Section IV. C. of Defendant Dille and the Southern Idaho Pain lnstitute's
Trial Brief which discusses the use of appropriate statutory language in jury instructions.
Defendants further object to these instructions to the extent they include a
reference to the Southern Idaho Pain Institute. As discussed above, reference to the
Southern Idaho Pain Institute is unnecessary and confusing.

PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 14:

Defendants object to

Plaintiffs' proposed Instruction No. 14 because it is inconsistent with the definition of
evidence instruction given to the jury at the beginning of trial. Any instruction provided
to the jury on this topic should be consistent with the Court's initial instruction on this
topic.

PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 15:

Defendants object to

Plaintiffs' proposed Instruction No. 15 because instructing the jury on the topic of
insurance only serves to highlight the fact that insurance may be involved in this case.
Defendants prefer that no instruction on the topic of insurance be given to the jury.

PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 17:

Defendants object to

Plaintiffs' proposed Instruction No. 17 because the evidence does not support the
assertion that Mrs. Schmechel provided any financial support to Mr. Schmechel, which
therefore makes any recovery of financial support speculative and not reasonably

DEFENDANTS' JOINT OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 3

36G

certain. Plaintiffs' Instruction No. 17 is misleading as to what damages maybe properly
recovered in this wrongful death action.

The evidence introduced at trial does not

support an award of any economic damages to any of the Plaintiffs.
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 18 AND 19:

Defendants

object to Plaintiffs' proposed Instructions Nos. 18 and 19 because as discussed above,
Plaintiffs have not proven they are entitled to recover any economic damages in this
action.

Defendants further object to these instructions to the extent the standard

mortality listed in the instructions is inconsistent with the mortality tables contained in
Idaho Code.
PLAINTIFFS PROPOSED SPECIAL VERDICT FORM:

Defendants object to

Plaintiffs' proposed special verdict form because it is confusing in its identification of the
parties in its Interrogatories. Because any negligence found on the part of Dr. Dille or
Mr. Byrne will be imputed to the Southern Idaho Pain Institute, it is unnecessary and
confusing to refer to it on the special verdict form. The special verdict form should
rather refer only to the individual defendants Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille.
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO. 32:

Defendants object to

Plaintiffs' proposed Instruction No. 32 as an improper instruction which purports to
define the standard of care in contradiction to Idaho Code § 6-1012 and § 6-1013.
Defendants further object to Instruction No. 32 on the basis that it is not supported by
the evidence introduced at trial and that the Instruction improperly comments upon the
evidence. Plaintiffs further have not introduced any direct expert testimony supporting

DEFENDANTS' JOINT OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 4

3 67

the proposed Instruction No. 32 as required by Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013.
Under these sections, direct expert testimony is required to establish a breach of the
standard of care by a health care provider. It is improper to attempt to establish the
standard of care through reference to a statute without any direct expert testimony. The
instruction also improperly comments on the specific evidence of this case rather than
defining the law and allowing the jury to draw its own conclusions from the evidence
adduced at trial.
Defendants affirmatively assert that their conduct was consistent with all
applicable statutes, rules and regulations, and agreements between the Defendants and
instructing the jury on Board of Medicine regulations will only serve to confuse and
mislead the jury in this medical negligence litigation.
Moreover, Plaintiffs cannot meet the necessary elements to establish that
violation of the Rules for the Licensure of Physician Assistants ("Regulations") or the
Delegation of Services Agreement constitutes negligence per se.

Specifically, the

Regulations and Delegation of Services Agreement are subject to interpretation and do
not clearly define a required standard of conduct Further, because testimony at trial
indicates that Dr. Dille would not have changed Mr. Byrne's care and treatment of Mrs.
Schmechel, plaintiffs are unable to establish that any alleged breach of Regulations or
Delegation of Services Agreement was the proximate cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death.
Negligence per se occurs where a person violates an ordinance or state law.
Ahles v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 393, 395, 34 P.3d 1076, 1078 (2001 ). Negligence per se is a

question of law for the court. Id. Negligence per se is no different from ordinary
negligence. Id. Negligence per se only acts to remove duty and breach from the jury.
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Id. (citing Slade v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 119 Idaho 482, 489, 808 P.2d 401, 408

(1991 )). A claim of negligence per se requires that plaintiffs prove: (1) the statute or
regulation clearly defines the standard of conduct; (2) the statute or regulation was
intended to prevent the harm caused by defendant's act or omission; (3) plaintiff is a
person of the class the statute or regulation was designed to protect; and (4) the
violation must be a proximate cause of plaintiff's alleged injury. O'Guin v. Bingham
County, 142 Idaho 49, 52, 122 P.3d 308, 311 (2005).

A.

The rules for the licensure of Physician Assistants and the Delegation of
Services Agreement do not clearly define the required standard of conduct.

The Regulations and Delegation of Services Agreement are subject to
interpretation and do not clearly define a required standard of conduct, and therefore
cannot give rise to negligence per se.
In Ahles

v. Tabor, 136 Idaho 393, 34 P.3d 1076 (2001), the district court held that

the defendant was negligent per se for violation of I.C. § 49-633 for passing the
plaintiff's vehicle on the right side and a subsequent collision. On appeal, the Idaho
Supreme Court addressed each of the four requirements of negligence per se and
determined that the statute did not allow for negligence per se. The Ahles court found
that elements 2 and 3 were met as the statute was intended to protect motorists and
plaintiff fell within the protected category. However, the court held that "the standard of
conduct described in I.C. § 49-633, . . . is far from clear and requires statutory
interpretation including consideration of problematic definitions of terms used in the
statute."

Id. 136 Idaho at 396, 34 P.3d at 1079. The Ahles court held there were

numerous questions as to certain terms in the statute that were subject to interpretation,
and that "[a]ll of these questions add to the complexity of the statute and show that the
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standard of conduct derived from interpreting the statute is less than clear and not
easily ascertained or applied." Id.

As such, the Ahles court held that I.C. § 49-633 did

not satisfy the test with regard to the "description of a clear standard of conduct.
Accordingly, the alleged violation of the statute in this case cannot be deemed
negligence per se." Id.
In the instant matter, the Rules for the Licensure of Physician Assistants and the
Delegation of Services Agreement are subject to interpretation and do not clearly define
a required standard of conduct.

Specifically, Idaho Administrative Code 22.01.03.28

SCOPE OF PRACTICE, indicates various items which a physician assistant may
perform if included in the Delegation of Services Agreement including, "Diagnose and
manage minor illnesses or conditions" and "manage the health care of the stable
chronically ill patient in accordance with the medical regimen initiated by the supervising
physician." IDAPA 22.01 .03.28.03 and 22.01 .03.28.04.
The Regulations do not define minor illnesses or conditions or major illnesses or
conditions or what constitutes chronically ill.

Nor does the Code define the term

manage. As such, what constitutes a minor or major illness or condition is ambiguous
and left to interpretation.

In addition what constitutes managed care of a stable

chronically ill patient is left to interpretation.

If Mrs. Schmechel's chronic pain was a

minor condition (as testified to by Mr. Byrne) the Regulations would allow Mr. Byrne to
diagnose and manage such condition.
Further, in addition to the ambiguousness of the Regulations, one must further
consider the added layer of interpretation required by the Delegation of Services
Agreement.

Specifically, the Regulations provide a general outline of care that a
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physician assistant may perform as included in the Delegation of Services Agreement
and other documents that help define the scope of the physician assistant.
The Regulations define a "Delegation of Services (DOS) Agreement" as:
A written document mutually agreed upon and signed and dated by the
physician assistant and supervising physician that defines the working
relationship and delegation of the duties between the supervising
physician and the physician as specified by Board rule. The Board of
Medicine may review the written delegation of services agreement, job
descriptions, policy statements, or other documents that define the
responsibilities of the physician assistant in the practice setting, and may
require such changes as need to achieve compliance with these rules and
to safeguard the public.
Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille's 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement provides in
part, "the physician assistant ... will be utilized in the initial evaluation for patients seen
in this facility ... Patients will require a full history and physical on initial visit. Pertinent
findings will be documented and recommendations made. The recommendations will
be reviewed by the supervising physician to confirm finding and determine a treatment
plan."

As testified to by Dr. Dille, the Delegation of Services Agreement was not

intended to in any way limit Mr. Byrne's scope of practice as compared to what was
allowed by the Regulations.

Further, both Dr. Dille and Mr. Byrne testified that the

Delegation of Services Agreement allowed Mr. Byrne to evaluate Mrs. Schmechel and
alter her pain management regimen from OxyContin to Methadone, without first
discussing the case with Dr. Dille.
Further, the Administrative Code states that the Board of Medicine may also
review "job descriptions ... or other documents that define the responsibilities of the
physician assistant in the practice setting .... " IDAPA 22.01 .03.06. The Delegation of
Services Agreement itself includes this language indicating that the scope of Mr.
Byrne's practice further requires analysis of the Job Description.

Mr. Byrne's job
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description with the Southern Idaho Pain Institute indicates that the physician assistant
will be utilized in the initial evaluation for patients, and that such patients "will require a
full history and physical on initial visit and will be documented with appropriate findings
and recommendations.

This will include the ordering of appropriate tests and

prescribing of medications." (Exh. 233, p. 2).
A review of the Regulations, Delegation of Services Agreement, Job Description
and the testimony of both Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille indicate that Mr. Byrne's care and
treatment of Mrs. Schmechel and Dr. Dille's supervision of such care did not violate the
Regulations or Delegation of Services Agreement. At the very least, such evidence and
testimony indicates that the Regulations and Delegation of Services Agreement require
interpretations of undefined and ambiguous terms and do not clearly define a required
standard of conduct. Therefore, neither the Regulations nor the Delegation of Services
agreement give rise negligence per se.

B.

Plaintiffs' negligence per se instruction should not be given because the
alleged violation of the regulations was not the proximate cause of Mrs.
Schmechel's death.
As stated above, the fourth requirement to find that violation of a statute or

regulation equates to negligence per se is that "the violation must have been the
proximate cause of the injury." Ahles, 136 Idaho at 395, 34 P.3d at 1078. Plaintiffs
cannot meet this requirement as Dr. Dille testified in both his deposition and at trial, that
with regard to Mr. Byrne's treatment of Mrs. Schmechel, he "could not see where [he]
would have made any changes or done anything different than what Mr. Byrne had."
(Deposition of Dr. Dille, p. 29, II. 17-21). Because Dr. Dille would not have changed the
treatment provided by Mr. Byrne to Mrs. Schmechel, plaintiffs are unable to establish
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that any alleged breach of the Regulations or Delegation of Services Agreement was
the proximate cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death.
Therefore, plaintiffs cannot establish that the Rules for the Licensure of Physician
Assistants or the Delegation of Services Agreement clearly define a required standard
of conduct for Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille.

Nor can plaintiffs establish that any alleged

violation of the Regulations or Delegation of Services Agreement was the proximate
cause of Mrs. Schmechel's death. As such, plaintiffs are unable to meet the necessary
requirements for negligence per se and plaintiffs' proposed jury instruction should not
be given.

PLAINTIFFS' UNUMBERED PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS RE: STANDARD
OF CARE:

Defendants object to Plaintiffs' proposed supplemental standard of care

instructions because they do not accurately reflect the requirements of Idaho Code §§
6-1012 and 6-1013. Defendants specifically object to Plaintiffs proposed standard of
care instruction relating to Dr. Dille and its reference to Dr. Dille as a "pain management
specialist."

Dr. Dille is a board certified anesthesiologist who practices pain

management; he is not, nor does he claim to be, a board certified "pain management
specialist." Including such reference in a jury instruction may confuse the jury regarding
the appropriate standard of care applicable to Dr. Dille.
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PLAINTIFFS' UNLIMBERED PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS RE: "RECKLESS
CONDUCT":

A.

The evidence does not support instructing the jury on the definition of
reckless conduct.
Defendants object to Plaintiffs' proposed reckless conduct jury instruction

because it is not supported by the evidence adduced at trial and because it improperly
states the law of Idaho as it relates to any alleged reckless conduct in this case.
Plaintiffs have not shown that any Defendants' conduct was reckless in this action.
They have not submitted sufficient evidence on this issue to create a jury question as to
whether or not Defendants' conduct, even if found negligent, rose to reckless conduct.
The only direct expert testimony opining that Mr. Byrne's care and treatment of
Mrs. Schmechel was "reckless" was offered by Dr. Lipman. Dr. Lipman's testimony was
not sufficient, however, to support a reckless jury instruction. When asked if Mr. Byrne's
conduct was "reckless," Dr. Lipman testified that:
So, it's not possible to say that anyone apriori, everybody up front, will
know which patient will suffer the adverse effects; but it's absolutely
scientifically valid to say that anyone who understands what the law
requires us to understand to use these medications will know that
someone will suffer these adverse effects; and tragically in this case, I
believe it was Mrs. Schmechel.
Trial Testimony of Dr. Arthur Lipman at p. 75, II. 5-12
Dr. Lipman went on to testify that he did not "think it was intentional harm," and that he
did not think there was "any malice." Id. at p. 76, II. 13-16.
This testimony, which is the only testimony offered in support of a reckless
instruction, simply does not support such an instruction.

By Dr. Lipman's own

admission, it was impossible to know whether a particular patient, such as Mrs.
Schmechel, would suffer an unexpected adverse result because she took Methadone.
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The fact one patient out of the thousands of patients Mr. Byrne treated during his
employment at Southern Idaho Pain Institute may have suffered an unexpected,
unfortunate result does not support a finding Mr. Byrne acted recklessly in prescribing
Methadone or was reckless in the manner in which he prescribed the drug. All drugs
have risks and with almost all drugs there is some small percentage of patients that will
not react will to the drug.
Under the Plaintiffs own proposed definition of "reckless," Mr. Byrne's conduct
was not reckless because there was no "high degree of probability that such harm
would actually result." Dr. Lipman's testimony shows there was no way of knowing
before hand that Mrs. Schmechel could suffer an immediate adverse reaction to the
Methadone. See Galloway v. Walker, 140 Idaho 672, 676-677, 99 P.3d 625, 629 - 630
(Ct. App. 2004) (Discussing IDJl2d and noting that "it appears to set a higher standard
of proof for the plaintiff, requiring a showing that the defendant's conduct "involved a
high degree of probability that ... harm would actually result." )(emphasis added). Dr.
Lipman's testimony shows Plaintiffs cannot establish any "reckless" conduct because it
was impossible for Mr. Byrne to know "with a high degree of probability" that harm
would actually result when he prescribed Mrs. Schmechel Methadone, and, in the face
of this knowledge, prescribed it anyway.

B.

Plaintiffs' proposed reckless instruction does not accurately reflect Idaho
law concerning "reckless disregard."
Plaintiffs attempt to utilize an instruction intended to be used in punitive damages

cases in this matter. It should be noted that Plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew their motion
to amend to allege punitive damages. In an attempt to pierce the statutory noneconomic damages cap, however, Plaintiffs propose a modified version of IDJl2d 2.25
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("Definition of willful and wanton"), which is based upon Restatement of Torts Second
section 500. The comments to this Restatement section make clear, however, that
reckless conduct "must involve an easily perceptible danger of death or substantial
physical harm, and the probability that it will so result must be substantially greater than
is required for ordinary negligence." Rest. 2d of Torts§ 500, comment (a) (Westlaw
2007). Comment (g) to Section 500 further highlights the difference between mere
negligence and recklessness. This comment provides:
g. Negligence and recklessness contrasted. Reckless misconduct differs
from negligence in several important particulars. It differs from that form of
negligence which consists in mere inadvertence, incompetence,
unskillfulness, or a failure to take precautions to enable the actor
adequately to cope with a possible or probable future emergency, in that
reckless misconduct requires a conscious choice of a course of action,
either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with
knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable
man. It differs not only from the above-mentioned form of negligence, but
also from that negligence which consists in intentionally doing an act with
knowledge that it contains a risk of harm to others, in that the actor to be
reckless must recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially
greater in amount than that which is necessary to make his conduct
negligent. The difference between reckless misconduct and conduct
involving only such a quantum of risk as is necessary to make it negligent
is a difference in the degree of the risk, but this difference of degree is so
marked as to amount substantially to a difference in kind.

(emphasis added).
Although Plaintiffs have attempted to distinguish the application of the definition
of recklessness found in Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 365, 128 P.3d 897, 902
(2005), the definition contained in Athay is consistent with the above Restatement
comment and Idaho law.

In Athay, the Supreme Court held that reckless disregard

required the actor to actually perceive the danger and continue his course of conduct
any way. Id. Defendants submit this standard is what is required under Idaho law and
IDJl2d 2.25's comments are not consistent with Idaho law.
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C.

Instructing the jury on recklessness at the close of evidence and before it
has found Defendants negligent is improper and prejudicial.
Plaintiffs seek to instruct the jury on recklessness so they have a basis to pierce

the statutory non-economic damages cap of Idaho Code § 6-1603 if the jury finds the
Defendants negligent and returns a damage award above the cap. The issue of the
statutory non-economic damage cap is only relevant if the jury awards non-economic
damages in excess of the cap. In fact, the statute specifically provides the jury should
not be informed of the cap during its deliberations. See I.C. § 6-1603(3) "(If a case is
tried to a jury, the jury shall not be informed of the limitation contained in subsection (1)
of this section."). Therefore, the jury should only be instructed to determine whether or
not the Defendants' conduct was reckless, if and only if, it first finds the Defendants
negligent and it awards damages in excess of the non-economic damage cap.
Instructing the jury on recklessness before it has found negligence and awarded
damages in excess of the cap prejudices the Defendants and will only serve to confuse
the jury on the Plaintiffs' burden in this negligence case. Instructing on reckless conduct
before a finding of negligence implies that the conduct was not only negligent, but may
have also been reckless. Such instruction encourages the jury to weigh the Defendants'
alleged conduct against the wrong standard.

Instead of first determining if the conduct

was negligent and then considering whether it was reckless, the jury may first decided
the conduct was not reckless, but since it was not reckless, it was negligent.

In

essence, giving a reckless jury instruction before a finding of negligence improperly
lowers the Plaintiffs' burden of proof on the duty and breach elements of the prima facia
elements of any negligence action.
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tyioreover, instructing the jury on reckless conduct could inflame the jury's
passion and prejudice them against the Defendants. The mere implication that there
was reckless conduct, when such finding is simply not supported by the weight of the
evidence or even Dr. Lipman's testimony, unduly prejudices the Defendants.

DATED this

1_~ of October 2007.

HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT & BLANTON PA

~~~K

Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J.
Byrne, P.A.

GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP

s for Defendants
Dille, M.D. and Southern
Cli
Idaho Pain Institute
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ~ y of October 2007, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:

David E. Comstock
COMSTOCK & BUSH
199 N. Capitol Blvd. #500
P.O. Box 2774
Boise, ID 83701-2774
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Richard E. Hall
Keely E. Duke
Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton PA
702 W. Idaho Street
P.O. Box 1271
Boise, ID 83701-1271
Attorneys for Defendant, T. J. Byrne P.A.

_ _ U.S.Mail
Overnight Mail
~ Hand Delivery
_
__
~ Fax 344-7721

_ _ U.S. Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
_ _ Fax 395-8585
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Attorneys for Defendants, Clinton Dille, M.D.
and Southern Idaho Pain Institute

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS
VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, Individually, and :
as Surviving Spouse and Personal ':
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE :
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT :
P. LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA:
HALL, natural children of ROSALIE :
SCHMECHEL, deceased,
:'
''
'
Plaintiffs,
'''
''
Vs.

Case No. CV 05 4345

DEFENDANTS' JOINT OBJECTIONS
TO COURT'S PROPOSED FINAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

'

CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN :
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho:
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A., and :'
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, I through X,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

COME NOW Defendants Clinton Dille, M.D., the Southern Idaho Pain Institute
and Thomas J. Byrne, P.A. ("Defendants") and lodge the following objections to the
Court's Draft Final Jury Instructions as follows:
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GENERAL OBJECTION

Defendants object to the use of any jury instructions or special verdict form they
did not propose. Defendants further object to the failure to instruct the jury using the
jury instructions and special verdict form they have proposed. Defendants reserve their
right to further object to the Court's proposed final jury instructions and special verdict
form and to object to any further supplemental jury instructions Plaintiffs or the Court
may propose.
OBJECTIONS TO SPECIFIC JURY INSTRUCTIONS
PROXIMATE CAUSE INSTRUCTIONS (pp. 5-6):

Defendants object to the

Court's two proximate cause instructions (pp. 5-6 of Draft Final Instructions) because
they are redundant and prejudicial.

The Court omitted the language, "It is not a

proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway" from
IDJl2d 2.30.2. Defendants recognize such instruction is consistent with those used in
the recent cases of Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 127 P.3d 187 (2005) and
Garcia v. Windley, 144 Idaho 539, 164 P.3d 819 (2007), however, the omitted language

should be used under the current circumstances where there is substantial evidence
that many other factors could have contributed to or caused Mrs. Schmechel's death.
For example, Dr. Smith testified that Mrs. Schmechel's death was likely caused by a
sudden cardiac event. There is further no dispute that Mrs. Schmechel had numerous
comorbid factors, which could have contributed to her death. For these reasons, the
omitted sentence from IDJl2d 2.30.2 should be included so the Defendants are not
improperly held responsible for factors over which they had no control.
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The second proximate cause instruction (p. 6) is redundant and prejudicially
emphasizes the substantial factor test. Including duplicative instructions on this topic
prejudices Defendants because it encourages the jury find the Defendants liable, even
through there is ample evidence that many other factors likely contributed to Mrs.
Schmechel's death and that Defendants' conduct was not a substantial factor in the
death.
STANDARD OF CARE INSTRUCTION (p. 10): Defendants submit that Dr. Dille

and Mr. Byrne should be referenced in the Court's standard of care instruction at page
10 of the proposed instructions. Both Dr. Dille and Mr. Byrne's qualifications establish
them as experts and the jury should be instructed to consider their testimony as expert
testimony beyond simple factual testimony recounting the events at issue in this matter.
NEGLIGENCE INSTRUCTION (p. 13): Defendants object to the inclusion of a

standard negligence instruction without any reference to Mrs. Schmechel. As currently
drafted, this instruction may confuse the jury regarding the Plaintiffs' burden of
establishing medical negligence against the Defendants. Idaho Code sections 6-1012
and 6-1013 have very specific requirements for establishing medical negligence, and
this standard is included in other instructions. Providing a garden variety negligence
instruction without clarification that this instruction only applies to Mrs. Schmechel may
confuse the jury.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY INSTRUCTIONS (pp.14-15):

Defendants object to

instructions referring to Dr. Dille and Mr. Byrne as employees of the Southern Idaho
Pain Institute. While these facts are not disputed, it is confusing and unnecessary to
include an instruction on this topic because any negligence found on behalf of Dr. Dille
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or Mr. Byrne will be imputed to the Southern Idaho Pain Institute. Defendants submit
that Southern Idaho Pain Institute should not be included upon the Special Verdict Form
and that no instruction regarding Dr. Dille and Mr. Byrne's employment status should be
submitted to the jury.
RECKLESS CONDUCT INSTRUCTION (p. 16): Defendants object to instructing

the jury on recklessness because such instruction is not supported by the evidence and
the proposed instruction does not accurately reflect Idaho law. Defendants' position is
discussed in more detail in their Objections to Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions,
which is herein incorporated by reference, and will not be repeated here. Specifically,
there is no evidence supporting a finding that Dr. Dille was negligent and instructing the
jury on reckless conduct may improperly taint its finding on liability and damages while a
finding of recklessness only becomes relevant if liability is found and damages are
awarded in excess of the statutory non-economic damages cap.
Moreover, a more appropriate way

to handle this issue is to allow the jury to

weigh the evidence and return a verdict on liability and damages, and then, if it finds
damages in excess of the statutory non-economic damages cap, to send the jury back
with an instruction to determine if it finds the conduct to be negligent. This procedure
has been utilized recently by at least one other 5th district trial court, Judge Elgee in the
recent trial of Neiwert v. Rae, CV 043002. There, the Court refused to instruct the jury
on recklessness until it first determined liability and damages. The jury did not find any
liability, however, and therefore, the jury was never instructed on recklessness.
DAMAGES INSTRUCTION (p. 18 and p. 21): Defendants object to the Court's

proposed damage instruction to the extent it refers to "the decedent's age and normal
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life expectancy." Here, there is no evidence that Mrs. Schmechel was an "average"
female for her age.

In fact, all evidence, including the Plaintiffs' and their experts'

testimony, points to the fact Mrs. Schmechel had many health conditions that would
likely reduce her life expectancy. Moreover, Plaintiffs' economist testified he did not
take any of Mrs. Schmechel's health factors into consideration when making his
damage calculations. Given Mrs. Schmechel's many health issues and the unrebutted
testimony of Dr. Smith concerning Mrs. Schmechel's expected life expectancy, the
"standard" life expectancy should not be used.

Defendants further submit the word

"normal" should be omitted from numbered paragraph (2) in the Court's instruction on p.

18.
DATED this ~ f October 2007.

HALL FARLEY OBERRECHT & BLANTON PA

TOCK
Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J.
Byrne, P.A.
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP

A orney for Defendants
Cli
ille, M.D. and Southern
Idaho Pain Institute
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Attorneys for Defeudant Thomas J. Byrne

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually,
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P.
LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA
HALL natural children of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased,

Case No. CV-05-4345

DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO
PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED
REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF
DR.LIPMAN

Plaintiffs,
vs.
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A. and
JOHN DOE, I through X,
Defendants.

COME NOW defendants, Thomas J. Byrne (hereinafter "Mr. Byrne") and Clinton Dille,
M.D. ("Dr. Dille") by and through their counsel of record and submit this Objection to Plaintiffs'
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Proposed Rebuttal Testimony of Dr. Lipman.

I. INTRODUCTION
On Monday October 29, 2007, plaintiffs' counsel indicated they intended to call Dr. Lipman
as a rebuttal witness. The email from Mr. Foster stated "the rebuttal will be limited to the testimony
of Mr. Kottenstette and Dr. Hare regarding the graph that Mr. Hippler drew and the testimony that at
a 30 mg dose, the therapeutic line will never be crossed." Defendants indicated that they would
object to Dr. Lipman testifying to this matter on rebuttal, as it was addressed in direct and was not
proper rebuttal testimony. Mr. Foster then wrote another email indicating that "[w]e also intend to
have Dr. Lipman rebut Mr. Kottenstette's assertion that Mr. Byrne could have started Mrs.
Schmechel's dosage at 90-120 mgs. per day ... There are also other matters which constitute rebuttal
which we may go into with Dr. Lipman." Defendants object to plaintiffs calling Dr. Lipman to
testify on rebuttal, as he has already offered his opinions regarding these matters and on rebuttal
would merely rehash these same opinions. Such testimony would be cumulative and should be
excluded pursuant to the Court's discretion in governing rebuttal testimony, I.R.E. 403 and I.R.C.P.
43(b)(5). As the Court made clear during its discussion on plaintiffs' motion to exclude Dr. Binegar,
the parties have already offered numerous witnesses discussing the "science" related to Methadone
and Hydrocodone. Plaintiffs should not be permitted to get a last bite at the apple by calling Dr.
Lipman to go through these issues one last time for the jury, when such matters were directly covered
in plaintiffs' case-in-chief.

II. ARGUMENT
Rebuttal evidence is evidence which "explains, repels, counteracts or disproves evidence
which has been introduced by or on behalf of the adverse party." State v. Olsen, 103 ldaho 278,647
P.2d 734, 737 (1982). "Within limits, the [trial] judge may control the scope of rebuttal testimony;
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED REBUTTAL TESTIMONY
OF DR. LIPMAN- 2

387

may refuse to allow cumulative, repetitive, or irrelevant testimony; and may control the scope of
examination of witnesses." State v. Knight, 128 Idaho 862,865,920 P.2d 78, 81 (Ct. App. 1996).
"The pem1issible scope of rebuttal rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Absent abuse of
such discretion, the trial court's ruling will be sustained on appeal." McAtee v. Faulkner Land &

Livestock, Inc., 113 Idaho 393,397, 744 P.2d 121, 125 (Ct. App. 1987).
Idaho appellate courts have routinely excluded cumulative rebuttal testimony. In McAtee, the
district court excluded rebuttal testimony regarding certain matters that had been addressed in the
case-in-chief. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision to exclude the rebuttal
testimony citing to Idaho Rule of Evidence 403, stating "proffered evidence merely elaborated what
they had already attempted to establish during their case-in-chief. Although the evidence was offered
for the purpose of rebuttal, it was cumulative in content." Id. In Findley v. Woodall, 86 Idaho 439,
387 P.2d 594 (1963), the Idaho Supreme Court similarly affim1ed the trial court's refusal to allow
rebuttal testimony that was cumulative. Id. at 443, 387 P.2d at 596.
Further, in addition to the Court's discretion regarding admissibility of rebuttal testimony and
Idaho Rule of Evidence 403, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 43(b)(5) provides in part that "after the
examinations on both sides are once concluded, the witness cannot be recalled by the same party
without leave of the court."
In the instant action, Dr. Lipman was on the stand over the course of two days and offered
numerous opinions regarding various matters in the case, including, matters that plaintiffs have
indicated they are calling him for rebuttal. The Court should not allow plaintiffs to call Dr. Lipman
on rebuttal to merely rehash opinions he has previously provided, as such testimony was addressed in

direct and is therefore cumulative and improper rebuttal testimony:

•

Dr. Lipman has already testified regarding the "science" involved regarding the chart
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of 30 mg of Methadone a day and lesser amounts.

Plaintiffs have indicated that they intend to call Dr. Lipman on rebuttal to discuss the chart
drawn by Mr. Hippler as well as Mr. Kottenstette and Dr. Hare's testimony regarding such chart.
However, the concept of the chart was clearly addressed by Mr. Hippler on cross-examination of Dr.
Lipman and plaintiffs' re-direct examination of Dr. Lipman:
Q:
Okay. And I just want to understand something from a mathematical
standpoint okay? And that is, if we take, mathematically, in terms of risk of
respiratory depression, if we take a patient and start them at 30 milligrams a day total
Methadone dose, and we keep them on that does for six days, the risk of respiratory
depression on your curve that you showed us, would be greater than if we took a
patient and started them at 5 milligrams--or pardon me- 10 milligrams a day for a
day, 20 milligrams a day for a day, and 30 milligrams a day for four days.
Mathematically that would be, make less risk of respiratory depression?

A:
That's not a correct statement, the reason being that it is not the issue of the
total number of milligrams, and that's what you keep focusing on. The issue
clinically is that, whatever dose we start at, it will have an effect that will keep
increasing until the drug is at a steady state level. Ifwe pick the correct dose initially,
then at steady state we'll be getting the desired effect without the bad effects. Ifwe
pick too low a dose initially, at steady state we will get not enough of the desired
effect without the bad effect. Ifwe pick too much of the, or too high a dose initially,
we're going to get side effects even before we reach stated state. The concern is that
once we start a dose, we must watch ... The concern is that once we pick a dose, we
must monitor the patient until the patient is at steady state and not increase the dose
until we've reached steady state, because if our dose is too high, then we're
increasing the risk of a bad outcome; and I firmly believe that's what happened in
this case.
Mathematically speaking, ifwe were to draw the line starting at 30 milligrams
a day and drawing the curves, and if we were to draw a line starting at less than 30
milligrams for the first couple of days and then at 30 milligrams, that line would be
below the one at 30, would it not?
Q:

A:

Yes. But you don't know -

Q:

Thank you.

A:
-- where that intersects with the therapeutic window, which is why you don't
change the dose.

DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAfNTfFFS' PROPOSED REBUTTAL TESTfMONY
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Q:
And I'm just talking about the line itself and the math on the chart that you
showed us.

A:
The answer is correct but irrelevant to the clinical medicine. (October 19,
2007, trial testimony of Dr. Lipman, pp. 109-111, 11. 9-11).
In addition to discussing these matters on cross-examination, Dr. Lipman testified regarding
these theories on re-direct:
Q:
With regard to the math that Mr. Hippler was talking about, explain why a
strict mathematical calculation is inapplicable in a situation with regard to the dosing
and titration of Methadone?

A:
The issue is not the dose, as I've said. The dose will give us a certain level.
In some people that will be a good level. In some people it will be too low. In some
people it will be too high. Whether the initial starting dose is ten milligrams three
times a day or 15 milligrams twice a day, we get the same total serum level. We're
going to get better analgesia with three types a day, be we won't get any less risk.
The problem is that we must not adjust the dose until we know that we're within the
safe effective range.
And it's the same point that keeps coming up again and again that I'm sure
the jury now understands, and that is, that we have to use the medication in a time
sequence consistent with the way that the human body eliminates it. Otherwise we
have a risk of disaster. (Id. pp. 116-117, 11. 7-1).
The mathematical issues relating to the levels of Methadone discussed by counsel for Dr.
Dille and Dr. Lipman at trial in plaintiffs' case-in-chief are the exact same issues as addressed by
defendants' experts Dr. Hare and Mr. Kottenstette in relation to the graph drawn by Mr. Hippler. As
such, Dr. Lipman has already testified regarding this matter, and any additional testimony would
merely be cumulative and should be precluded an improper rebuttal testimony. Further, as the Court
is aware, Dr. Lipman has discussed the issue of "therapeutic window" at length. Again, the Court
has indicated that the parties have already offered expansive testimony regarding the "science" of
Methadone and plaintiffs should not be given one last chance to elicit such testimony in the guise of
rebuttal testimony.
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Mr. Kottenstette testified that there are a nnmber of charts that practitioners use for
purposes of determining a conversion dose in switching a patient from OxyContin to
Methadone.
Plaintiffs indicate that they further intend to question Dr. Lipman on rebuttal regarding

alleged testimony of Mr. Kottenstette that 90-120 mgs of Methadone would have been an appropriate
starting dose and within the standard of care.

However, plaintiffs have misconstrued Mr.

Kottenstette's testimony. Mr. Kottenstette testified that there are a number of charts a practitioner
can use out there and he was merely using Dr. Lipman's PowerPoint slide as an example of how you
take a chart and determine the conversion dose. Mr. Kottenstette did not testify that starting Mrs.
Schmechel on a 90-120 mgs of Methadone would have been within the ,,tandard of care. Plaintiffs
had Dr. Lipman testify regarding these slides and therefore any additional testimony regarding this
matter would be cumulative and should be excluded,

•

Any other rebuttal testimony offered by Dr. Lipman should also be examined for
determination of whether it is truly rebuttal testimony or merely a rehashing of
previous testimony offered by plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs have indicated they may offer rebuttal testimony of Dr. Lipman on other issues that

have not yet been disclosed. Defendants request that such topic areas be addressed prior to offering
Dr. Lipman as a witness in order to determine whether such areas of testimony are true rebuttal or
mere! y a rehashing of previous testimony.

•

Mr. Kottenstette's opinions regarding the pharmacokinetics of Methadone were
properly disclosed, and regardless, plaintiffs failed to object to such testimony at trial.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that Mr. Byrne failed to properly disclose Mr. Kottenstette's expert

opinions with regard to the pharmacokinetics of Methadone, and that in fairness, they should be
allowed to call Dr. Lipman in rebuttal to address these undisclosed opinions.
Mr. Kottenstette's opinions regarding the pharmacological properties of Methadone were
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properly disclosed. Mr. Kottenstette's disclosure, at page 4, indicates that Mr. Kottenstette would
testify as follows with respect to the pharmacologic properties of Methadone:
[T]hat Mr. Byrne has an appropriate understanding for a physician assistant of the use
and prescription of Methadone. As such, it is anticipated Mr. Kottenstette will testify
that he disagrees with Dr. Lipman's assertion that Mr. Byrne appeared to lack the
appropriate level of understanding of the pharmacologic properties of Methadone;
rather, it is anticipated Mr. Kottenstette will testify Mr. Byrne had an appropriate
understanding of the pharmacology of Methadone and prescribed it appropriately.
In addition, page 10 of the disclosure indicates that "Mr. Kottenstette is expected to respond
to and/or rebut opinions provided by medical expert witnesses called by plaintiffs, including, but not
limited to, ... Arthur Lipman .... " and that "Mr. Kottenstette will address, explain and render
expert opinions with regard to relevant medical subjects within his expertise, including, but not
limited to, Class II narcotics (including OxyContin and Methadone), Hydrocodone .... " As such,
Mr. Kottenstette's opinions regarding the pharmacologic properties of Methadone were properly
disclosed.
Second, plaintiffs failed to object to such testimony during Mr. Kottenstette's testimony, and
cannot now allege some unfairness in an attempt to allow in improper cumulative rebuttal testimony.

III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs should be precluded from calling Dr. Lipman as a rebuttal witness to testify
regarding matters that plaintiffs have already offered testimony and evidence on, as such testimony
would be cumulative and improper rebuttal testimony.
DATED this X)~day of October, 2007.
HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT
& BLANT, N, P.A.
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Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J. Byrne
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the '56~day of October, 2007, I caused to be served a true copy
of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED REBUTTAL
TESTIMONY OF DR. LIPMAN by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the
following:
David Comstock
Law Offices of Comstock & Bush
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 500
P.O. Box 2774
Boise, Idaho 83 701
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Fax No.: (208) 344-7721

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
~and Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
Telecopy

Steven J. Hippler
GIVENS PURSLEY
601 W. Bannock ST.
POBox2720
Boise ID 83701-2720
Attorneys for Clinton Dille, M.D. and
Southern Idaho Pain Institute
Fax No.: (208) 388-1300

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
~ a n d Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
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HALL, FARLEY, OBERRECHT & BLANTON, P.A.
702 West Idaho, Suite 700
Post Office Box 1271
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: (208) 395-8500
Facsimile: (208) 395-8585
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Attorneys for Defendant Thomas J. Byrne

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS

VAUGHN SCHMECHEL, individually,
and as Surviving Spouse and Personal
Representative of the Estate of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased, and ROBERT P.
LEWIS, KIM HOWARD and TAMARA
HALL natural children of ROSALIE
SCHMECHEL, deceased,

Case No. CV-05-4345
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Plaintiffs,
vs.
CLINTON DILLE, M.D., SOUTHERN
IDAHO PAIN INSTITUTE, an Idaho
corporation, THOMAS BYRNE, P.A. and
JOHN DOE, I through X,
Defendants.

Keely E. Duke, deposes and states as follows:
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1.

I am an attorney with the firm Hall, Farley, Oberrecht & Blanton, P.A., the attorneys

for defendant Thomas J. Bryne and, in that capacity, I make the following declaration t based upon
my own personal knowledge and belief.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit" A" is a true and correct copy of an email received from

Byron Foster dated October 29, 2007 at 10:38 a.m.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of an email received from

Byron Foster dated October 29, 2007 at 12:29 p.m.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Idaho, that the foregoing is true
and correct..

Keely E. Duke
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3;>:s?J-day of October, 2007, I caused to be served a true copy
of the foregoing DECLARATION OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF DR. UPMAN, by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
David Comstock
Law Offices of Comstock & Bush
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste. 500
P.O. Box 2774
Boise, Idaho 83701
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Fax No.: (208) 344-7721

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
VHand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy

Steven J. Hippler
GIVENS PURSLEY
601 W. Bannock ST.
PO Box 2720
Boise ID 83701-2720
Attorneys for Clinton Dille, M.D. and
Southern Idaho Pain Institute
Fax No.: (208) 388-1300

_ _ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
v-Hand Delivered
_ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ Telecopy
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Kathy A. Savell
From:

Keely E. Duke

Sent:

Monday, October 29, 2007 10:44 AM

To:

Kathy A. Savell

Subject: FW: SCHMECHEL
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From: Byron Foster [mailto:byron@bvfoster.com]
Sent: Monday, October 29, 2007 10:38 AM
To: Keely E. Duke; sjh@givenspursley.com; ahyer@co.twin.falls.id.us
Subject: SCHMECHEL
Counsel:

I want to inform you that we intend to call Dr. Lipman in rebuttal. The rebuttal will be limited to the
testimony of Mr. Kottenstette and Dr. Hare regarding the graph that Mr. Hippler drew and the testimony
that at a 30 mg dose, the therapeutic line will never be crossed.
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Kathy A. Savell
From:

Keely E. Duke

Sent:

Monday, October 29, 2007 1 :48 PM

To:

Byron Foster; Steven J. Hippler; ahyer@co.twin.falls.id.us

Cc:

Chris D. Comstock; Will Varin; Kathy A. Savell; Cathy A. Pontak

Subject: RE: SCHMECHEL
Byron:
Thank you for your e-mail.
First, with respect to your new assertion that we somehow did not disclose Mr. Kottenstette's opinions regarding
the pharmacologic properties of Methadone (no such objection was made during the course of Mr. Kottenstette's
testimony by you or Mr. Comstock), please look at Mr. Kottenstette's disclosure, page 4, the first full paragraph,
that discloses that Mr. Kottenstette would testify as follows with respect to the pharmacologic properties of
Methadone:
"that Mr. Byrne has an appropriate understanding for a physician assistant of the use and prescription of
Methadone. As such, it is anticipated Mr. Kottenstette will testify that he disagrees with Dr. Lipman's
assertion that Mr. Byrne appeared to lack the appropriate level of understanding of the pharmacologic
properties of Methadone; rather, it is anticipated Mr. Kottenstette will testify Mr. Byrne had an appropriate
understanding of the pharmacology of Methadone and prescribed it appropriately."
In addition, we also disclosed on page 1O of our disclosure that "Mr. Kottenstette is expected to respond to and/or
rebut opinions provided by medical expert witnesses called by plaintiffs, including, but not limited to, ... Arthur
Lipman .... " and that "Mr. Kottenstette will address, explain and render expert opinions with regard to relevant
medical subjects within his expertise, including, but not limited to, Class II narcotics (including OxyContin and
Methadone), Hydrocodone ...."
Dr. Lipman has already testified regarding the concepts depicted in the illustrative charts used by Dr. Hare and
Mr. Kottenstette and, therefore, we will request that you not be permitted to rehash this same ground under the
improper guise of rebuttal testimony.
Next, you are misstating Mr. Kottenstette's testimony regarding Dr. Lipman's PowerPoint slide. Mr. Kottenstette
testified that there are a number of charts a practitioner can use out there and he was merely using Dr. Lipman's
PowerPoint slide as an example of how you take a chart and determine the conversion dose.
Lastly, with respect to your statement that Dr. Lipman ffifil' go into other areas, we strongly disagree that you
would not need to disclose those opinions to us or the Court prior to a hearing on this matter tomorrow.
We look forward to addressing these issues with the Court tomorrow.
Best regards,
Keely

From: Byron Foster [mailto:byron@bvfoster.com]
Sent: Monday, October 29, 2007 12:29 PM
To: Steven J. Hippler; Keely E. Duke; ahyer@co.twin.falls.id.us
Subject: RE: SCHMECHEL
We also intend to have Dr. Lipman rebut Mr. Kottenstette's assertion that Mr. Byrne could have started
Mrs. Schmechel's dosage at 90-120 mgs. per day. By the way, Defendants never disclosed that Mr.
Kottenstette would testify to either one of these issues and in fact did not disclose that he would testify
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as an expert on the pharmacodynamics or pharmacokinetics of Methadone so we think it only fair to be
allowed to rebut these non-disclosed opinions. There are also other matters which constitute rebuttal
which we may go into with Or Lipman. Since we do not believe we had to disclose the nature of Dr.
Lipman's rebuttal testimony until argument on the issue is held, we have made these disclosures as a
courtesy to you and out of a sense of fair play.

From: Steven J. Hippler [mailto:sjh@givenspursley.com]
Sent: Monday, October 29, 2007 11:03 AM
To: Byron Foster; ked@hallfarley.com; ahyer@co.twin.falls.id.us
Subject: RE: SCHMECHEL
Byron, we will object to this proposed rebuttal testimony. It is testimony Dr. Lipman provided in direct and
discussed ad nausiaum. The judge has also indicated that there has been more than enough testimony regarding
pharmacokinetics, graphs and serum levels. It is not only improper cummulative testimony, it is not proper
rebuttal. It is part of what you had to prove in your case in chief, and part of what you had Dr. Lipman testify about
for the better part of 2 days. I just wanted to let you know our position before you expend the money to have him
come here only to have our objection sustained.

Steven J. Hippler

Givens Pursley, LLP
601 W. Bannock
Boise, ID 83702
(208) 388-1200
sjh@givenspursley.com

From: Byron Foster [mailto:byron@bvfoster.com]
Sent: Monday, October 29, 2007 10:38 AM
To: ked@hallfarley.com; Steven J. Hippler; ahyer@co.twin.falls.id.us
Subject: SCHMECHEL
Counsel:

I want to inform you that we intend to call Dr. Lipman in rebuttal. The rebuttal will be limited to the
testimony of Mr. Kottenstette and Dr. Hare regarding the graph that Mr. Hippler drew and the testimony
that at a 30 mg dose, the therapeutic line will never be crossed.
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